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Abstract 
This thesis examines how new types of water governance institutions, water 
partnerships, emerged and performed in Korea, a centralised state-driven 
society. Beyond conventional water management by either government or 
market, new forms of governance have been sought to address problems 
such as under-provision, pollution and water conflict. This study 
investigates voluntary water partnerships as a leading example of new 
water governance in East Asia. Conceptually, it uses a modified 
institutional approach, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework, to examine how global water reform discourses informed social 
actors in the design and implementation of regional and urban water 
partnerships in Korea. A comparative case analysis of six water 
partnerships finds that co-governance institutions emerged and operated in 
a complex linkage with existing water governance systems. For the three 
urban water partnerships, local actors actively seized opportunities to 
rehabilitate long abandoned urban streams. For the three regional water 
partnerships, public and private sector actors successfully negotiated 
partnership agreements, focusing on the restoration of polluted water 
sources. A modified IAD framework captured these complicated 
interactions among stakeholders within multi-layered water governance 
structures. An attitudinal survey of partnership members complemented 
the comparative case studies by assessing how the partnerships performed 
according to selected evaluation criteria. A multi-criteria assessment of the 
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data reveals three key findings. First, the partnerships achieved mainly 
positive procedural and socio-economic outcomes in water management. 
Second, observed lower environmental outcomes result mainly from the 
interlinked features of water resources management and the partnerships’ 
relatively brief history. Third, the overall findings indicate that the 
outcomes of co-governance institutions tended to be contextual. The scale of 
organisations and of the water resources concerned did not determine the 
outcomes of the water partnerships. Thus, this finding challenges the claim 
that ‘smaller is better’ in collaborative governance. This study concludes 
that the voluntary co-management of shared water resources by the six 
partnerships have simultaneously brought some solutions as well as costs 
to water governance in Korea. The design and development of co-
management institutions for water governance requires a greater 
understanding of local and national settings, as well as the facilitative role 
of national government. Co-operation between new co-governance 
institutions and existing water institutions is vital to long-term, effective 
water management. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Water governance reform has increasingly become a significant need due to 
the substantial challenge of water management. Reform of conventional 
water management bodies such as national and local governments has been 
called for by numerous organisations (UNDP 2006). Poor governance has 
been recognised as a key cause for the current water crisis (World Water 
Assessment Programme 2009). In particular, ‘mismanagement, corruption, 
lack of appropriate institutions, bureaucratic inertia and a shortage of new 
investments in building human capacity as well as physical 
infrastructure’(UNESCO and the UN World Water Assessment Programme 
2006: 45)1have been believed to cause problems in water provision in many 
countries.  In many developing countries, despite on-going efforts to solve 
water problems, there have been continuous concerns with the capacity of 
the current water management system to address the pressing issues 
(Plummer and Slaymaker 2007).  
 
To address challenges in managing water resources, which are multi-use 
and interdependent, various ideas have been experimented in different 
contexts under the name of water governance reform (Dinar 2000). The 
                                               
1 According to the third World Water Development Report (2009: 82), ‘almost two in three people 
lack access to safe drinking water survive on less than $2 a day and one in three on less than $1 a 
day’. 
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earlier initiatives were designed to treat water more as an economic good 
than a social or public good (Winpenny 1994; Clarke 2003). Despite being a 
counteract measure against government failure, attempts to ‘marketise’ 
water resources have generally been shown to be less successful than liberal 
economists’ originally thought (Weizsäcker, Young et al. 2005). Yet at the 
same time, reform initiatives advocated a transformation of management 
structure of nation states from centralised to decentralised (Mody and 
World Bank 2004). Despite the popularity of this initiative (Agrawal 2001: 
208), the effectiveness of local water management has been criticised as 
being limited,owing to its lack of coordination with the national water 
governance (Prud'homme 1995; Moore and Rockloff 2006). Aninitiative 
of‘collaborative governance’(Heikkila and Gerlak 2005) was designed to 
address the relationships among various stakeholders, which were 
dismissed in the previous alternatives. This notion entails a spectrum of 
ideas from stakeholder participation in the existing water management 
system to co-governance by partnerships between stakeholders and 
government (Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005).  
 
This thesis focuses on one of the water governance reform initiatives, 
known as ‘co-governance’. Co-governance has attracted academic attention 
within public policy and institutional schools of thought as a means of 
tackling the ‘governance crisis’ of water management(Rogers and Hall 2003; 
Castro 2007). This new form of environmental governance is operated via 
16 
 
horizontal collaboration between stakeholders, involving both government 
and non-governmental groups through power-sharing and participation 
(Béné and Neiland 2006: 39). 2  The diversity of stakeholder 
participation (Leach, Pelkey et al. 2002) and co-management based 
on voluntary agreement, are the key features of co-governance (Béné and 
Neiland 2006: 39). Partnership management (Reed 1995) under the notion of 
co-governance has become an integral part of the so-called ‘the [new] 
governance’ in natural resource management in Western countries (Rydin 
2003). This new notion distinguishes itself from policy fallacy led by either 
governments or markets(WB, Kim, Choi et al. 2001). Terms such as the 
watershed partnerships in the US (Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005), joined-up 
government (Bogdanor and British Academy. 2005) and public-private 
partnerships (Flinders 2005) in the UK, have become popular governance 
practices in these countries. In less developed countries, the involvement of 
local actors has been identified as promoting effective and deliberate 
governance (Fox 1996; Evans 1996b; Pretty and Ward 2001), where 
government failure has been identified as one of the main causes of poor 
water management. Again, the idea of co-governance has mostly been 
applied by at least the policy maker or more remotely by international 
organisations.  
                                               
2  Institutions here are defined in the research as systems of rights, rules and decision-making 
procedures (See Young, O. R., L. A. King, et al., Eds. (2008). Institutions and environmental change : 
principal findings, applications, and research frontiers. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.). 
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However, relatively few studies have been carried out on the institutional 
development of co-governance in East Asia (See DH, Ryu 2004; Waley 2005; 
Lee, Kim et al. 2006) where centralised states with relatively weak but 
developing civil societies have been put in place. In South Korea, the central 
government has been controlling local governments through tax sharing 
and delegating public affairs, given the distribution ration between national 
and local taxes has been fixed from 8 to 2 (BJ, Kim 2007). Only 27% out of 41, 
603 public affairs conducted by governmental bodies were under control of 
the local governments in 2002 (IS, Kim 2002). As Chalmers Johnson notes, 
this tendency of strong centralisation, the ‘developmental state’, the central 
government in the recentlyindustrialised countries drove economic 
development by itself, rather than let the market take the lead (Johnson 
1982). With Korean cases, this political economic context has much been 
debated in terms of economic growth and failure (Woo-Cumings 1999; 
Castells 2000). At the same time, a few studies on water management in the 
context of the developmental state were devoted to civil society, rather than 
co-governance (Yoon 2001; Ku 2004).  
 
In this regard, this study pays attention to co-governance institutions that 
have emerged in NICs, such as Korea,from the late 1990s. There has rarely 
been the direct imposition of governance reform as designed by the 
international organisations, which has been common in the South (Evans 
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2004). Nor is there an endogenous top-down reform design that stipulates 
the application of co-governance, such as the EU Water Framework 
Directive. The dominance of the nation state found in Korea is in contrast to 
the cases found in the US and the Netherlands, where the historical legacy 
of self-governance at a community level remains strong (Sabatier, Focht et 
al. 2005; Möllenkamp, Lamers et al. 2008). By addressing the empirical gaps 
in the institutional development of water partnerships, an analysis of co-
governance institutions in NICs can help explain the growing diversity in 
new institutional development. Because this study addresses the voluntary 
emergence of partnerships, its results expands the understandings of co-
governance from ‘institutional design’. The details will be analysed in 
Chapter 5.  
 
The objective of this thesis is therefore to analyse how co-governance 
institutions – one of the central themes of contemporary water management 
— have been developed in a highly centralised state such as Korea (See 
section 1.2). In this context, Korea offers new insights to understand the 
adoption of co-governance in water management system in a highly 
centralised state structure. The analysis of water co-governance in such a 
state system has so far been absent. This research aims to raise the 
understanding of two questions: a) How have co-governance institutions 
for water management emerged in Korea?; b) How and why have water 
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partnerships in Korea produced certain outcomes?3 The analysis in this 
study has gone beyond the conventional approach of public policy reform, 
e.g. best practice management. Such an approach tends to regard co-
governance institutions as an instrument to fix existing problems by 
isolating them from existing water governance (See Lubell, Sabatier et al. 
2005). In doing so, it pays less attention to a continuous process from the 
perspective of institutional development within multi-layered water 
governance. Instead, this thesis attempts to understand the dynamic and 
complicated process of co-governance development by analysing how a co-
governance structure, that of ‘water partnerships', has been shaped in 
connection with existing water governance and produced certain outcomes. 
 
The rest of this chapter begins by introducing how co-governance 
institutions have been discussed in previous water studies. This is followed 
by a brief introduction to the Korean context. Afterwards, theoretical 
arguments on the development of co-governance institutions for water 
management will be briefly discussed. A modified analytical framework for 
this study is proposed after a review of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework. After an explanation of the research design 
applied to this study, the chapter concludes with a summary of the 
structure of the thesis, which follows at the end of the chapter.  
 
                                               
3 Korea in this thesis is the Republic of Korea - known as South Korea.  
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1.1 Rationales for studying water partnerships 
Before the examination of co-governance for water management, this 
section presents the rationales for the study. The section starts with the 
common features of water management, which are deeply related to the 
current debate of water management. The following lists include 
contemporary debates about the search for effective governance, 
governance change and related analytical works and scale issues.  
 
1.1.1 Complexities in water management 
The challenge to water management derives from the complexities inherent 
in water management. Three features have made water management more 
complicated.  
 
At the outset, there has been thecontinuing problem of water resource 
management, due to physical complexities such as uneven seasonal 
availability, regional disparity, contamination of the resource by pollutants 
and the more recent threat of climate change (Rees 1992; Bressers and Kuks 
2004; Falkenmark, Gottschalk et al. 2004). For example, the multi-layered 
nature of water governance is often known as being ‘polycentric’ 
(Blomquist and Schlager 2005) or ‘nested’ (Ostrom 2005b) by describing the 
organisations created as being based on the cascade-like structure of river 
basins in nature.In addition to physical complexities, water resources are 
used in various ways such as socio-economic activities for human societies 
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and habitat conservation for ecosystem. Hence, the functions of water 
management are inherently varied, which have been expanding beyond 
human-centred use. 
 
As a newly rising concern, river restoration has been introduced by new 
institutions such as the water partnerships in the US (Sabatier, Focht et al. 
2005) and Japan (Waley 2005) to tackle problematic urban rivers. This recent 
concern has been applied as a more naturalised re-structure of artificially 
modified rivers (Ryu 2004; Volker 2004), and furthermore, rehabilitation for 
ecosystem conservation (Baldwin, De Luce et al. 1994; de Waal, Large et al. 
1998; Clarke 2003). The scholars have debated how to restore the human-
altered river environment because the application of the notion, river 
restoration varies in reality. Strictly speaking, restoring water system is 
referred to as “the return of an ecosystem to a close approximation of its 
condition prior to disturbance”(Committee on Restoration of Aquatic 
Ecosystems: Science and National Research 1992: 17).In contrast, as this 
report criticises, there have been practices that “[m]erely recreating a form 
without functions, or further functions in an artificial configuration being 
little resemblance to a natural resource”(op cit. 18). The gap between theory 
and engineering-focused practices have become apparent, which requires 
further study with more attention being made to institutional surroundings 
around restoring the water system (Hilden 2000).  
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Finally, water organisations vary according to either the object of 
management (water quantity or water quality) or the nature of 
management (development or regulation) (Caponera 1992). It is not 
surprising that a plethora of management and consumer bodies are 
involved in water governance at various spatial scales ranging from 
community to river basin, and at national and global levels. For example, 
the European Union’s Water Framework Directive announced in 2000, 
encompasses an array of various types of water organisations (Bressers and 
Kuks 2004; Volker 2004). Thus, how recently emerged co-governance 
institutions are connected to specific water management topics needs to be 
examined.  
 
1.1.2 Current debatesonwater management 
Debates over effective organisations have been shaped with the continuous 
search for institutional alternatives up to the development of water 
partnerships. In the beginning, debates have centred on fragmented 
management, high maintenance costs and inefficient regulatory schemes 
under the notion of government failure. National states, historically 
depending on professionals (Berry and Mollard 2010), were questioned as a 
main cause of governance crisis(Global Water Partnership 2001). To address 
government failure, the privatisation of water management was robustly 
adopted in the 1990s in the global south of Africa, Asia and South America 
(Budds and McGranahan 2003). However, marketisation reform is found to 
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be only partly successful mostly under democratic national governments 
with the capacity to monitor the increased roles of the private sector 
(Weizsäcker, Young et al. 2005: 111). By questioning the pre-determined 
roles of markets to reform government with 40 cases, Weizsäcker and his 
colleagues suggest an alternative idea; participatory governance with active 
engagement from the nongovernmental sector (NGOs) (Weizsäcker, Young 
et al. 2005: 331-2).   
 
The search for effective water management is echoed with another 
significant issue in contemporary water management, ‘a shift from 
government to governance’. The last two decades have witnessed 
substantial changes in the role of the State, and greater participation of 
informal institutions in policy-making alongside formal state organisations 
(Carney and Farrington 1998; Pierre 2000). When it comes to water 
governance, the boundary between state and society in water management 
has become more obscure. This evolving feature shows the possibility of the 
development of polycentric water governancealong with the emergence of 
partnership institutions. State, market or civil society and hybrid forms of 
governance institutions are all participating in water management in a 
number of countries from Nepal, Sweden to the US (Jönsson 2004; Sabatier, 
Focht et al. 2005; Berry and Mollard 2010). While a considerable amount of 
literature has been published on the shift from ‘government to governance’, 
few studies have paid attention to how water problems have been 
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intertwined with this transition. 
 
Even though current debates in water management have been deeply 
influenced by water governance reforms, the definition and its implications 
of water governance are not as clear as the problems of water management 
such as governance crisis. For example, the encompassing feature of water 
governance is found in the well-known definition proposed by the Global 
Water Partnership and accepted by the UNDP. Water governance is 
referred as ‘governance from a water perspective’ (Global Water 
Partnership 2003). Or this notion is defined as 'the range of political, social, 
economic and administrative systems that are in place to regulate the 
development and management of water resources and provision of water 
services at different levels of society (Global Water Partnership 2003)'. These 
definitions stress the socio-political and economic aspects in water 
management that had been overlooked in technology-driven approaches. 
However, these definitions are merely descriptive and can hardly be used 
for analytical purpose.  
 
In a more analytical sense, water governance reform has two targets, 
namely civil society and governments, when governance is referred to 'the 
sum of interactions between civil society and governments' (Manor 1998: 2; 
Béné and Neiland 2006: 5). By proposing two alignments within the broadly 
defined governance debates, Béné argues that two targets of water 
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governance reform are often reflected in an imbalanced way. Whereas the 
liberal dimension pays attention to 'misrule and abuse of resource users by 
the state, statists focus on 'the State's inability to manage the resources’(Béné 
and Neiland 2006: 9). Often, the initially proposed definitions of water 
governance remain too abstract and mislead the roles of governments or 
over emphasise with non-governmental actors. Thus, a balanced and more 
analytical approach is required to advance current debates about water 
governance.  
 
The scale of management has been a particularly controversial issue in 
water resource management (Bressers and Rosenbaum 2003), which this 
study notes as a significant factor in institutional development. Regarding 
river-related water governance, some argue that a river basin is the logical 
unit of water resource management(Tortajada 2001; Bressers and Kuks 
2004); however, others acknowledge that a river basin is treated as a mere 
operational level or sub-system, and being supplementary to the 
conventional scale of management based on administrative boundaries 
(Hofwegen and Jaspers 1999: 11). The overlapping and connection between 
the scale of water resources and the levels of administrative management 
have been deeply related to the development of water partnerships. There 
are two different types of co-governance institutional development 
recognised in the Western World. The first type has appeared in a top-down 
manner, for example, the EU Water Framework Directive. In this case, the 
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EU is a key promoter of participatory governance in Western Europe. The 
second type of co-governanceis the combination of bottom-up and top-
down types, found in the US. An array of local stakeholders voluntarily 
created partnerships for small watershed conservation with the support of 
state and federal agencies. A wealth of literature shows the increased 
emergence of smaller-scale watershed management institutions, in 
particular, in the U.S. (Woolley and McGinnis 1999; Center for the Economy 
and the Environment 2000; Kenney, McAllister et al. 2000; Wondolleck and 
Yaffee 2000; Leach and Pelkey 2001; Leach, Pelkey et al. 2002; Lubell 2004a; 
Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005). The case studies of co-governance institutions 
in this literature are mostly on a small scale in Western societies or in less 
developed countries, which raise the 'scale-up' problem of self-governance 
institutions in general,and in other contexts.  
 
The notion of a social basin, being referred to as ‘a sub-basin, a local or 
regional unit of government, or a hybrid unit’ (Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005: 
35), is useful to depict this complexity of management scales. By capturing  
the interconnected diversity of formal water organisations (Falkenmark, 
Gottschalk et al. 2004; Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005; Franks and Cleaver 
2007), this concept visualises“space”as an extra element inthe analytical 
framework. In other literature, a social basin means networked 
relationships among water users that stress interdependence and preferable 
solidarity among riparian communities, rather than institutional units 
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(World Water Council 2006). In ecology, basin is referred to as a simple 
boundary of an ecological system (Folke, Carpenter et al. 2010). Because the 
focus of this thesis is on institutional development, the former definition of 
social basins is useful to describe the complicated structure of water 
institutions (Kemper, Dinar et al. 2005). While social basins exemplify the 
functions and/or jurisdiction of water management in practice, the political 
factors that influenced the creation of co-governance institutions are to be 
analysed in institutional and discourse perspectives.  
 
1.1.3 Co-governance: Development of water partnerships at the 
multiple levels of management 
This study needs to fill those gaps drawn from the theoretical and empirical 
experiences of co-governance. Hence, how co-governance ideas have been 
applied at national and local levels are to be examined here. In doing so, the 
current issues of water partnerships as well as the experiences in a variety 
of contexts are reviewed, which include examples in the Global South 
andNICs.  
 
Co-governance born in global politics 
Global politics bore the idea of co-governance in water resources 
management through the campaigns for better water governance and 
application of public participation. Since the early 1990s, one of the 
solutions for the so-called water crisis was the improvement of water 
28 
 
governance, in particular, through enhancing stakeholder involvement. As 
found in the Dublin Principles (1992), developed by water experts at the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE), Dublin, 
Ireland, organised on 26-31 January 1992, the notion of water governance 
has been advocated along with the key management framework of 
integrated water resource management (IWRM). In particular, being ‘soft’ 
non-legally binding international water law, guiding principle 2 is the 
‘participatory principle’. This principle indicates that decisions should be 
made at the lowest appropriate level with consultation between relevant 
stakeholders.4 The stress on participation had become a famous slogan, 
adopted in the third World Water Forum (WWF hereafter), “the water crisis 
is mainly a crisis of governance”. Initially used by the Global Water 
Partnership’s (GWP) Framework for Action (2001: 23), this slogan was the 
key theme in the second WWF in 20035. Thus, international discussion 
targeted prevailing systems of water management to create a broader, more 
integrative ‘governance’ beyond the traditional boundaries of water 
                                               
4 The following call for improved water governance was recognised as one of the three priority areas 
for action in the Bonn Freshwater Conference in December 2001. The twelve agendas expressed in 
the governance section in the Bonn Recommendations for Action identify the rather broad political 
spectrum of water governance beyond the conventional scope of water management, in particular, 
guaranteed fair access to all social groups and management at the lowest appropriate level. See Bonn 
Freshwater Conference. (2001). "Bonn Freshwater Conference."   Retrieved January 23, 2006, from 
http://www.water-2001.de/. 
5 Along with ‘Article 4 of The Introduction to the Plan of Implementation’ at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (UNCED) in Johannesburg (2002), the official statement of the third WWF 
in Kyoto (2003) acknowledged the significance of water governance: “Many countries face a 
governance crisis, rather than a water crisis.” 
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management. 
 
Global dialogues often demand that the existing participants (e.g. nation-
states) in water governance actively reform the system by introducing new 
institutions. The first World Water Forum, held in Marrakech, Morocco in 
1997, literally recommended ‘partnership between the members of civil 
society and governments’ in the Marrakech Declaration (World Water 
Forum 1997: 1). It was the first official statements to declare ‘partnerships 
between government and NGOs’ as a key goal in water management. This 
decision reflected the popular introduction of partnerships worldwide from 
Africa, Eastern Europe (Brinkerhoff 1999) to the Middle East, Russia and so 
on (UNEP International Environmental Technology Centre. 2002).   
 
Beyond the water community, the promotion of partnerships as an 
organisational form had started under the Local Agenda 21 campaigns, 
which were initiated after the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(UNCED) in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. A fast-growing number of partnerships 
among stakeholders were recognised at Rio+10 in 2002. UNCED identified 
more than 200 partnerships related to sustainable development that had 
been organised since the 1992 Rio Declaration (UN/DESA 2002). 
Subsequently, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD) announced the focus on ‘partnerships for sustainable 
development’ in the LA21 campaigns in its 11th session in May 2003 
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(UN/DSD 2003). According to the CSD database, the number of 
partnerships for sustainable development that expressed their primary 
theme as water, were the highest with 81 out of a total of 348 on March 1, 
2011(UN Commission on Sustainable Development 2011). In other words, 
water partnerships were promoted in the 1990s not only by the 
international conferences for water resources but also by the ones for 
sustainable development. Thus, this connection between the LA21 
movements and the development of water partnerships needs to be 
examined with the Korean cases.  
 
However, the roles of global politics in partnership development have been 
controversial. Advocates explain that international organisations played a 
critical role in leading debate over governance reform, in particular, in the 
1990s. As discussed above, local and global institutions started to raise their 
voices and staked their claim to play a part in water management. As 
mentioned earlier, the globalisation of water politics, boosted by a series of 
international conferences since the early 1990s, literally opened the door of 
decision-making processes to the local actors as ‘direct participation’ 
opportunities. However, the sceptics who criticise the active roles of local 
actors remain instrumental. A lack of understanding of locally embedded 
implementation and decision-making processes in pro-participatory 
initiatives have been criticised as ‘imposing’ ‘top-down’ reform (Evans 
2004). Another debateable point is about the partnerships developed in 
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countries, which do not belong to either the global North or South. If the 
emergence of water partnerships is not directly planned or fostered by 
global organisations, the influence of global politics in partnership 
development needs to be understood within the interlinked tiers of global-
national-local governance.  
 
Evolution or barriers of development of co-governance institutions: The 
Global South and the NICs 
In comparison with the influence of the global dialogues, the academic 
literature has found that local initiatives are critical to the design of co-
governance. Some scholars in development studies claim that empowering 
local institutions can secure democratic decision-making and transparent 
management. As stated in Section 1.1.1, co-governance is a notion raised in  
literature on natural resources, which it derives from debates over 
government reform and privatisation (Evans 1996a; Evans 1996b; Ackerman 
2004; Head and Ryan 2004; Eversole and Martin 2005; Lemos and Agrawal 
2006). This notion has been supported on the grounds of promoting 
effectiveness and deliberative governance, for example, in the field of 
development studies (Fox 1996; Evans 1996b; Pretty and Ward 2001). 
Similarly, Scholz and Stiftel (2005) support the significance of contextual 
analysis for co-governance by emphasising the ‘adaptive nature’ of 
governance. For example, the importance of local institutions to natural 
resource management has been supported in the contexts of the developing 
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countries (Pretty and Ward 2001; Evans 2004). Pretty and Ward notice that  
‘Recent years have seen remarkable advances in-group formation, 
with in the past decade some 408,000~478,000 groups emerging 
with 8.2~14.3 million members in watershed, irrigation, 
microfinance, forest, and integrated pest management, and for 
farmers' research (2001: 214).’ 
 
The importance of sub-national governance is:  
‘...for many [who are] interested in environmental governance, it is 
synonymous with what happens on the international or the global 
stage. However, it is at least equally correct that some of the most 
important contemporary changes in environmental governance are 
occurring at the sub-national level and relate to efforts to 
incorporate lower-level administrative units and social groups 
better into the formal process of environmental governance. 
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006: 302)’ 
 
Thus, advocates of collaboration have offered justifications for tackling 
'diverse, dynamic and complex social and political issues and settings' 
(Kooiman 2000: 154) such as environmental problems. In contrast to  
conventional bureaucracy that is organised along hierarchical lines, 
collaborative governance works horizontally within the community where 
problems occur as well as in a reformative way against conventional top-
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down and formal environmental management by public agencies 
(Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000: 5). In this regard, this study focuses on two 
topics, which are the contextual development of co-governance institutions 
and their outcomes as the consequences of interactions between the 
partnerships and existing water governance.  
 
In terms of institutional development contexts, it is argued in this study that 
recent attention to global and local initiatives in co-governance institutions 
overlooks any roles of nation-states in multi-layered water governance. 
Recently, traditionally strong nation states started to engage with the NGOs. 
For example, East Asian and South East Asian countries such as Malaysia, 
Thailand, China, Korea and Japan still suffer from the high cost of 
environmental degradation because of rapid industrialisation and the lack 
of environmental governance (Adeel and Nakamoto 2003). These 
governance problems involve the rigid nature of command-and-control 
regulation and failure to mainstream sustainable development, along with 
inefficient capacity to enforce policy in various levels of 
governance.However, Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), including 
previously mentioned countries except Japan, have started to empower 
environmental agencies within government structures as well as to consult 
environmental NGOs on better social regulation. Thus, it is less explored 
about how this shift in governance emerged and was shaped in mid-income 
countries with state-dominant water governance. 
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In summary, the rationales for this study is to understand why co-
governance institutions demand comprehensive learning not only of “the 
effects of exogenous factors such as historical forces, political arrangements, 
demographic condition, resource endowment, and economic development 
within the model of institution-performance interaction” (Saleth, Dinar et al. 
2004: 328), but also an analysis of lower level and cross-layer relationships. 
In this respect, the next section will introduce an unexplored political 
context for the emergence of water partnerships.  
 
1.2 Emergence of co-governance in a centralised state and water 
governance in Korea 
In order to understand the complicated and locally dependent development 
of co-governance institutions, an analysis of the emerging collaborative 
water institutions within different socio-economic and biophysical levels is 
necessary. For states like Korea, which are highly centralised and 
hierarchical, and experiencing rapid socioeconomic changes(HJ, Chang 
1993; Lim 2001)6, this is a particularly interesting question. Korean water 
governance has been explored in a few water governance publications(Koo 
1993; Diamond and Sin 2000; KR, Seong 2000; HJ, Chang 2007). Since the 
                                               
6 The rapid growth of East Asian economies since the end of World War 2 is commonly believed to 
be realised by ‘government-business alliances and the public management of private risks’ (Lim 
2001). The ‘pervasiveness of state intervention’ despite controversial causality with rapid economic 
growth (Chang 1993) is the one of the typical social phenomenon in the NIC.   
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late 1960s when the dictator Park, Jung-Hee implemented the first national 
plan for economic growth, dependency on the national state has been 
embedded in Korean society. This situation remains today even following 
democratisation. Though recent social changes have given a slight push 
towards political decentralisation, the hierarchical nature of state-society 
relationships remained persistent even up to 2003(Presidential Committee 
on Government Innovation and Decentralization 2004). 7 Despite the 
resistant power of civil society against authoritarian state government in 
Korea (Koo 1993; Armstrong 2007), the hierarchical nature of the national 
state in Korea persists in terms of governance authority and natural 
resource management (See DJ, Choi and Park 2001; Armstrong 2002).8 The 
central government of Korea has led economic development and water 
management(SB, Shim and Lee 1996; JY, Chung and Kirkby 2001; SH, Lee 
2003), reflecting the highly centralised nature of water governance in Korea 
(See section 5.1.1). 
 
More to the point, central government and related public-owned 
enterprises have dominated water resource management in Korea. Four 
                                               
7 In 2003, The Presidential Committee on Government Innovation ＆ Decentralization (PCGID 
hereafter) recognised that 73 % of public service and 80 % of tax was still concentrated in the 
national state, while 61% of local authorities faced financial difficulties due to lack of income.  
8  Recent changes in Korean society can be characterised by three key aspects: the political 
democratisation of the late 1980s, the growth of civil society, and in particular the greater influence 
of a few nationwide NGOs since the 1980s (See  Armstrong 2002) and the adaptation of the local 
autonomy system in 1995 (DJ, Choi and Park 2001). 
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major rivers (See Figure 1.1) have been major water sources of public 
supply. Centralised water management has been focused on these four 
rivers—including riparian artificial dams—(MY, Han 2000), which 
contribute to nearly 90% of the national water supply. Large dams have 
been constructed to mitigate the effects on the water supply of large 
seasonal variations in rainfall (Ministry of Environment 2004a). Most of the 
population, and industrial facilities, are located in the downstream stretches 
of the major rivers and the priority for water supply is given to domestic 
and industrial users, though the greatest amount of water is still consumed 
for agricultural purposes (47% of withdrawal in 2003)(Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation 2005).  
 
As in other countries, water management has been segmented into two 
main aspects: 1) Functional and spatial range in central agencies and 
affiliated local offices: water supply, water quality, ecosystem and natural 
hazard control; 2) Administrative jurisdiction: the government classified the 
river sections, from national to local rivers, based on the levels of 
administration. For example, central government agencies manage the 
national rivers mainly for water supply, whereas the provincial and 
metropolitan governments cover the first local rivers and the municipalities 
the 2nd local rivers and urban streams. In other words, the central 
government manages the main streams of the key water sources, the four 
major rivers (See Figure 1.1), and then, the provincial and the local 
37 
 
governments do the less significant sections of the rivers. Thus, there is a 
strict hierarchy of management in Korean water governance. 
 
 
Figure 1.1Four major river basins in South Korea 
(Source: Ministry of Environment (2006: 10)) 
 
In contrast to public-dominated water governance, co-governance 
institutions emerged in Korea in the form of water partnerships from the 
late 1990s: these have been little and rarely studied. Unlike cases found in 
the US, the UK and the global South, this trend in Korea occurred without 
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direct government planning. The organisational features vary from co-
management of a river restoration project to conflict negotiation dialogue 
and an information-sharing forum. The scale of organisation also varies 
from watershed-level, and from city to regional scale. The national state has 
attempted to respond to growing concerns over the environment and the 
safe provision of water resources through the generation of river basin 
committees and a series of reform measures introduced since the late 1980s 
and the 1990s (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and 6). Though public-
private collaborations for better water management, hailed as a new reform, 
formal decision-making and the implementation of river basin management 
continued to remain a public sector responsibility. Therefore, despite the 
continued dominance of the nation-state in Korean water governance, a 
different form of co-governance institution, based on relatively equal 
participation among stakeholders, has started operating in some areas of 
water management.  
 
1.3 Analytical framework: water partnerships in multi-layered water 
governance 
In order to assess the complicated development of co-governance 
institutions, a ‘new institutional approach’ is useful. This offers an 
explanation of the dual aspects of stability and change (True, Jones et al. 
2007), and thebi-directional process between the structure and agents 
(Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994). Water partnership studies have focused 
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largely on the feasibility of co-governance institutions with the limited 
capacity of political perspective (Brinkerhoff 2002b). The institutional 
arrangements as well as locally embedded nature or partnership 
development are often overlooked in these studies (Leach and Pelkey 2001; 
Seppala, Hukka et al. 2001; Leach 2002; Leach, Pelkey et al. 2002; Connick 
and Innes 2003).In this thesis, I address both institutional development and 
outcomes. From this point of view, political approach is useful such as 
governance literature. ‘Governance’ studies (Pierre 2000; Kooiman 2003) 
propose the notion of ‘self-, co- and hierarchical governance’ (Kooiman 2003: 
218-223). Whilst Kooiman’s idea remains descriptive, the group of CPR 
analysts led the advance of an analytical framework, which will be 
discussed later. Among the institutional perspective, Common-pool 
resource analysis (CPR 9  hereafter) literature (Ostrom 2005b; Ostrom 
2007)attempts to explain the intertwined institutional structure and 
complex operation, e.g. ‘nested enterprise’(Ostrom 2005b: 269). 
 
Additionally, a ‘new institutional approach’is able to describethe intricate 
nature of the social phenomenon beyond the dichotomy of government and 
market. For example, the literature on public reform pays attention to the 
notion of institutions in public policy in general. Williamson (1994) argues 
                                               
9  Ostrom and her colleagues define the key features of CPRs as ‘difficulty of exclusion and 
subtractability’, which basically cause problems in managing a limited resource without an 
appropriate constraint, rules of the game. (See pages 278-279 of Ostrom, E., J. Burger, et al. (1999). 
"Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges." Science 284(5412): 278-282. ) 
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that the significance of ‘institutions’ is often neglected in the planning 
process for economic reform, which accordingly often results in failure. 
Furthermore, he claims that ‘institutions’ beyond policy, price and property 
rights need to be a new centre of governance reforms (1994: 3). Similarly, 
Young and others (2008: xiii) indicate that ‘institutions play a role in both 
causing and addressing problems that arise from human-environment 
interactions but that the nature of this role is complex’. In this regard, 
specifically, this study employs a modified analytical framework by 
combining two strong approaches of new institutionalism, the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and Mahoney’s (2000) 
periodization, in order to understand the contextual development of water 
partnerships within Korea’s highly centralised water governance. Because 
the notions of governance and nested enterprises only explain institutional 
development at an endogenous level, this thesis explores to complement 
this with additional analytical elements and by using Mahoney’s 
periodization approach (See 1.3.2).  
 
1.3.1 IAD framework: Interactive institutional development of water 
partnerships 
The IAD framework is useful for identifying complicated institutional 
procedures. It does this by depicting the interactive development between 
participants and the conditions within the action arena (Ostrom, Gardner et 
al. 1994). The CPR school, based on rational choice analysis, has informed 
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many studies of self-governance institutions and contributed to 
understanding alternative institutions beyond government policy or market 
mechanisms alone.  
 
The IAD framework depicts incremental development by linking 
preconditions, the action arena and its outcomes. Whereas the literature on 
collaborative institutions mainly covers microcosmic outcomes and 
organisational history, this framework offers an opportunity to portray 
partnership mechanisms from their emergence to their outcomes. In 
particular, Ostrom’s notion of an action arena (Lubell, Sabatier et al. 2005: 
264) reveals that different types of collaborative institutions tend to emerge 
in response to the contexts of ‘local political, social, economic and 
environmental realities’. Thus, this study depends on the IAD framework to 
integrate the fragmented and atheoretical findings of the partnership 
literature into the case studies of water partnerships, to be discussed in 
detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
1.3.2 Modified framework: examining water partnerships 
There are additional points where this study modifies the IAD framework 
based on the research objectives. To start with, the focus of the IAD 
framework needs to be expanded from controlled experimental situations to 
more diverse water resource problems with political analysis. The actors are 
presumed to create and enforce rules of co-governance based on economic 
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interests (Ostrom and Ostrom 2004). Additionally, three elements of the 
preconditions are prefixed and regarded as constraints to the actors (McCay 
2002). 
 
The IAD frameworkis often criticised as being weak at explaining exogenous 
factors beyond a community level(Lundqvist 2004). An explanation of the 
emergence of water partnerships in Korea under the strong influence of 
existing exogenous factors can address the shortcomings of prescriptive 
'designing principles' at a single level of governance or resource 
management.  
 
Additionally, the IAD framework offers an empirical investigation of 
collaborative institutions, which tend to overlook the linkage with existing 
governance (Ostrom 2007). Thus, a modification of the framework is needed 
to explain the emergence of water partnerships in the context of Korea, 
which is intertwined with global water governance reforms, national policy 
reforms and the growing power of NGOs.  
 
Finally, it is common to see the mixed use of more than one theoretical 
approach in environmental studies. For example, Rydin (2003) explored the 
application of a combined approach when she examined ‘the role of 
discourse’ in the process of English environmental planning, from agenda 
setting to putting planning procedures into practice. This study will 
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examine how water reform ideas are used to ‘constitute, negotiate, mediate, 
reproduce, transform or otherwise shape’ the social relations of power over 
the water reform political process (Mollinga 2001: 735).  
 
To modify the IAD framework, this study adopts Mahoney’s periodization 
approach, which adds an analytical tool to the preconditions of the IAD 
framework by stressing the significance of time sequences (Berman 1998; 
Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; Livingston 2005; Peters, Pierre et al. 2005). 
Mahoney’s periodization analysis basically shows how an institution 
remains on a stable path until the sustained path can no longer achieve the 
designed goals. By reflecting not only rational change, but also political 
change in a historical sense, this approach claims to give convincing 
answers to macro-scale change over a short period of time (Pierson 2000; 
Lim 2001), as found in dynamic social changes in Korea. Combined with an 
analytical framework, this descriptive approach to institutional change can 
help explain the emergence of co-governance institutions, which are the 
subject of this research. In order to link the classic IAD framework and 
Mahoney’s periodization approach, two concepts are used: the social 
basin(Falkenmark, Gottschalk et al. 2004; Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005; 
Cleaver and Franks 2005)—representing a structure of multi-layered water 
governance; and the nesting of water reform discourses—expressing the 
political influences on institutional development (See Rydin 2003; HJ, 
Chang and Evans 2005). Therefore, a modified framework will capture the 
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influence of macro-scale institutional changes such as water reform 
discourses on Korean water partnerships and structural relationships with 
global and national governance (See Figure 3.2. in Chapter 3). 
 
1.4 Research questions and aims 
This thesis attempts to unpack the evolution of water reform in Korea since 
the 1990s,as the background to emerging new institutions in water 
governance, by examining previous paths of water management. Based on 
theoretical discussions and research, the main questions addressed in this 
thesis are:  
a) How have co-governance institutions for water management emerged in 
a country like Korea where state-led water management combined with 
weak local autonomy has been practiced for many years?  
b) How and why have water partnerships in Korea produced certain 
outcomes?  
Two rationales are presented to verify the two proposed research questions 
above. Firstly, partnership outcomes need to be assessed in the context of 
institutional development. Thus, the IAD framework is used to explore each 
partnership as an action arena where members create and enforce new rules 
in order to respond to local water issues. Additionally, the outcomes of 
partnerships are assessed based on multi-categorised outcomes, in order to 
reflect the complicated and interactive process of development. Secondly, it 
is necessary to look at the institutional development of partnerships linked 
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with existing water governance. Therefore, Mahoney’s periodization 
approach with two linking concepts - social basins and water reform 
discourses- complements the IAD framework. The hypothesis of this thesis 
is that a combination of Mahoney’s periodization approach and the IAD 
framework can reveal the extent to which water partnerships, as co-
governance institutions at the local level, have emerged and have produced 
certain outcomes to Korean water governance. 
 
Based on the discussion of the theoretical and empirical literatures related 
to the development of co-governance institutions, this thesis aims to 
contribute to the water management and governance school in three ways. 
First, studying co-governance 'institutions' with multiple cases at different 
scales, provides explanatory insights into the application of co-governance 
reforms. This study critically points out that previous partnership studies 
overlook the complicated and dynamic features of institutional 
surroundings by focusing on performance-oriented outcomes. Second, by 
combining the IAD framework and Mahoney’s periodization analysis, this 
study adopts a novel theoretical framework to explain the complicated 
institutional development of water partnerships in Korea. Third, by 
analysing co-governance institutions in Korea, this study adds to 
scholarship on water governance and partnership studies, which has 
hitherto focused on either the global North or South.   
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1.5 Research design and Methodology 
In order to unpack the complicated and context-specific development of co-
governance institutions, a comparative case study is employed as the main 
methodology for this thesis. A mixed approach is adopted to generate both 
qualitative and quantitative original data. A pilot study was carried out in 
2004 before the subsequent main data collection in 2005. The data collection 
method depends mainly on a qualitative approach through documentary 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. To assess the on-going outcomes 
produced by a spectrum of water partnerships, this research adopted a 
simple attitude survey, which has been used to represent the perceived 
outcomes of partnerships in previous studies (Griffin 1999; Saleth and Dinar 
1999; Asthana, Richardson et al. 2002; Leach, Pelkey et al. 2002; Connick and 
Innes 2003; Trachtenberg and Focht 2005). In order to examine the influence 
of reform discourses on the emergence of water partnerships, a 
complementary methodology, discourse analysis, is used to examine 
partnership documents. 
 
This study employs comparative case studies with multiple levels of 
analysis to present an in-depth picture of how water partnerships have 
emerged and worked via new ways of governing rivers. The temporal 
scope of research encompasses Korean water policy since the 1980s to 2006. 
A pilot survey found thatwater partnerships were a new phenomenon that 
had hardly been studied in Korea. Ten cases of public-private collaboration 
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for better water management were identified from three documents (River 
Network 2004; Ministry of Environment 2004b; Korean Council for Local 
Agenda 21 2005b). From these ten candidate cases, six were selected for this 
study (See the figure below).  
 
Figure 1.2 The location of the selected case areas in the Republic of Korea. 
(Source: Adopted from (Kang and Ministry of Environment 2007)) 
 
For consistency and comparability among cases, four cases were ruled out 
because either the case was too small-scale and short-lived—A in the 
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Yeongsan River basin- or the partnership onlycomprised only NGOs—cases 
B, C and D in Figure 1.2. The selected cases with the numbers, as identified 
on Figure 1.2, are 1) Jeonju partnership, 2) Daechong lake partnership, 3) 
Busan city partnership, 4) Incheon city partnership, 5) Paldang lake 
partnership and 6) Gyeongnam Water Forum (GWF hereafter). 
 
As will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4, the data collection was carried 
out through fieldwork in Korea from 2004 and 2005. Primary data was 
generated from 31 semi-structured interviews and brief observations of 
single meetings per case (6 meetings in total). A supplementary 
questionnaire survey was distributed to 129 members of steering 
committees and executives of the water partnerships (response rate: 59.7%). 
Secondary data consists mainly of official documents, participatory meeting 
reports and academic works and publications. The structuring of the 
interview transcripts was conducted through simple thematic coding, 
according to semi-structured interview questions on the creation, operation 
and outcomes of each partnership and water governance in Korea in 
general. For controlled comparison, the six cases are categorised into two 
sub-groups based on the scale of water resource and the key agenda of 
partnerships: urban water partnerships—no’s. 1, 3 and 4—and regional water 
partnerships—no’s. 2, 5 and 6—.  
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Figure 1.3 Research Flow Chart 
 
1.6 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis aims to contribute not only to partnership studies through 
comparative case studies in a less explored geographical context, but also to 
institutional studies through the use of a modified analytical framework. I 
will now summarise how the thesis is structured.   
 
Chapters 2 and 3 contain a two-fold literature review of water management 
and partnerships as co-governance institutions. Chapter 2 reviews the 
theoretical and empirical studies on the development of co-governance 
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institutions for water management and the assessment of partnership 
outcomes. Subsequently, Chapter 3 presents a modified IAD framework by 
using Mahoney’s periodization approach to assess the multi-scaled, locally 
embedded development of water partnerships in Korea.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the comparative case study methodology designed for 
Korean contexts and its application, in particular, during the fieldwork in 
2004 and 2005. To address two research aims, addressing the development 
and outcomes of the water partnerships, interviews and attitude surveys 
were designed and applied. The advantages and the limitations of the data 
collection are discussed in the later section of the chapter.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the preconditions for water partnerships in the history 
of water policy change through the 1980s to 2006 by using Mahoney’s 
periodization analysis. This chapter considers the exogenous factors that 
have affected the emergence of water partnerships in highly centralised 
Korea. Chapter 6 and 7 are devoted to analysing the development and 
outcomes of the six water partnerships by adopting the modified analytical 
framework developed in Chapter 3. These case analysis chapters are 
divided into two subgroups for controlled comparison. The comparison 
between the two groups is presented at the end of Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
The conclusion, Chapter 8, gives a brief summary and critique of the 
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findings and discusses their policy implications for collaborative institution 
development. Finally, areas for further research are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 WATER PARTNERSHIPS ANALYSIS: CO-
GOVERNANCE FOR WATER MANAGEMENT IN 
PRACTICE 
Introduction 
Co-governance institutions have become one of the key initiatives of water 
governance reform. To address the current problems in water 
management,water institutions have become more diverse and dynamic 
with new innovative initiatives. These include the creation of river basin 
organisations (Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005), the active roles of supra-
national coordination bodies and global institutions (Conca 2006), and the 
empowerment of local government and stakeholders (Brown, Gyde et al. 
2003; Rydin and Falleth 2006). Co-governance institutions originated from 
the third group. A spectrum of concepts has been generated to portray co-
governance(Freeman 1997; Connick and Innes 2003; Schneider, Scholz et al. 
2003; Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Gerlak and Heikkila 2007)10. This study 
aims to examine how these ideas have been shaped in the development of 
water partnerships in Korea as well as the outcomes of the partnerships.  
 
This chapter presents a review of co-governance and partnership studies on 
                                               
10 The relative concepts are ‘collaborative dialogue’ in policy process(es)’ (Connick and Innes 2003), 
‘collaborative governance’(Freeman 1997; Gerlak and Heikkila 2007), ‘large-scale collaborative 
resource management institutions’ (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005) and ‘consensual 
institutions’(Schneider et al. 2003). 
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the one hand and water management literature on the other to inform the 
research questions of this study. It begins by conceptualising co-governance 
institutions and water partnerships, a particular type of co-governance. 
How the different functions of water management have been paid attention 
in policy change and governance studies will be followed. In the next 
section, the empirical studies related to water partnerships are reviewed, 
which are divided into three strands of the lifecycle of partnerships: the 
incremental development of water partnerships (emergence and operation) 
and their outcomes.  
 
2.1 Concepts and features of water partnerships 
The centre of this study, co-governance institutions, are referred to as 
‘hybrid and embedded autonomy across state-market-society divisions’ 
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006: 297). These new forms of environmental 
governance encompass an array of new organisations, namely co-
management, public-private partnerships and social-private partnerships.11 
In terms of organisational structure, the first type, co-management is most 
similar to the operational concept of water partnerships selected for this 
study. Hence, as an operational concept, water partnership is a type of co-
governance institution for water management in practice. The concept of 
                                               
11 These three types are distinctive from soft governance, which indicates the forms of market and 
individual incentives with self-regulatory processes (seeLemos, M. C. and A. Agrawal (2006). 
"Environmental Governance." Annual Review of Environment and Resources 31(1): 297-325.).  
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water partnership is depicted in the notion of collaborative resource 
management institutions (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005). They depict the rules 
and/value as an organisational aim in the abstract notion of ‘collaboration’ 
among stakeholders for management of natural resources. . Thus, I define 
water partnerships as used in this study‘a social organisation to promote 
collaborative water governance based on social agreement between more 
than two participants’.12 
 
Based on the literature, water partnerships are found to have dynamic 
features, listed as below.  
- The heterogeneous collection of various social actors (Memberships): 
water partnerships are formed according to the broad arrangements 
between stakeholders in the public and private sectors (Ackerman 2004). 
- Innovative initiatives (Mission): mostly, water partnerships are established 
with the purpose of reforming existing social institutions and promoting 
governance for accountability (Ackerman 2004). Or they often focus on 
unsolved issues such as regional natural resource management (Head and 
Ryan 2004: 361, 381). 
- Participation and negotiation (Decision-making): The participatory 
decision-making is one of the principles of co-management (Head and Ryan 
2004). Due to dissimilar interest of members, the decision-making in 
partnerships often results in negotiation among different stakeholders or 
                                               
12 This definition will be used in Chapter 4 for the selection of the cases. 
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values (Davies 2002).   
- Adaptive autonomy (Operation): Co-governance idea works through 
locally tailored activities via a process of learning-by-doing in water 
partnerships (Head and Ryan 2004: 361, 381; Olsson, Folke et al. 2004: 75).  
This description of partnerships with these various inherent features puts 
partnership studies ‘in danger of remaining a ‘feel good’ panacea for 
governance’ (Brinkerhoff 2002b: 20). In agreement with this criticism, the 
characteristics of co-governance institutions need more elaboration in the 
context of evolving water management, partnership studies respectively.  
 
2.2 Water management and partnership development 
Before reviewing the partnership studies literature, it is significant to 
discuss how water studies are relevant to the understanding of the water 
partnerships. Two aspects are worth visiting. On the one hand, it is 
significant to examine how new institutions are linked with water 
management functions, i.e. the nature of water problems, e.g. pollution, 
ecosystem conservation. As discussed in section 1.2 earlier, water 
partnerships in the global discourse on water reforms were recommended 
as a prescriptive tool to reform current water management. For example, 
the participation of stakeholders in water partnerships is related to the 
criticism against engineering-oriented professionalism because of the 
resultant environmental costs (Huitema and Meijerink 2009). Water 
partnerships as social organisation are mingled with the salient issues 
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arising in water management. Thus, this study notes that the increasing 
concerns with certain issues associated with water resources management 
may be related to the development of water partnerships.  
 
In details, linkage between water partnerships with certain management 
functions is related to the aims and operation of partnership, as suggested 
in the previous section. The management functions are covered by 
partnerships are conventional problems, e.g. water pollution control or 
supply, and/or new functions, e.g. river restoration or habitat conservation 
(See Moseley 1999 for the cases in the US). A persistent issue such as 
pollution control to ensure safe water supply has been attached to an array 
of prescriptions in water institutional change, from engineering and 
professional-driven approach to participatory approach (Meijerink and 
Huitema 2009). At the same time, the concern with the water ecosystems 
emerged from the criticisms against the heavy modification of water 
resources by ‘hard engineering techniques’ such as dams, channelization 
(Eden and Tunstall 2006).13 The institutional development in relation to 
ecosystem conservation is related to voluntary, informal organisation, 
whereas the conventional management functions such as pollution control, 
flood prevention are likely to remain in the hands of formal water 
                                               
13 Postel and Richter point out that during the last decade, ‘more than 230 rivers around the world are 
already undergoing some degree of flow restoration’ (See Postel, S. L. and B. Richter (2003). Rivers 
for Life - managing water for people and nature -. Washington, Covelo, London, Island Press.p.4). 
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management organisations. For example, the application of this new issue 
has been a peripheral issue in formal policy domain of the European 
Union’s Water Framework Directive (WFD hereafter). The WFDstipulates it 
as a voluntary task for local communities in contrast to the compulsory goal 
for wastewater treatment (Bressers and Kuks 2004; Volker 2004)14. Some 
scholars disclose the involvement of nongovernmental actors in river 
restoration through case studies (Kenney and Lord 1999; Heikkila and 
Gerlak 2005; Waley 2005). Yet the division between the conventional 
management bodies and the new organisations in terms of management 
functions has not been fully explored. For this study, this idea is used for 
selection and grouping of cases in Chapter 4. 
 
On the other hand, there is the question of the inter-linkage issue among 
water institutions. As pointed out in section 1.1, the conventionally 
segmented water management systems failed to address persistent 
pollution and protect non-consumptive water use (Bressers and Kuks 2004). 
Historically, water institutions have been maintained or created to address 
the water issues deemed to be relevant at the time of their formation. The 
decentralisation of natural resource management has been introduced ‘by 
the central government officials in order to solve their own problems’—e.g., 
                                               
14One of the earliest pieces of legislation about water ecosystems was the EU WFD established in 2000. 
The WFD expanded the scope of management from human usage to the living environment. As an 
applied type of ecosystem conservation, river restoration aims to integrate rivers more with their 
floodplains through ‘softer’ engineering styles and materials’ (Eden and Tunstall 2006). 
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to reduce or eliminate the central government’s political accountability for 
past or current resource policy failures, resolve a budgetary crisis by cutting 
their financial responsibility for selected domestic policy areas’ (Dinar and 
World Bank. 2005: 10-11). This indicates that new water institutions 
emerged to reform previously established systems of water management. In 
this sense, the change of water management towards more integrated, 
participatory governance has been noted (Meijerink and Huitema 2009: 371-
2). This inevitable mix of water institutions, as Winpenny (1994) points out 
in the early 1990s, entailed the clash among different institutions at various 
levels of governance, scale of management (Uphoff 1993; Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999). Furthermore, the complexity of water institutions was 
increased when ecosystem conservation became a significant policy agenda 
beyond the conventional management issues directly related to human 
water consumption. Thus, the emergence of water partnerships affects the 
pre-existing water governance, in particular, the coordination among 
different organisations. The comparative case study analysis in Chapters 6 
and 7 examines this idea.  
 
In the following section, how this notion of water partnerships has been 
applied in practice will be reviewed.  
 
2.3 Water partnership analysis 
Relatively little research has been carried out on the institutional 
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development of water partnerships from their emergence to their outcomes. 
Hence, following the notion of the whole lifecycle of water 
partnerships(Imperial and Koontz 2007) and adaptive governance (Scholz 
and Stiftel 2005), this study attempts to re-arrange the patchy work on 
water partnerships (See Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Davies 2002; Saleth, 
Dinar et al. 2004) into a chronological development of co-governance 
institution. In one of the few studies on co-governance institutions for water 
management , Saleth and Dinar (2004) set up the multiple stages of 
institutional change based on rational choice theory: 1) mind change of 
political entrepreneurs → 2) political articulation → 3) institutional change 
→ 4) actual impact; information and learning are seen as a mediating factor 
engaged with all stages. Saleth and Dinar’s framework (2004) is not used in 
this study in the life cycle of partnership development because it is 
designed to fit the one-way exercise of top-down reform, mostly at the 
macro level, whereas the concern in this study is the voluntary emergence 
of partnerships at the sub-basin level.  
 
Two other studies (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Davies 2002) that are more 
relevant to the work at the sub-national level divide the processes of 
development not by the dominant actor in the partnerships but by the 
partnership itself. According to Lowndes and Skelcher, partnership 
development comprises of consecutive stages from emergence to operation 
and outcomes (See Figure 2.1). In this approach, each process is likely to be 
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determined as the random result of competition and/or collaboration by 
interconnected but heterogeneous rules of the game (Lowndes and Skelcher 
1998). This approach can be useful for understanding the complicated and 
contextually dynamic development of water partnerships. Thus, to find the 
gaps in the relevant empirical studies, the process-driven perspective will 
be applied in the next section to examine water partnership studies.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The lifecycle of water partnerships: the institutional development of process-
focused studies versus outcomes-focused studies 
 
2.3.1 Emergence of water partnerships 
Despite the growing significance of water partnerships, there have been 
relatively few studies on the emergence of such partnerships. While myriad 
studies have been devoted to different patterns of partnership structures 
and features (Leach and Pelkey 2001; Caplan and Jones 2002; Brinkerhoff 
2002a; Connick and Innes 2003), studies on why and how this variation 
happens are still at an early stage (Lubell, Sabatier et al. 2005).  
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A few case studies based on a rational choice approach explain institutional 
emergence as responsive to pre-existing problems. Saleth and Dinar (2004) 
stress the roles of policy entrepreneurs in creating institutions to adopt 
reform ideas. This approach is relevant to the Korean context where the 
public sector dominates at all levels of water governance. Lubell and his 
colleagues (2005) presume that a partnership structure tends to be shaped in 
order to fit into its surrounding context. Yet, this context remains a black 
box that does not provide a clear answer to the research question of this 
study. Thus, disclosing what and how context influences the varying 
features of partnerships needs to be explored.  
 
Contextual emergence of water partnerships in the US and Western 
Europe 
In the literature, water partnership development in the US and Western 
Europe is the most explored among the numerous adoptions of water 
partnerships in the worldwide. There are common but dissimilar adoptions 
of co-governance in the US and the UK contexts. One of the most common 
features between these two groups of water partnership practices is the new 
topic of ecological restoration (Eden and Tunstall 2006). Rehabilitation of 
river ecosystems, often utilising ‘soft engineering’ and participatory 
monitoring by neighbourhood residents, has been a popular programme for 
water partnerships (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005; 
Scholz and Stiftel 2005; Eden and Tunstall 2006). However, watershed 
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partnerships in the US, participatory pilots for EU WFD and joined-up 
government in the UK, also show contrasting features in terms of creation 
processes, organisational structures and ensuing operations.  
 
The watershed partnerships in the US, as an example of co-management 
institutions, are recognised as organisations with ‘relatively informal, wide 
engagement of stakeholders for watershed management’, mostly through 
co-writing a plan for basin development (Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005: 6). The 
emergence of watershed partnerships were mostly ‘organically’ led by 
community groups with financial and professional support from state 
and/or federal governments (Moseley 1999; Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005). 
These community-level partnerships have been popular: there were 2,100 
watershed partnerships in the US by early 2000(Lubell, Schneider et al. 
2002); however, the informality of organisation and small scale of 
governance based on a watershed unit in the North American cases (Leach 
and Pelkey 2001; Leach 2002; Lubell, Schneider et al. 2002; Lubell 2004a; 
O'Neill 2005; Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005) are not easily applicable to larger 
scale river basins or larger scale and/or state-dominating, formal law 
systems. Additionally, there are few studies on how the unofficial nature of 
watershed partnerships has been interconnected with formal water 
management systems.  
 
Comparatively, the West European experience is described as ‘top-down 
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promotion of bottom-up participation’ by Sklarew (2005: 103), which 
followed the global debate on environmental policy reform in the Rio 
Declaration in 1992. The official documents about the Water Framework 
Directive emphasise that full stakeholder participation is a key to successful 
delivery of the legislation itself (Lanz and Scheuer 2001; WWF 2001). Pilot 
projects have been carried on in Western European countries in order to 
develop participatory institutions at the local and national levels to meet the 
multi-linked goals of water governance in the EU. For example, the River 
Ribble pilot was expected to overcome the often criticised ‘tokenistic’ 
involvement of the public in policy processes in the UK; however, the weak 
commitment of stakeholders and the passive attitude of public sectors 
persisted (Carter and Howe 2006). As found in the lessons of ‘joined-up 
government’ (Bogdanor and British Academy. 2005) 15 , the horizontal 
collaboration for strategic development at local level can work when there 
is a change in the conventional hierarchy to allow the new institution to 
operate. Otherwise, as observed in the Ribble pilot, which aimed to test 
participatory techniques at local level, the feedback loop to reform the 
existing governance from the local experience is not included, which make 
this participatory experiment look tokenistic (Papadopoulos 2003). Thus, 
                                               
15 It is referred as ‘a strategy which seeks to bring together not only government departments and 
agencies, but also a range of private and voluntary bodies, working across organizational boundaries 
towards a common goal’ (see Bogdanor, V. and British Academy., Eds. (2005). Joined-up 
government. British Academy occasional paper. Oxford, Oxford University Press for the British 
Academy.: 1).  
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the applications of water partnerships are contextually embedded. 
 
Emergence of partnerships in newly industrialised countries 
Related to the emergence of co-governance institutions, there are few works 
in partnership studies on the ways reform discourses promoted in 
international conferences are interpreted and implemented within the NICs 
like Korea. There are, however, studies analysing the roles of global 
dialogues, directly affecting the emergence of co-governance institutions, 
mostly in the contexts of developing countries (Conca 2006). This approach 
provides an understanding of the imposition of Western reform discourses 
into the dissimilar contexts of the global South, based on a critical view 
about power relationships between the donor, e.g. international 
organisations, and the less developed countries (Pretty and Ward 2001; 
Evans 2004). Unlike the cases in the developing countries, there was no 
direct imposition of reform discourses by the international actors in the 
creation of water partnerships in Korea.  
 
In the literature on water partnerships, the role of the national state is often 
neglected, overshadowed by the increasing power of global and local 
governance. Often the creation of institutions is typified into either top-
down or bottom-up ways (Mullen and Allison 1999), which overlooks more 
intricate institutional development at the local and community level in 
practice. Instead of imposing reform plan to local people, a national 
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government actively supports the proposed reform ideas to its application 
by local actors. Chang and Evans (2005: 119), used the term, ‘nesting’ to 
describe the institutional change led by global politics but selectively 
introduced by national government. For example, despite the recent socio-
economic changes reflecting neo-liberal globalisation, the national 
government in centralised societies such as China persists to lead recent 
water governance reforms (Liang and Yue 2010). Furthermore, Lane and 
McDonald describe the complicated interactions in the development of 
community-based environmental planning as ‘an inherent, conceptual 
contradiction’, which is rather a combination of 'bottom-up' knowledge and 
action within the fostered opportunities and possibilities of community 
engagement by the state (2005: 710). In this sense, institutional development 
as ‘a local prerogative’ (Okun 1991: 40) in partnership creation needs to 
include the scale of not only the community surroundings but also the 
related national policy and institutional elements. By attempting to reflect 
the complicated interactions among actors within the multi-layered 
governance, this study pays attention to the contextually embedded 
development of water partnerships, in particular, in relation to national 
water governance. 
 
Empirically, water partnership studies rarely address the cases in the NICs. 
There have been studies on the cases in the US, the UK and another set of 
multi-organisational partnerships between North-South countries. The 
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latter have been largely examined within development studies (Frances 
1999; Newman 2000; Morse and McNamara 2006). The related literature 
pays attention to the relationships between the North and the South at the 
global environmental scale (Ashman 2001) often because of the weak 
capacity of the national state (Davis 2004) or the imposition of unilateral 
reform initiatives to the South (Evans 2004; Cleaver and Franks 2005). The 
analytical findings from political complexity surrounding the partnerships 
between the North and global South are meaningful to the institutional 
approach in general. However, the contextual factors in this literature, such 
as transnational scale and overlooked roles of national governments, are 
seemingly rather far from nationally driven water policy and socioeconomic 
development in NICs. Therefore, partnership literature lacks the 
explanations about how water partnerships emerged in centralised societies, 
which needs to be addressed in the next chapter.  
 
2.3.2 Operations of water partnerships 
Operations link two stages of partnership development—emergence and 
outcomes, two research aims of this study. In comparison with partnership 
emergence, researchers have shown more interest in the operation of 
partnerships, mostly in order to assess the outcomes. According to 
Blomquist and his colleagues (2005), the responsibilities of collaborative 
basin organisations could be broader than those of existing water 
institutions. The broader array of collaborative activities include ‘planning 
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and/or coordination, infrastructure operation and maintenance, licensing 
water uses/ allocating water supply, monitoring of basin conditions (water 
quantity and/or, quality and/or ecosystems), consultation on land use or 
new water use, discharge permits setting, collecting water charges/water 
pricing and stakeholder information sharing and 
communication’(Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005: 21). This sort of literature 
presumes an ideal condition where the variety of partnership activities 
linearly achieves a range of positive outcomes.  
 
Collaborative practice is also regarded as ‘more fluid and less predictable’ 
(Connick and Innes 2003: 178) in comparison to conventional policy making. 
Analysing a river basin management in Usangu, Tanzania, Cleaver and 
Franks (2005: 2) claim that as ‘external crafting is inevitably problematic’ 
owing to social constraints such as scale, diversity and complexity, then, 
instead of general prescriptions, ‘a variety of partial and contingent 
solutions’ are desirable. Their analysis clarifies the contextual gap between 
textbook recommendations and practice as well as the significance of social 
capacity within multi-layered governance in order to experiment with 
adaptive management. This array of case studies confirms Kooiman’s (1993: 
35) idea, which indicates that the new form of interactive governing 
between government and society is ‘complex, dynamic and diverse’.  
 
The politically motivated operation of partnerships is supported by another 
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scholar, as Freeman (1997) proposes five normative features of collaborative 
governance that work better, he claims, than interest representation politics 
in terms of regulatory reform. These features are problem-solving, 
participation, provisional solution, accountability transcending the public–
private divide, and a flexible, engaged agency. Freeman’s argument uses 
the normative features to stress the alternative value of collaborative 
governance against the existing interest representation and exhausting 
negotiation within bureaucracy in the pluralistic American public 
administration. For example, thriving small scale watershed partnerships in 
the United States may root themselves in the value of ‘autonomy, welfare 
and justice’ (Trachtenberg and Focht 2005: 53). As discussed in Chapter 1, 
global dialogues played a significant role in influencing the various actors 
at the multiple levels of water governance over the world. Therefore, 
regarding the emergence of water partnerships, there is a need for more 
diverse case studies in different contexts, which can disclose the embedded 
development of partnership operation within reality.  
 
2.3.3 Outcomes of partnerships 
The need to consider organisational outcomes 
As an innovative solution, co-governance institutions have been expected to 
address current water management problems. Hence, the assessment of 
partnership outcomes should focus on how partnerships achieved these 
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expectations. For example, poor service such as the lack of clean water 
provision, unreliable management due to corruption, closed decision-
making systems and poverty are current problems in water management 
(Llamas, Martínez-Cortina et al. 2009). Given that the design and the 
emergence of co-governance institutions are contextually specific rather 
than general, a simple assessment based on partnership performance is 
insufficient to depict this variety of current problems and their complicated 
relationship with the surrounding environment. The current studies on 
partnership outcomescan be problematic, particularly, in terms of the scope 
of assessment. Because the partnership studies focus on the organisational 
level (Leach and Pelkey 2001; Caplan and Jones 2002; Brinkerhoff 2002a; 
Connick and Innes 2003), this approach isolates partnerships from related 
socio-economic settings (Davies 2002). The embedded development of 
partnerships is often overlooked (Lubell, Schneider et al. 2002). Thus, this 
outcome-based group of studies often fails to provide generalisable lessons 
with application to different contexts.  
 
The presumption that a good institutional design (cause) will bring 
optimistic outcomes (effect) is not always evident (Freeman 1997; 
Brinkerhoff 2002b; Lubell 2004a).Brinkerhoff (2002b: 21) points out these 
dual missions of GO-NGO partnerships (See Fox 1996; Evans 1996b; Pretty 
and Ward 2001)- ‘a solution to reaching efficiency and effectiveness 
objectives and as the most appropriate relationship as defined by its value-
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laden principles’ often clash with each other.Among the stronger sceptics 
about participation (Arnstein 1969; Amy 1987; Lane, McDonald et al. 2004; 
Lane and McDonald 2005), Amy critically depicts that 'participation 
techniques are often used for purely political purposes-to give the illusion 
of citizen power while actually serving the interests of policy makers who 
desire to increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of their decisions' 
(1987: 13). In other words, the normative nature of partnerships that may 
enhance democracy and bring up procedural legitimacy can hinder the 
functional virtue of partnerships. In this regard, Koontz (2005: 459) stresses 
the significance of contexts in understanding collaborative governance 
‘rather than internal group factors often emphasized in studies of citizen 
advisory committees and collaborative groups’. In order to unpack this 
complexity of partnership outcomes, an analysis should focus on to what 
extent related features such as management functions, contexts of 
institutional development and politics surrounding partnerships. 
 
The assessment of partnership outcomes needs to reflect more critical 
concerns over partnerships, e.g., even producing negative outcomes such as 
burdens and participation fatigue within communities (Mosse and Sivan 
2003; Cleaver and Franks 2005; Forsyth 2005). There has been a debate over 
whether water partnerships are productive beyond the ‘hope of 
networking’(Rydin 2006: 214). Scholars discussing the notion of social 
capital argue that not only trust between elites and grassroots, but also long 
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term economic gain is provided through cooperation among citizens (Fox 
1996; Evans 1996b; Inoguchi 2002; Pretty 2003). However, Rydin and her 
colleagues’ ex-post analyses (2006) indicate that it is often difficult for local 
partnerships to achieve natural resource management despite some positive 
outcomes. In addition, some scholars radically challenge the normative 
programmes of partnership based on lack of applicability to different 
contexts and its inductive approach based on small N case studies (Evans 
2004; Cleaver and Franks 2005; O'Neill 2005). Therefore, instead of a single 
in-depth case study, this study needs to consider how the diversity of 
partnership outcomes is assessed in a highly centralised society, Korea.  
 
Multi-criteria assessment of partnerships 
As an alternative to the criticisms raised above, system evaluation has been 
attempted on a rather macro scale (Saleth, Dinar et al. 2004), which aims to 
check water institutions (law, policy and organisation) and the surrounding 
institutional arrangement in a particular society. Their cases focus on the 
outcomes of water institutions and the influences from the related 
institutional settings at a single level of national water policy and 
organisations. More focused on the interactions among community 
organisations, Provan and Milward (1995) disclose that how the networked 
community-based public health service is more effective than separately 
operating public organisations. Given a hybrid organisation comprised of 
various representatives of first-order organisations and/or individuals, the 
72 
 
systematic approach needs to cover multi-organisational features—often in 
various decision-making levels from community, river basin to national 
scale. Furthermore, the key methodology used in their work, social network 
analysis is a useful tool to rather visualise the structure of networked 
relationships (Brandes, Kenis et al. 1999) than reveal the various aspects of 
partnership outcomes. Hence, the systematic approach is inapplicable to 
multiple cases of water partnerships in Korea developed at the various 
scales of management. Instead, performance evaluation has advanced to 
reflect the direct outcomes as well as intangible outcomes created during 
the process of co-governance.  
 
This thesis adopts more comprehensive criteria for organisational 
performance of multiple partnerships. To assess the various aspects of 
partnership outcomes for this study, three sets of criteria—procedural 
issues, socioeconomic performances and environmental achievement (see 
Table 2.1)—are selected from the literature (Conley and Moote 2003; 
Connick and Innes 2003; Plummer and Armitage 2007). These criteria are to 
reflect the complicated features of co-governance outcomes. For example, 
Plummer and Armitage (2007) propose three concentric circles of evaluative 
criteria categories as ‘ecological sustainability, livelihoods and process’ 
based on the ecological concept, system resilience. Similarly, Connick and 
Innes (2003) propose the combination approach using process and 
outcomes criteria, based on complexity studies and Habermas’ 
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communicative rationality concept. In terms of comprehensiveness, to cover 
the organisational aspects of environmental and process-focused outcomes 
as well as the institutional settings related socio-economic aspects, this 
research adopts the sub-categories of assessment proposed by Conley and 
Moote (2003): process, environmental and socioeconomic outcomes. Criteria 
regarding the negative aspects of partnership consequences (Kenney 2000; 
Rydin and Falleth 2006) are also added as part of the procedural issues 
category in Table 2.1. The table below shows a compiled set of partnership 
outcomes.  
Table 2.1 Selected evaluation criteria 
Sub-category Criteria  
Procedural 
issues 
Social capital 
High quality agreements 
Innovation 
Mutual understandings* 
Learning and change beyond the original group* 
Changes in attitudes, behaviours, institutions & practices* 
Costs due to cultural and professional gaps among members* 
Transactional costs* 
Environmental 
outcomes 
Water quantity* 
Water quality*  
Ecosystem sustainability* 
Socio-
economic 
outcomes 
Relations built or strengthened 
Cost effective decision making 
Trust building* 
(capacity for) conflict management* 
*: Assessment criteria chosen for attitude survey, to be discusses in Chapter 4.  
Source: Modified Connick and Innes (2003), Conley and Moote (2003), Innes and Booher 
(1999: 9), Rydin and Falleth (2006) and Kenney (2000) 
 
How to apply the selected criteria needs to be discussed. As suggested 
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above, a multiple case study may overcome the weakness of performance 
assessment on a single organisation (Murray 2000). Additionally, the 
assessment of organisational performance in various perspectives is often 
hindered by the difficulties to collect data (Beierle 2002; Baruch and 
Ramalho 2006). Instead, to assess perceived outcomes of water partnerships 
has proliferated based on collectable data (Ryan 1998; Saleth and Dinar 1999; 
Faulkner, Green et al. 2001; Leach 2002; Lubell 2004b; Torgler and Garcia-
Valiñas 2006; Koehler and Koontz 2008). In order to address the weakness 
of perceived outcomes evaluation, analysing available secondary data about 
other outcomes of partnerships16 in addition to a survey of partnership 
members on perceived outcomes would advance the evaluation research. 
How to attain data for the application of these criteria will be discussed in 
section 4.2.5. 
 
Conclusion 
Review of the partnership literature and water studies work confirms the 
need to understand water partnerships through a more contextual 
approach and in a less explored context, that of Korea. Furthermore, the 
review of both literatures reveals the need for theoretical responses to their 
limitations, which refer above all to lack of understanding of the emergence 
of partnerships and few case studies in the contexts of the NICs.  
 
                                               
16 The method of data collection and related analysis will be discussed in details in Chapter 4. 
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Apart from the multi-criteria assessment of partnerships, this study 
proposes a theoretical innovation to overcome the limitations of these 
empirical studies. In the next chapter, I examine a theoretical perspective 
that addresses these limitations.  
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CHAPTER 3 IAD FRAMEWORK: DEVELOPMENT AND 
OUTCOMES OF WATER PARTNERSHIPS 
Introduction 
To examine how Korean water partnerships emerged and produced certain 
outcomes, this study principally employs an institutional approach, the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. In contrast to the 
conventional partnership literature discussed in section 2.3, the IAD 
framework can depict the incremental development of institutional 
emergence and operations linking with outcomes. Proposed by the 
Common Pool Resources (CPR) literature (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994),17 
this useful approach explains how local actors interact with a broad 
spectrum of analytical factors from political, social to physical 
environmental problems. The comprehensiveness of this approach 
overcomes explanatory limitations in the partnership literature, reviewed in 
section 2.3. As a framework, this approach is often used in combination 
with other theoretical approaches(See Imperial 1999; Rydin 2003). Based on 
this flexible framework as a solid foundation of a comparative case study, 
additional elements of analysis will be drawn from this theoretical 
                                               
17 CPR school stems from a notion, common-pool resource, which are defined as the same resources 
that multiple individuals rely without rules that clearly divide what is available for withdrawal among 
a defined group of individuals (Ibid, p.2). Common-pool resources problems are referred as a 
dilemma that a resource user often yields undesirable outcomes to oneself and the belonged group 
(op cit).  
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discussion in order to examine water partnerships developed in varied 
structure and contexts of Korea. Thus, this study makes use of the enhanced 
explanatory power of the IAD framework through its modification as 
proposed at the end of this chapter.   
 
The chapter is organised in two sections. The first section starts with a 
review of the key analytical elements of the IAD framework, which is 
followed by a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of its original form. 
The second part of the chapter introduces how this study modifies the 
original framework to examine the development and outcomes of water 
partnerships in Korea. The chapter concludes with identifying additional 
analytical elements for the modified IAD framework, which are used in this 
study.   
 
3.1 IAD framework: A theoretical approach to institutional 
development 
3.1.1 Unpacking the incremental development of institutions 
The IAD framework is an institutional approach that helps us understand 
the stable but comprehensive nature of institutional arrangements, shaping 
participants’ behaviour as well as the rules of the game. Rules are here 
defined as ‘shared understandings among those involved that refer to 
enforced prescriptions about what actions (or states of the world) are 
required, prohibited, or permitted’ (Ostrom and Ostrom 2004: 124). 
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Institutions are referred to as a 'stable, recurring pattern of behaviours: 
informal conventions of political life, formal constraints and organisations’ 
(Goodin and Klingemann 1996: 22). The IAD framework claims greater 
explanatory power in unpacking the detailed processes of institutional 
operations, which will be useful for understanding the complicated 
development of co-governance institutions in general and particularly for 
this study. By broadly embracing water institutions, the framework 
addresses the complexity of institutional development (Ostrom 2005a: 824), 
which include the set of rules of the game, informal norms and beliefs 
embedded within partnerships. This process-oriented framework (See 
Figure 3.1 below) interprets a case of institutional development among a set 
of actors, addressing problems with given resources by creating and/or 
enforcing the rules of the game (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The IAD framework  
(Source: Ostrom, Gardner et al. (1994: 37)) 
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The literature using the IAD framework addresses the emergence of co-
governance institutions with three types of preconditions (Möllenkamp, 
Lamers et al. 2008), which include physical conditions, attributes of 
communities and rules-in-use. These three preconditions are actually 
interlinked with the actors that are the focus of the framework in 
transformative rule-making or enforcement (Gibson, McKean et al. 2000).  
 
Physical conditions refer to those local problems within resource 
management, and conditions that trigger policy entrepreneurs to act on 
institutions (Ostrom 1990). This idea has been applied to various previous 
studies on watershed partnerships in the United States and Western Europe 
(Lawrence 2000; Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005). As indicated in section 1.2, 
water problems are often intertwined with the problems in water 
governance. Particularly, given the influence of the water governance 
reform discourses proposed globally and nationally, it is important to 
examine critically whether water problems have determined the formation 
of water partnerships in a context.  
 
The inclusion of community attributes allows that IAD framework to 
reflect the local situations in which participants have organised 
partnerships, creating rooms to explain the interactive, locally embedded 
institutional development in terms of socio-economic aspects. In this way, 
what used to be treated as separate factors are embraced within the 
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boundary of a local study area. This makes the IAD framework particularly 
powerful when it comes to a small-scale analysis.  
 
The third element, rules-in-use, is based on the idea that institutions are 
conceptual patterns in society as rules-in-use, norms, and strategies than 
formally announced rules such as public policy. Co-governance institutions 
are created within water partnerships, when local actors repetitively use 
certain rules-in-use, norms and strategies. The interconnected nature of 
these three factors reflects the dynamic behaviours that are usually 
observed in collective action situation (Ostrom 2005a: 824). Here, rules-in-
use are often enforced with punitive effects on rebellious participants. 
Norms are shared prescriptions among the participants who are aware of 
the costs and incentives given internally and externally. Strategies refer to 
plans set up by the participants, who have knowledge of rules-in-use, 
norms and the expectation of other behaviour. The recognition of the ‘rules-
in-use’ element, therefore, highlights the reality of resource politics and 
stakeholder behaviour. 
 
The way people cooperate in a society has been a key issue in the 
development of the IAD framework. The common features of communities 
that tend to cooperate with each other include 1) a homogenous social 
structure, 2) sharing common interests and norms 3) in a small spatial unit 
(Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994; Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Ostrom 
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(1998)argues that trust, reputation and reciprocity encourage cooperation, 
particularly, in a relatively small social group, which has access to face-to-
face communication and information about actions. This perspective is in 
accordance with Olson (1965)’s work about the high cost of organising 
collective action in larger groups. However, McCay (2002) points out that 
the theoretical understanding of the IAD framework literature needs to 
cover more diverse realities. Recently, studies have shown that cooperation 
cases emerged in heterogeneous and larger scale communities (Agrawal 
2000; Poteete and Ostrom 2004). For example, the larger communities 
performed better in protecting shared forests in Nepal thanks to securing 
more resources. In contrast, it was found that smaller communities more 
easily formed collective action groups, but did not achieve desired 
outcomes (Agrawal 2000). McCay, therefore, demands more focus on ‘the 
political, legal, cultural, and other institutions that mould and constrain 
their perceptions and interpretations and the options and incentives they 
face’(2002: 393).  
 
The IAD framework provides an analytical unit, called an ‘action arena’ for 
this study, where water partnerships operate. This unit of analysis is helpful, 
especially for this research by disclosing interactions between key actors 
and surrounding institutional arrangements and the processes that lead to 
producing outcomes. The seven variables characterising the action arena (as 
shown in Table 3.1 below), are suggested to reflect the complicated nature 
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of interactions within resource management. These variables include (1) the 
set of participants, (2) the specific positions to be filled by participants, (3) 
the set of allowable actions and their linkages to outcomes, (4) the potential 
outcomes, (5) the level of control, (6) the available information, and (7) the 
costs and benefits (Ostrom 2007: 29). When water partnerships operate, the 
seven variables of the IAD framework interact with one another as 
described below:  
Participants are assigned to positions and possible actions of a 
participant depend on his or her position. Actions are linked to 
outcomes, and both actions and outcomes have costs and benefits 
assigned to them. Participants have possibly limited information 
on the linkages between actions and outcomes, and some kind of 
control over this link (Ebenhöh 2007: 87).  
 
Table 3.1 Seven analytical elements for intra-action arena of partnerships 
Analytical 
elements and 
Rules-in-use 
Analytical elements in Action 
situation 
 
Rules in use 
(Operational; Collective-
choice) 
(1) the set of participants  entry & exit rules 
(2) the specific positions to be filled 
by participants  
position rules 
(3) the set of allowable actions and 
their linkages to outcomes  
scope rules 
(4) the potential outcomes  authority rules 
(5) the level of control  aggregation rules 
(6)the available information  information rules 
(7) the costs and benefits payoff rules 
   
Place-related  
intermediate 
variables 
Attributes of physical and material conditions 
Attributes of the community 
Source: Ostrom, Gardner et al. (1994: 37-43) 
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Once the operational conditions of the action situation are analysed, rules-
in-use, one of the preconditions explained earlier, becomes a useful 
indicator as they highlight the patterns of actions taken within partnerships. 
Possible rules used in common-pool resource studies range from 
memberships to punishment and rewards (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994). 
The seven rules as shown in Table 3.1 determine the seven valuables of 
action situations, and work as comparative parameters for partnerships 
operations in small N case studies, adopted in this research.  
 
The key to the IAD framework is how actors shift the rules of the game 
through incentives and adapt to succeed, while individual preferences and 
exogenous factors are given and controlled. Previous studies applying the 
IAD framework paid attention to the high costs of rule enforcement that is, 
problems associated with imposing policies by external organisations 
without consideration of related contexts. For instance, the seven analytical 
elements in an action arena have great explanatory power to show how the 
rules of resource management within a community setting can be enforced 
to produce outcomes through monitoring and sanctioning. Institutions as 
constraints on social actors are not abruptly changeable and could be 
treated as constant, hence, it is understood as in the expression, ‘[t]he happy 
marriage of conundrum, actor and structure’ (Hodgson 1998: 181). In other 
words, ‘institutional maintenance and stability are primarily explained by 
the capacity of institutions to produce collective goods or benefits for social 
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groups’ (Ostrom 1990; cited in Knight and Sened 1995: 2). This viewpoint 
supports self-governance systems rather than institutions (e.g. national 
states) exogenous to community resources. The CPR literature recognise the 
structural (exogenous) variables (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1998; Poteete, 
Janssen et al. 2010), such as the roles of the state in stimulating self-
governance institutions, but because of methodological difficulties (Poteete, 
Janssen et al. 2010) and possibly, the ontological defence against the 
exogenous intervention for self-governance, the attention to the exogenous 
factors to institutional development remain static in the framework. 
 
Furthermore, the conventional IAD framework often assumes the single 
usage of resources (e.g. irrigation), but the use of water resources serves 
various purposes, which are conflicting with each other. Their uses are 
socially embedded within cultural and political contexts as well as 
economic interests (Mosse and Sivan 2003; Franks and Cleaver 2007). The 
inadequate establishment of water-related property rights as well as the 
increasing demand for non-consumptive use of water management adds 
complexities. This suggests that the variety of management topics and the 
scope of external institutions outside a single level of governance are 
possibly beyond Ostrom’s model.  
 
3.1.2 Polycentric governance of water resources 
In order to avoid the application of the IAD framework at the single level of 
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governance, the CPR school acknowledges the complicated interactions 
among multiple levels of resource governance. Especially when the size of 
resources and the affected regions are large, there is tendency to create a 
hierarchy of institutions ranging from a smaller scale to a higher and larger 
scale: the so called 8th principle of institutional design, ‘nested enterprises 
resources’ (Ostrom 1990; Lundqvist 2004; Ostrom 2005b: 269). This principle 
explains that governance consists of constitutional, collective-action, and 
operational level (Ostrom 2007). This notion is able to capture the 
interconnected hierarchy of river basin systems (Harper, Smith et al. 1995; 
Clarke, Bruce-Burgess et al. 2003) or a complex irrigation system with the 
elements of resources for production at various administrative, as found in 
Japan’s old autonomous irrigation system (Sarker and Itoh 2001).  
 
However, admittedly, the nested enterprises principle remains at an early 
stage of concept development (Ostrom 2005b). Four levels —from 
operational to meta-constitutional— of a nested enterprise are roughly 
presumed to be an analogous system to polycentric feature of water 
governance structures in reality (Cleaver and Franks 2005). Recently, 
Ostrom puts forward this feature of resource management organisations by 
specifying the relationship between institutions and the surrounding socio, 
economic and political settings, following her own work (SES framework). 
Yet this does not explain why and how the mechanisms of multi-layered 
governance are sustained and created, but describes the given existence of a 
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polycentric structure. 
 
Similarly, in terms of the scale of water management, Lundqvist (2004) 
argues that it is not always convincing to set a clear boundary for 
institutions, and apply Ostrom’s (1990: 30) idea of ‘the smaller or simpler, 
the better’ to the multi-layered water governance of a nation like Sweden. 
As Ostrom and her colleagues (1999) admit, the CPR can be applicable at 
the local community level, and is a simplified concept of self-governance, 
thus in contrast to the complicated structures of natural resource 
governance. It would be important to recognise the polycentricity of 
institutional development, which Ostrom (2005b: 269) refers to ‘robust 
system—the presence of governance activities organised in multiple layers 
of nested enterprises’. Therefore, this notion of the nested enterprise depicts 
the phenomenon of multi-layered governance structure in water 
management but analytical understanding needs to be advanced with more 
case studies. Galaz (2005) criticises the rather static and economic-
deterministic approach of the common pool resource literature and argues 
the need for more context-reflective analysis in order to deepen the 
understanding of institutional change.In this regard, generally the notion of 
nested enterprise cannot explain how and why co-governance institutions 
could emerge within the state-dominant water governance of Korea.  
 
Despite the significance of the contextual factors highlighting localised 
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institutional development, the IAD framework overlooks exogenous factors 
outside the boundaries of the related community. By separating a rather 
homogenous community from the interlinked broader water governance 
system, the IAD framework tends to overemphasise the role of community-
based factors.   
‘Cultural factors controlling the structure of an action arena 
include generally accepted norms of behaviour, the level of 
common understanding about action arenas, the extent to which 
the preferences are homogeneous, and distribution of resources 
among members’ (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994: 45).  
The emphasis on cultural community-based factors may be further justified 
when the degree of local independence in water governance is very high 
(e.g., in the case of a locally manageable resource—forest—and the history 
of devolution) (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). However, local participants in 
water partnerships have to act within more complicated multi-layered 
governance systems, which are shaped for the multiple uses of trans-
boundary water resources (Caponera 1992: 78-79, 176). As Rydin (2003) 
points out, the discursive reform idea(s) picked up by actors within an 
action arena needs to be used to modify the IAD framework. 
 
In summary, the IAD framework presents two merits as an analytical tool for 
this study. First, the framework is suitable for this study because it 
embraces the diverse aspects of actors as well as contexts in relation to 
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institutional development. This allows the capturing of partnership 
operations from the emergence to outcomes (See Figure 3.1 earlier) Second, 
three preconditions (physical conditions, community attributes and rules-
in-use) capture political, social and physical settings around partnerships, 
while seven analytical elements in action arena disclose the complicated 
interactions among actors within the related contexts (see Table 3.1 earlier). 
These analytical elements allow rich understandings of institutional 
development, overcoming the shortfalls of being descriptive in existing 
partnership studies.   
 
However, as an analytical framework, three additional aspects with regard 
to the emergence and outcomes of partnerships can be identified for further 
modification of the IAD framework. Chiefly, the three ‘preconditions’ used 
in the framework may be insufficient. There is no explanation about how 
specific preconditions in a certain community are changed and/or shaped. 
Such a static account of the preconditions is often used to emphasise grass-
root institutions and criticise the remote management of outside 
organisations such as national government. When a new institution is 
created within a local community, it is necessary to examine what lies 
beyond community level. Changes in water management are often 
determined by episodic events of dramatic changes in political systems. 
Examples are the cases in South Africa and Eastern Europe as well as full 
privatisation in Chile (Dinar 2000: 6-10).  
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Moreover, regarding the preconditions of partnership development, the 
IAD framework is based on CPR studies, which focus on voluntary users of 
economically consumed water resources, e.g. irrigation, at the community 
level or controlled experimental situations. The increased number of water 
partnerships since the LA21 campaigns (see section 1.1.2) are related to non-
consumptive uses such as river restoration. In this case, the motivation of 
cooperation among partnership members cannot be explained through the 
direct economic interests. Thus, the IAD framework needs to evolve to 
explain political influence on actors’ behaviour and its consequences for 
institutional development.  
 
This study employs a multi-criteria approach drawn from partnership 
studies to reveal the dynamic features of partnership outcomes, which will 
be examined in connection with the seven analytical elements of 
partnership operations. This linkage between the operation and the 
outcomes of water partnerships can be used to draw the more detailed 
lessons for further study. The IAD framework contributes to designing 
common pool resource institutions (e.g., resource user groups) for self-
governing alternatives to the existing formal institutions. The stress on 
actors stemming from surrounding conditions and institutional 
arrangements is a useful point for suggesting how to solve externalities in 
human society. In other words, this approach is better at explaining 
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principles of institutional design and lessons for organising and operating 
self-organising institutions for better management of common pool 
resources. Hence, for assessing the outcomes of Korean water partnerships, 
the multiple criteria of partnerships outcomes, examined in the Section 2.3 
(see Table 2.1) will be applied to the link with the seven elements of action 
arena. 
 
Finally, the previous studies tend to provide prescriptive 'designing 
principles' at a single level of resource management, which is often 
criticised as a weakness in explaining the exogenous factors beyond 
community level. In other words, communication among different actors at 
different decision making levels (Ostrom 2007) needs to be improved. This 
weakness is also found when the focus on the organisational boundary of 
partnerships in existing partnership studies fails to explain the bigger 
picture of co-governance institutional development.  
 
3.2 A modified IAD framework for the analysis of Korean water 
partnerships 
This section proposes a modified analytical framework for studying water 
partnership by reviewing the theoretical literature on Mahoney’s 
periodization approach and water management. The review will show that 
the work explicitly addressing water partnerships is limited. Two aspects of 
the IAD framework are subject to modification: (i) an addition of the 
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exogenous factors that lie beyond the community; (ii) an inclusion of the linkage 
between the water partnerships and the existing multi-layered water governance. 
 
3.2.1 Exogenous factors to institutional development and outcomes 
Factors: governance reform at the global and national levels 
The political aspects involved in forming partnerships (see Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff 2002; Flinders 2005) need to be incorporated into the IAD 
framework in order to grasp a broader picture of partnership formation. 
The roles of global reform ideas in relation to the emergence of water 
partnerships need to be analysed with regard to existing water governance. 
The ‘enabling’ role of national states emphasised in governance literature 
indicates that national states conduct the ‘nesting’ of reform discourses into 
the related contexts (Rhodes 1997). However, the current partnership 
literature misses to recognised the roles of national-level actors in the 
development of partnerships (See Evans 2004).  
 
To address the absence of national-level actors and reflect the associated 
political aspects in the IAD framework, this study follows Rydin (2003)’s 
approach. She identifies how the different types of rationality discourses are 
reflected in the environmental planning process in the UK as an action 
arena. She added a discursive approach to the IAD framework based on 
rational institutionalism, which enriches the picture of the policy process by 
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finding various reasons of policy actors’ behaviours. Similarly, Hajer (1995) 
proposes a concept of ‘discursive coalition’ to analyse the collective action 
that influences the development of social institutions. Hajer analyses how 
environmental policies are shaped though political competition based on 
confronting values (See Bickerstaff and Walker 2005; Hajer and Versteeg 
2005). The emphasis on the political interaction is useful for the 
understanding of the emergence of institutions, especially formal 
institutions such as public policy. As this study aims to cover not only the 
outcomes of partnerships but also their formation, Rydin (2003)’s attempt to 
combine political infusion with rational policy process will be particularly 
relevant for examining what discourse proceeded before the preconditions 
in the conventional IAD framework.18 
 
Analytical approach: Path dependent institutional development 
Additionally, this study uses Mahoney’s periodization approach to cover 
the nesting of water reform discourses in relation to partnership emergence. 
Mahoney’s periodization approach claims to be effective in two aspects: 
First, this approach is analytically significant for recognising the long-term 
incremental change or stability of existing institutions. Second, it may 
                                               
18 However, because her discourse study focuses on the outcomes of the existing institutions such as 
decision-making and policy agenda, an additional element of discourses is designed to locate right 
before the action arena, the planning processes. Also, whereas the additional element of rationality 
discourse in her study remains at the national policy level, the nesting of reform discourses in this 
study is the consequence of multi-layered water governance from global, national to local levels. 
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justify how social institutions address challenges by adopting reform 
measures. In other words, Mahoney’s periodization approach reflects both 
change and stability of social institutions in a bigger picture (Jacob 2001).  
 
Institutionalists have broadly focused on the notion of time in institutional 
changes. For example, North (1990; 1995) famously argues that long-term 
institutional changes in a society are usually incremental. In other words, 
abrupt change in the rules of the game at the societal level is too expensive 
to be desired by key agents unless there are urgent needs to rescue the 
political economic benefits in the case of ‘crisis like’ situations. Thus, 
Mahoney’s periodization approach provides the explanatory power to 
investigate larger-scale institutional changes by focusing on the nature and 
direction of change (See Mahoney 2000).  
 
Mahoney’s periodization approach is in contrast to the rational 
institutionalism approach which predominantly presumes preferences are 
given and focuses on the stability of established institutions (Blyth 2002). 
One of the most significant points of dependency is the notion that ‘time 
matters.’ In other words, literature onMahoney’s periodizationplaces 
historical events in the form of steps along the institutional development 
path, which is usually shaped through selective institutional changes. There 
are three distinct phases of path dependent processes, which are as follows:  
- The initial “critical” juncture, when events trigger movement toward a 
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particular “path” or trajectory out of two or more possible ones;  
- The period of reproduction, in which positive feedback reinforces the 
trajectory initiated in phase one; and  
- The end of the path, in which new events dislodge a long-lasting 
equilibrium (Mahoney 2000: 514). 
 
Mahoney’s periodization approach has both merits and drawbacks for 
analysing water partnership development in Korea. First, as previously 
stated, the approach has more explanatory power to reveal the dynamic 
institutional changes due to its broader spectrum in time variation. On the 
one hand, Mahoney’s periodization approach is an all-inclusive analytical 
framework useful for providing expansive understandings of partnership 
development beyond organisational analysis. Whilst this approach 
supports historical explanation of newly emerged institutions from the 
reproduction period, it relies on the rational choice institutional approach 
for the mechanisms of positive feedback and increasing return patterns, 
following North (1990; Pierson 2000). On the other hand, by relating the 
order of events, the linkage between critical junctures and the reproduction 
period remains descriptive rather than analytical. Thus, Mahoney’s 
periodization approach is a useful analytical element when it is used with a 
more analytically detailed approach, such as reform discourses and the IAD 
framework applied in this thesis. In order to link this descriptive analysis to 
the IAD framework, the modification needs additional factors drawn from 
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water studies, to be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.2.2 Social basin: illustrating changes in multi-layered water 
governance 
For institutional development of water partnerships, the concept of a social 
basin is a useful tool for the comparison of governance change. This concept 
is defined as ‘a sub-basin, a local or regional unit of government, or a hybrid 
unit’ (Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005: 35). This notion is useful to demonstrate 
the overlapping boundaries of existing administrative institutions and 
recently developed watershed-based organisations (Blomquist, Heikkila et 
al. 2004; Walker, Gunderson et al. 2006). 19  In water governance, the 
boundary between water management and organisational type has been a 
controversial issue20. The claim that a river basin is a ‘logical unit of water 
management’ (Jaspers 2003) has been advocated by the Integrated River 
Basin Management approach (Hooper 2005). However, in terms of 
management, water services in modern society are not necessarily based on 
respective watershed considering the effectiveness of public-centred 
management accomplished through the size of economy (Pierce and 
                                               
19 Sometimes this term is used to indicate human networks within a watershed or river basin (see 
Walker, Gunderson et al. 2006), which is more close to interlinked virtual community often formed 
in solidarity. 
20  For example, the rationale for geographically based, watershed partnerships is driven by the 
normative idea regarding the river basin as an ideal unit of management. To scholars like Sabatier 
and his colleagues (2005), this norm can be seen as an inevitable result of water policy evolution 
which seeks to overcome the governance crisis. 
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Doerksen 1976; Rees 1998), As noted by Blomquist and colleagues (2005: 35):  
‘Although river basins are important hydrologically, ecologically, 
and economically, not all aspects of stakeholder participation and 
not all decisions and activities that contribute to IWRM have to be 
organised at the basin scale. As we have seen in these cases, a 
variety of scales have been used. The “lowest appropriate level” 
for some IWRM functions may therefore be a sub-basin, a local or 
regional unit of government, or a hybrid unit sometimes referred 
to as the “social basins” (e.g., the basin subcommittees in the Alto 
Tietê case)’.  
 
Based on the work by Blomquist and colleagues, in the following case 
studies, a social basin is definedas an area of 
different/overlapping/separate responsibilities in water management by 
water partnerships and other water organisations.  The ability to visualise 
the relationships among water organisations means this notion of a social 
basin will incorporate an analyticalelement for-“space”in water governance, 
which is often missing inwater governance studies, including Ostrom’s IAD 
framework. As discussed in the previous section, a notion of ‘nested 
enterprise’ can be used to describe social actors and how they interact and 
cross over different layers of decision-making systems, shaped in 
hierarchical structures.  
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However, as pointed in section 1.1.1, thecomplexity of water governance 
stems from clashes and/or interdependency between scales of related water 
resources, such as thewatershed area of a lake and the scope of human 
society-led management systems. Recognising the role of spatial context is 
necessaryin understanding the interconnected units of multi-layered water 
governance:the notion of a social basin will shed light on the territories of 
water governanceinstitutions in Korea. The case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 
look at the process of water partnership development from emergence and 
operation to outcomes. Through examining the two different social basins 
shaped by the formation of water partnerships, the case study analysis 
provides opportunities to comparatively show the changes of water 
governance structures over the time. The difference before and after the 
partnership was established will reveal how new institutions have been 
connected or not within the existing water governance. 
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Figure 3.2 Modified IAD framework (Two research aims are highlighted in bold and 
upper characters) 
 
A modified analytical framework is presented in Figure 3.2, which adopts 
an institutional approach with additional analytical elements. In the 
diagram above, three exogenous factors are put on the left hand side so that 
they precede the emergence of water partnerships. Exogenous factors are 
divided into three: global water reform discourses, national water policy 
reform and local capacity building experiences. These factors are designed 
to reflect the changes to multi-layered water governance in the 
development of water partnerships, which will be examined using 
Mahoney’s periodization analysis. Social basins at the top of the diagram 
will provide the snapshots of the relationships between water partnerships 
and the existing water governance. In terms of the scales of management, 
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this modified IAD framework is designed to overcome the limitation of the 
conventional IAD framework in terms of providing more explanations 
about how new institutions were created through political factors such as 
reform discourses. Another additional element, social basin, will catch the 
multilayered water governance before and after the partnerships are 
created, which address the second weakness of the IAD framework.   
 
Conclusion 
Most academic work on water governance is concerned with checking the 
outcomes of partnerships, which treat an array of governmental and 
nongovernmental partnerships as an isolated organisational type. Why and 
how a new type of institution appeared as a contemporary water institution 
is often overlooked. In order to address this gap in partnership studies, this 
research employs an institutional approach, the IAD framework. It is useful 
in two ways: (i) the disclosure of the complicated interaction among 
participants and institutional arrangement including problems, physical 
conditions and socio-economic contexts; (ii) the unpacking of how water 
partnerships have developed in terms of creating, enforcing rules of co-
governance and producing outcomes for water management in incremental 
stages. The institutional approach has potential for further development to 
understand exogenous factors, i.e. what conditions affected the creation of 
co-governance institutions and what has determined the multi-scale 
development of water partnerships and their relationship to existing water 
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governance.  
 
This chapter has concluded with a modified IAD framework for the 
analysis of Korean water partnerships. In addition to socioeconomic factors, 
it is necessary to include exogenous factors that lie beyond the community to the 
IAD framework. This inclusion will assist this study to analyse the 
development of water partnerships, particularly, in relation with their 
emergence. The exogenous factors include water reform discourses that 
have been internationally promoted, the application of these reform 
discourses in the national policy and local capacity building. To integrate 
these factors with the framework, Mahoney’s periodization approach will 
be adopted as a supplementary analytical tool. Additionally, water 
management topics such as pollution control, river restoration will be used 
to divide two subgroups of partnerships in order to examine how different 
water topics influenced the development of co-governance institutions (See 
section 2.2). The linkage between the water partnerships and the existing multi-
layered water governance will be unveiled through the application of concept 
of social basin. This concept is introduced to illustrate how water 
partnerships have been linked with other existing water organisations. The 
comparison between the social basins before and after the emergence of 
partnerships will explain the interaction between water partnerships, and 
their relationships with the existing water governance shaped at various 
levels of management. The static nature of the IAD framework can be 
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complemented through this modification. The next chapter will discuss the 
methodology of this thesis; that is how to conduct this modified analytical 
framework in the context of Korean water partnerships.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This research employs a comparative case study approach to answer the 
two main research questions as follows: a) How have co-governance 
institutions for water management emerged in Korea?; b) How and why 
have water partnerships in Korea produced certain outcomes? To unpack 
the recent emergence of water partnerships and state-led water governance 
in Korea, it is critical to reveal not only the development of these new 
organisations but also the embedded operation of co-governance 
institutions within South Korean contexts. The case study method is an 
excellent tool to assist an institutional approach, which requires detailed 
stories from individuals as well as political, cultural information 
surrounding the partnerships. 
 
This chapter begins with the explanation of the methodological foundations 
of the research design and moves on to present selected data collection 
methods. The last part of the chapter concludes with a summary of the data 
analysis.  
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4.1 Research design for institutional development of Korean water 
partnerships 
4.1.1 Qualitative comparative case study 
This research employs a comparative case study approach in order to 
analyse a various number of water partnerships that emerged and operated 
in contexts of Korea. A case study has strengths in ‘investigating a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 
2003: 13-14). Hartley adds that ‘case studies are useful when it is important 
to understand how the organizational and environmental context is having 
an impact on or influencing social processes’…and…‘[a] case study can be 
useful in capturing the emergent and changing properties of life in 
organizations’(Hartley 2004: 325). Thus, explanatory case studies are ‘the 
preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when 
the investigation has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’(Yin 2003: 1-2). Its 
distinct merit allows us ‘to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics’ 
of ‘complex social phenomena’ (Ibid).  
 
One of the criticisms of case studies is the problem of generalisability, or 
external validity (Bryman 2004: 51-2), but this is not an issue for this study 
for two reasons. First, the goal of this comparative case study is not to create 
a generalisable theory but to bring out context-rich knowledge (Flyvbjerg 
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2006: 222) in order to enrich the current understanding of an emerging 
water institution in a less explored context, that of Korea. Thus, an analysis 
of a comparative case study in a particular context is to reflect upon the 
divergent institutional development of multiple water partnerships in 
Korea. Secondly, the problem of representativeness can be remedied to an 
extent by carefully selecting multiple cases. The virtue of a comparative case 
study approach is praised by George and Bennett (2005: 18), who indicate 
that ‘the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use 
of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within 
a single study or research program’. Thus, this thesis adopts multiple case 
studies within Korea to address the research questions.  
 
Controlled comparison: Grouping multiple cases 
In order to refine the multiple comparative case study approach, this study 
adopts a well-known research design strategy that is controlled comparison. 
George and Bennett (2005: 151) refer to this as ‘the study of two or more 
instances of a well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every 
respect but one’. For achieving better outcomes from a comparative analysis, 
Lijphart (1975) recommends four strategies:  
 
(i) Increasing the number of cases;  
(ii) Reducing the property-space by combining variables;  
(iii) Focusing the analysis on comparable cases; and  
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(iv) Restricting the analysis to the key variables.  
 
However, as George and Bennett (2005), and Lijphart (1975), acknowledge, 
an experiment-like comparative case study may be too idealistic. For this 
study, as many cases as possiblewere deliberately selected within a national 
context. Additionally, in order to maintain pattern-matching among 
voluntarily emerging partnership cases, the cases for comparison in this 
research were divided into two sub-groups based on the topics and scales of 
water management: namely into those concerned with urban river 
rehabilitation and those involved in regional water conservation.   
 
Design of case study analysis 
In order to achieve valid results from the present investigation, this thesis 
employs Yin’s proposed tactics in research design, data collection and 
analysis processes, as seem in Table 4.1 below. Analysts have provided 
recommendations on how to refine comparative case studies for each phase 
of the research process. Yin (2003), quoting a COSMOS Corporation 
document, proposes that a case study should fulfil four criteria: construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. The procedure of 
data collection and analysis is presented in sections 4.2. and 4.3.  
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Table 4.1 Case study tactics for four design tests 
Tests Case study tactics Related research 
process 
Construct  
validity 
Use multiple sources of evidence 
Establish chain of evidence 
Have key informants review draft case 
study report 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Composition  
Internal 
validity 
Do pattern matching 
Do explanation-building 
Address rival explanation 
Use logic models 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
External  
validity  
Use theory and replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
Research design 
Reliability  Use case study protocol 
Develop case study database 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Source: Yin (2003: 34) 
 
4.1.2 Complementary assessment for partnership outcomes 
To reveal the complicated features of partnership outcomes, data was 
collected through a qualitative case study approach with a complementary 
attitude survey. As the partnerships are relatively new, and consistent data 
on outcomes did not exist at the time of conducting fieldwork for this 
research, the comparative case study approach develops both quantitative 
and qualitative data on partnerships, rather than pursuing an analysis of 
previously published data.  
 
An application of mixed methods for this research is based on the notion of 
complementarity, which has been used increasingly in recent years 
(Bryman 2004; Brannen 2005). Complementarity is sought when ‘the two 
research strategies are employed in order that different aspects of an 
investigation can be dovetailed’ (Hammersley 1996; cited in Bryman 2004: 
455). According to Yin (2003), once relevant situations where compatible 
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research strategies are identified, mixing different research methods can be 
justified. For example, May (2001: 112) points out that 'surveys are often 
used as part of a multi-method approach wherein qualitative methods 
precede and/or follow a survey, thus permitting the development of an 
understanding of agents' perspectives, social process and context'. 
Therefore, this study depends on a qualitative approach of comparative 
case studies as the main methodology. Furthermore, a supplementary 
method of attitude survey will be used to perform the assessment of 
partnership outcomes, which cannot be done through single qualitative 
approach.  
 
4.1.3 Research procedure 
The research design for this study is a comparative case study approach 
with the addition of a survey method for assessing partnership outcomes. 
The procedure of the study is described in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1 Research flowchart 
 
Based on the research design and background information on the Korean 
context, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the details of the research strategies 
employed in each methodology are provided in the next section. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
 The data for this study has been collected mainly through field research 
during 2004 and 2005 in Korea, as well as a number of additional interviews 
followed up through email exchanges in 2006.   
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Various data sources should be sought to conduct comparative case studies. 
Yin (1994) recommends six possible types of evidence, among them 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation, and physical artefacts. In this study, documentation, 
interviews and direct observations have been used because there was no 
single archive for water partnerships and a qualitative multiple case 
approach for this research hardly required physical artefacts. Because it was 
difficult to access some partnerships (see section 4.2.4), participant 
observation was replaced by direct observation of selected activities. The 
author conducted the direct observation of a meeting per single 
partnerships, wherever possible.21  The possible combination of multiple 
sources in data collection for this study involves related public and 
partnership organisations, interviews and surveys, as seen in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.2Data collection methods employed 
Research procedure Methodology 
Research design Mixed methods approach 
Data collection  Background research 
Documentary research 
Pilot study: simple factual survey 
Main fieldwork 
Semi-structured interviews 
Attitude surveys 
 
                                               
21 This was far from a long-term observation method often used in anthropological study, which 
required longer time observation of usually fewer number of cases (See Bernard, H. R. (2006). 
Research methods in anthropology qualitative and quantitative approaches. Lanham, MD, AltaMira 
Press.). 
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4.2.1 Documentary analysis examining reform discourses and 
partnership outcomes 
Documentary analysis is used mainly to understand the contexts of the 
cases and counter-check organisational features, including history, basic 
statistics and preliminary sources of data on partnership outcomes. The key 
sources for documentary data include governmental bodies such as the 
Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Construction and Transport, 
water partnership organisations and private information sources. While the 
web pages of the partnerships and related organisations such as the River 
Network have been the source of a vast amount of information, ranging 
from monthly water quality data in second class local rivers to policy 
reports, personal contact-particularly interviews using snowball strategies-
were also used to gain insights. The contacts with interviewees also enabled 
the acquisition of more exclusive information such as minutes of meetings 
and master plans for certain projects. When needed, an online newspaper 
database run by the Korea Press Foundation, an independent mass media 
watchdog, was used to verify and complement collected documents.  
 
Despite not applying a discourse analysis, the author used a non-traditional 
concept of discourse with reference to ‘water reform discourses’ in the case 
studies. In addition to the role of data verification, documentary analysis 
was applied to check how water reform ideas had been used in the 
emergence and the outcomes of the water partnerships discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Because the IAD framework treats rules-in-use and norms 
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as shaping water partnerships’ operation and outcomes (see section 3.1), the 
views related to co-governance, water partnerships were searched and 
examined in the case study. In this thesis, discourse was only employed in 
order to depict how the actors in the water partnerships represented ideas 
related to water reform.  
 
Discourse is believed to be a notion ‘on the linguistic and pragmatic 
production of meaning’(Feindt and Oels 2005: 163). In so doing, water 
reform discourses are referred to as ‘the ensemble of ideas and concepts that 
are related to the topic of water reform’. Documents containing vision 
statements and organisational aims related to policy reforms and 
partnerships were collected from interviewees and official archives. In 
terms of research phases, documentary analysis was heavily employed to 
highlight the differences in discourses concerned with water reform ideas 
and the way these ideas changed over time. The notion of discoursewas 
only applied in the case studies to complement the institutional analysis 
forming the main analytical framework for the comparative case study 
research. This is in contrast to most of the work of the Discourse Analysis 
School that addresses ‘discourse as an ‘objective’ of research (See Wood and 
Kroger 2000).  
 
4.2.2 Pilot study and pre-interview 
A pilot study was conducted in 2004 in order to gain a preliminary 
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understanding of the background to water governance in Korea and assist 
the documentary analysis, interviews through snowball strategies and case 
selection. During the pilot study, key stakeholders involved with the 
collaborative river basin management in the Han River and Nakdong River 
basins were selected for pilot interviews and asked to complete a short 
questionnaire (see Table 4.3 below). Initially, the pilot survey took place in 
two river basins, instead of targeting those at the national level, because 
they reflected the direction of recent water reform, which had concentrated 
on the four major basins in the country. The two cases cover not only 
geographical differences but also the evolution of recent water reform, 
which had been developed incrementally from the early enactment of the 
Special Act in the Han River in the late 1990s to the introduction of special 
acts in three other basins in 2003. Owing to limited time and budget 
constraints, the Geum and the Yeongsan River basins were not included in 
the pilot study.  
Table 4.3 Questions asked in the pilot survey 
1. The basic characteristics of respondent: demographical nature  
2. Please, list any water governance organisations within your region or other 
areas in Korea.   
3. What do you think of key obstacles and necessary resources for current water 
governance in Korea?  
4. How often have you contacted whom or which water/environmental 
organisation for work related water governance in the last year? Please indicate 
the frequency of contact next to the list of organisational types.    
 
Even though a pilot study collected information from twenty water experts 
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in the two river basins, their answers to the four questions were selectively 
used for this study. The results of a pilot study were useful for recognising 
the ‘water governance organisations’ in Korea, and contributed to the main 
data collection. Respondents were asked to assess the frequency of contacts 
from the given list of organisations, but, where needed, they were invited to 
add more. In addition, the results of this pilot study led to a refinement in 
case selection. The respondents found that they contacted local water 
partnerships, the LA21 offices, or local NGOs more frequently than public 
coordination bodies such as the River Basin Committees in the four major 
rivers. To the second question in the Table 4.3, 10 people pointed out local 
water partnerships as a water governance organisation, while others 
mentioned local LA21 office, an alliance of local NGOs, a River Basin 
Committee and a national water research institute. Thus, this study selected 
local water partnerships as co-governance organisation. Reflecting the 
results of this pilot study, the main data collection and case selection was 
designed to look for evidence of newly emerged water partnerships.  
 
4.2.3 Selection of cases 
According to George and Bennett (2005), it is quite common for case study 
analysts to select cases that share similar outcomes. For this research, the 
sharing outcomes, i.e. the criteria of case selection for this thesis are the 
emergence and operation of water partnerships in Korea. Based on the 
results of the pilot study, the author explored appropriate cases of newly 
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emerged water partnerships at the sub-basin level in the main fieldwork. 
Additionally, the case selection started from the list of partnership 
organisations found from three sources (River Network 2004; Ministry of 
Environment 2004b; Korean Council for Local Agenda 21 2005b).These 
three sources recognised 10 cases of public-private collaboration for better 
water management by 2004, six of them were selected for this study 
(Numbered 1 to 6 in Figure 4.2). These six cases are namely, Jeonju 
partnership, Daecheong lake partnership, Busan city partnership, Incheon 
city partnership, Paldang lake partnership and Gyeongnam Water Forum–1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. For controlled comparison, the six selected cases 
are categorised into two sub-groups based on the scale of water resource 
and the key agenda of the partnerships. Three partnership cases–1, 3 and 4–
are related to urban river rehabilitation and cases 2, 5 and 6 are regionally 
based and concerned with more general water management.  The key 
activities of the selected water partnerships are listed in the Table below.  
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Figure 4.2 Location of the selected case areas in numbers in the Republic of Korea 
(Source: Adopted from (Kang and Ministry of Environment 2007)) 
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Table 4.4 Key activities of the selected water partnerships 
Major activities Jeonju Busan In-
cheon 
Dae-
cheong 
Pal-
dang 
Gyeong-
nam 
Planning and 
Implementation of river 
rehabilitation project with 
local authorities  
√ 
 
 √    
Engaging with citizens 
through events on local 
water resources  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Organisation of sub-
watershed groups  
  √ 
 
√ 
 
 √ 
 
Work in coordination with 
LA21 movements 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 √ 
 
Work on conflict resolution     √ √  
Support of local groups 
implementing river 
rehabilitation project  
 √ 
 
 √ 
 
 √ 
 
Monitoring local water 
resources  
√ √ √ √ √  
Operation of grant 
programme support 
grassroots  
 √ √ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
Organisation of events 
about water resources   
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 √ 
 
Publication of annual 
white paper  
   √ 
 
 √ 
 
Co-management system 
with local governments  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
Monitoring central 
agencies  
 √ 
 
√ 
 
 √ 
 
√ 
 
Participation in the 
operation of current water 
governance institutions  
   √ 
 
√ 
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Major activities Jeonju Busan In-
cheon 
Dae-
cheong 
Pal-
dang 
Gyeong-
nam 
Working beyond the 
locality  
   √  √ 
Source: Interviews and data collection through the fieldwork in 2004/05 
 
Four cases were excluded in this study (marked A, B, C and D in the map) 
because they had lack of data and/or had no partnership organisation at 
the time of conducting field research. In the case of major river basins, there 
were four in total, reflecting the recent development of basin governance in 
Korea. It was difficult to pick the relevant case(s) in the Yeongsan River 
basin (marked A in the map above). A case of collaborative water 
management was recognised by the Korean Council for Local Agenda 21 
(2005b) for Yeongsan River basin, but the scale of the partnership at the 
county level was relatively small and their temporary presence. In order to 
maintain consistency and comparability among cases, the Yeongsan River 
basin was therefore ruled out as a case study for this thesis. Similarly, the 
Nakdonggang, Suwoncheon and Anyangcheon– B, C and D respectively in 
Figure 4.2– were not chosen because there were no partnership 
organisations.  
 
4.2.4 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews and partnership-published documents are the 
second source of primary data, and are used to reveal the processes of 
partnership emergence and organisational operations in the context of 
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interaction with other surrounding institutions. Two stages were involved 
in the conduct of the semi-structured interviews: setting the questions and 
selection of interviewees.  
 
Interview questions 
According to May, ‘questions are normally specified, but the interviewer is 
freer to probe beyond the answers in a manner which would appear 
prejudicial to the aims of standardisation and comparability’ (2001: 123). 
May also indicates that this approach accomplishes the dual goals of 
maintaining the compatibility of data and gaining natural answers from 
interviewees. In contrast to a questionnaire survey, to set up the semi-
structured questions for case studies is about re-shaping the research 
questions to take the form of more accessible and understandable language, 
‘couched in terms of language of informants’ (Wengraf 2001: 62). Interview 
questions were designed to focus on the emergence of water partnerships 
and operations, the notion of water governance to partnerships members 
and extra questions on the water policy processes to the non-members of 
partnerships but related stakeholders, as shown in Table 4.6. All interview 
questions were translated by the author, a native speaker, in Korean.  
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Table 4.5Questions asked in the semi-structured interviews 
- What is the status quo of your organisation(s) such as finance, regular 
projects and programmes (outreach and education, continuous/participatory 
monitoring etc.)? 
- How is the relationship with outside organisations, particularly River Basin 
Management Committee in your basin area and central state ministries?  
- Do you/your institution conduct evaluation schemes whether it is done by 
law or inter- or intra bodies? Do you publish information on the regular or ad-
hoc evaluations?  
- Would you tell me about the strategic plans and key activities of your 
institution? 
- Would you tell me about current challenges and major issues? What are 
the reasons for and solutions to these obstacles/current problems?    
- What do you think of water governance? Which organisations in Korea, as 
far as you know, can be called ‘water governance organisations’?  
 
Selection of interviewees 
The key stakeholders in water governance and partnerships were 
recognised through the pilot survey (Bryman 2004). In order to counter-check recommendations, official documents relating to the partnerships were used. The list of possible interviewees had been drafted based on the list of members of the decision-making committees within each partnership. This was 
possible through the documentary analysis and direct observation of 
partnership meetings. To gain practical knowledge of the partnership as 
much as possible, interviews were arranged with the head of the 
committees in each partnership first. When this was not possible, 
alternative interviewees were sought, identified from the direct observation 
of partnership meetings. At least two interviews were held with every 
interviewee in the partnership bodies and, where possible, related meetings 
were attended in order to observe them from an outsider’s perspective. 
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Difficulties encountered 
Fieldwork must be context-sensitive in order to conduct more realistic and 
appropriate data collection. Tensions between public and private sectors, 
and the mixed nature of partnership bodies with regard to river basin 
management, poses challenge to conducting field research when subject 
organisations are in conflict, both internally and externally. In addition, 
information, or even access to information, is not always available to 
researchers, especially when approaching organisation(s) from the outside. 
For example, with regard to case number 5, the Paldang water policy 
commission had been in internal conflict over changing a regulation system 
(based on pollution load) from a voluntary to a compulsory one. Due to the 
tense atmosphere within the partnership, it was hard to conduct the 
questionnaire survey with the steering committee members, and had to be 
postponed until the situation was resolved when the representatives of six 
local government agencies - officials and residential representatives - 
accepted compulsory regulation on 26 September 2006. Patient liaison with 
key contacts turned out to be the most helpful asset in this case.  
 
‘Lost in translation’ was an expected challenge to this study. The confusion 
in the translation of Korean to English or vice versa for this thesis is a 
common challenge in case studies. As Stake puts, ‘[t]ranslation from 
experimental language to formal language diminishes and distorts some of 
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the meaning’(1995: 86). To address this issue, the understanding of the 
cultural backgrounds and the contexts where the cases have been shaped 
was essential, which was secured by the author’s previous experience in 
water policy and public research. During the fieldwork, the interviews and 
data collection were conducted and recorded in Korean by the author 
herself, a native speaker of Korean, then were translated into English. 
Additionally, the name of the organisations, people and places in Korea are 
often subject to confusion because of Romanisation (Havard College 
Library 2010). This study followed the most recent rule of Romanisation, 
developed by the National Institute of the Korean Language, announced by 
the Korean government in 2000(The National Institute of the Korean 
Language 2000).  
 
4.2.5 Attitude surveys 
In order to answer the second research question examining partnership 
outcomes, a self-completion questionnaire was adopted. May (2001: 92) 
states that ‘surveys, through the use of questionnaires, measure some 
characteristic or opinion of its respondents’. In partnerships studies, this 
approach has been applied in the US (Leach 2002; Leach, Pelkey et al. 2002) 
mainly for the purposes of getting information on newly created 
institutions. In comparison with the case study method, a small-scale 
survey is quicker in terms of producing controlled information and is more 
cost-efficient. Thus, the aim of the questionnaire survey in this study was to 
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support the main qualitative approach by producing evaluative data, which 
would not otherwise be available.  
 
Two supportive survey methods were employed. Firstly, before the main 
fieldwork was undertaken, a pilot questionnaire survey was conducted in 
two sampled water organisations in two cities, in order to gain background 
information and to recognise the relevant case organisations (see section 
4.2.2 for the pilot study explanation). To obtain background information, 
this ‘factual survey’ was conducted to gain information from individuals 
(May 2001: 89) at small scale - less than 50 respondents. Secondly, an 
attitudinal survey of partnership members was conducted because of 
difficulties to gain objective data on partnership outcomes. Hence, it 
employed the self-evaluation method that has been used in the US 
watershed partnership literature. In addition to the three categorised 
criteria (see Table 3.1), this perception-based assessment measured self-
satisfaction of members with each partnership. Despite the members’ 
propensity towards positive responses(Leach, Pelkey et al. 2002), the degree 
of self-satisfaction indicates a significant aspect of internal collaboration, the 
general unity inside a partnership. In addition, its relationship with other 
perceived partnership outcomes can offer different analytical elements in a 
comparative case study. The presumption behind this approach is 
purposive sampling, ‘whereby a selection of those to be surveyed is made 
according to known characteristics’ (May 2001: 95).  The attitude scales, as 
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May mentions, such as the Likert scale, are a set of statements that a 
researcher asks respondents, with the suggested answers on an attitude 
continuum. Despite various criticisms, including weak sensitivity to diverse 
scales (Cummins and Gullone 2000), this method of attitude measurement 
has been popular because of its simplicity.  The ability to adopt simple 
methods outweighs the drawbacks and the survey results complement the 
findings from the qualitative analysis. Table 4.5 presents the questionnaire 
used.  
 
As for the creation of a Likert scaling questionnaire (May 2001; Leach 2002), 
the process involves four steps:  
- Devising statements to measure a particular aspect of the issues concerned, 
e.g., elements of partnership outcomes. 
- Categorising the items in order to see the relationships among them, e.g., 
self-satisfaction with the own partnership, process-related outcomes, 
environmental outcomes and socio-political outcomes. 
- Breaking up the proposed evaluation criteria into those for supplementary 
self-assessment elements and others for documentary assessment, in order 
to keep the simplicity of the attitude questionnaire. 
- Lastly, putting the 1-5 scale into words expressing the degree of opinions: 
1 = strongly disapprove, 2 = disapprove, 3 = neutral, 4 = approve and 5 = 
strongly approve.  
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Table 4.6 Attitude questionnaire form 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
Ideally, the data collection procedure for each case should be as identical as 
possible; however, due to the difficult conditions of fieldwork, the attitude 
survey was conducted in two ways–face-to-face interviews and an 
electronic mail survey, depending on the situation in each partnership. 
Face-to-face interviews and consecutive questionnaire surveys were 
conducted on the site of the Jeonju, Busan and Incheon partnerships. The 
interviewees were explained in advance that the results of survey would be 
used only for this research and were asked to be as honest and objective as 
Questions 1 2 3 4 5 
Q: To what extent are you satisfied with the 
partnership outcomes?  
     
Q: To what degree, would you agree with the 
achievement on the each element of your partnership 
outcomes shown below? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Improved ecological conditions 
Improved water quantity 
Improved water quality 
Mutual understandings 
Learning and change beyond the original group:  
- Expansion of the partnership 
- More application in other fields 
Changes in attitudes, behaviours, institutions & 
practices: Citizen awareness 
Cultural and professional gaps among members 
High transactional costs  
Trust building 
(capacity for) conflict management 
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possible. I was denied access to interviewees in three other partnerships in 
Daecheong, Paldang and Gyeongnam because of the political sensitivity of 
the water partnerships. As they were reluctant to meet this researcher or 
allow an observer to be in their meetings, electronic mails were used to do 
the survey on the members of working committees.  
 
4.3 Data analysis 
Semi-structured interviews were recorded with the permission of 
participants and coded in Korean. As discussed earlier, the six case studies 
were divided into two groups - urban stream rehabilitation and water 
conservation -, and were analysed to highlight the key features of 
partnerships. The results of the attitude survey on partnership outcomes 
were subsequently used for comparative case study purposes, helped by 
the standardised frame of the five-point Likert scale results. This allowed 
this researcher to address the diversity in size and features among the six 
partnerships. The responses were coded in Excel and analysed through 
simple scaling calculation and charts.  
 
Primary qualitative data is the product of semi-structured in-depth 
interviews and the direct observation of six meetings. Follow-up interviews 
and documentary collection were added in 2007 after the fieldwork period 
through e-mail correspondences. In total, 31 interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. Table 4.8 provides further details. 
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Table 4.7 Interviews conducted September 2004-June 2005 
Case Numbers of 
interviews 
Numbers of 
committee 
members 
Jeonju  3+1* 9 
Daechong-ho (lake) 5 24 
Busan  5 23 
Incheon  3 16 
Paldang –ho (Lake) 3+3** 22 
Gyeongnam Water Forum 3 15 
Sub-total  26 109 
Others (River net, KFEM Water committee 
and Daegu Office for Local Agenda 21) 
5 - 
Total 31 - 
* Additional interview in September 2005.  
**Additional interviews took place after the major fieldwork in 2005.  
 
Following Yin (2003)’s recommendations for improving case study results, a 
case study database that summarises the organisational features and 
relevant problems was prepared for preliminary case analysis. The 
prehistory of partnerships wasdrawn from the documentary analysis, 
mentioned in section 4.2.1, in relation to water reform discourse evolution, 
which convened the period between the late 1980s and 2006. The list of 
water-governance-related eventscan be found in the Annex of this thesis. 
 
The survey results of perceived partnership outcomes were coded initially 
into an Excel spreadsheet file. The coded data were analysed by statistical 
analysis software, SPSS. The raw data of the 12 question survey were 
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arranged in a five-point Likert, which were calculated into the median 
marks and scoring percentages (Laerhoven, Zaag-Loonen et al. 2004). Then, 
based on the three categories about environment, socio-political concerns 
and processes (See Table 3.1), these secondary data were grouped for a 
comparative case study in Chapter 7. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a contextually developed research design and 
related methods of empirical investigation for this thesis. A combined 
methodology is applied for this study to conduct the modified IAD 
framework. The study employs a comparative case study approach with the 
support of a simple questionnaire survey and develops an in-depth picture 
of water governance in Korea, focusing on the development of new co-
governance institutions such as water partnerships. The discussion will 
now move on to present the empirical results. Using Mahoney’s 
periodization analysis, Chapter 5 presents the macro-institutional stability 
and recent changes in water governance in Korea beyond the organisational 
boundary of water partnerships with the data collected through fieldwork. 
Chapters 6 and 7 then examine the development and outcomes of six water 
partnerships with a modified IAD framework and the data collected 
through the methodology outlined in this chapter.  
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List of interviews 
Table 4.8 The number of the interviews 
Case Numbers of 
interviews 
Jeonju partnership 4 
Daechong-ho (lake) partnership 5 
Busan urban stream partnership 3 
Incheon urban stream partnership 5 
Paldang_ho (lake) partnership 6 
Gyeongnam Water Forum partnership 3 
Others (River net, KFEM Water committee, Daegu Office for 
Local Agenda 21and a participant of PCSD) 
5 
Total  31 
* the most of the interviews were conducted from Sept. 2004 to June 2005 except 3 at the 
Paldang case in 2006 due to internal reasons 
 
Table 4.9the list of interviews in the urban cases 
Cases No
. 
Details of interviewees (Date, Organisation, 
Name) 
Types 
Jeonju J1 28/3/2005, local office for LA21 Mr Shin JC  Phone 
J2 31/3/2005, ex local office for LA21 Mr Kim 
JB 
Face-to-face 
JM 31/3/2005, Advisory Meeting  Meeting 
observation 
J3  7/4/2005, Jeonju City Mr Lee HH  Face-to-face 
J4 07/06/2005, Mr Lee HH E-mail 
Busan 
 
Bp
1 
19/10/2004, Busan Metro City, Mr. Kim KP Pilot, Face-to-face 
Bp
2 
26/10/2004, Busan Development Institute, 
Dr Yang JW 
Pilot, E-mail 
Bp
3 
11/29/2004, Busan Development Institute, 
Dr Shin SK 
Pilot, Face-to-face 
B1 11/29/2004, Oncheoncheon Network & 
Busan partnership, Mr Lee JK 
Face-to-face 
B2 29/11/2004, Mr. Kim KP Face-to-face 
B3 21/1/2005, Oncheoncheon Network & Busan 
partnership, Mr Lee JK 
Phone 
B3
-1 
12/4/2005, Mr Lee JK ADDITIONAL 
B4 12/4/2005, secretary general, Busan office 
for LA21 
Face-to-face 
B5 12/4/2005, a member of executive 
committee, HakJang Community Centre 
Face-to-face 
BM 12/4/2005, Executive committee Meeting 
observation 
Incheon 
 
* 21/1/2005, Dr Kim SW, Paldang Water 
Policy partnership, about his interview with 
Incheon partnership 
Face-to-face 
I1 24/3/2005, a fulltime staff (NGO), Incheon 
Partnership, Ms Choi HJ  
Face-to-face 
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IM 1/4/2005, Working Group Committee Meeting 
observation 
I2 1/4/2005, Jansucheon Network, Mr Kim SK Face-to-face 
I3 4/2005, a researcher, Incheon Development 
Institute, Dr Cho KD 
Email&Phone 
 
Table 4.10The list of interviews in the regional cases 
Cases No. Details of interviewees (Date, Organisation, Name) Types 
Daechong-
ho (lake) 
D1 4/3/2005, local academic Dr Bae NH Phone 
DM 4/3/2005, Annual Assembly  Meeting 
observatio
n 
D2 4/3/2005, Daejeon KFEM s.g., a co-founder of the 
partnership, Ms Kim JN 
Phone 
D3 6/4/2005, ex secretary general of partnership, s.g. 
of Daejeon Green Federation, Ms Park JH 
Phone 
D4 13/4/2005, Ms Park JH Face-to-
face 
D5 13/4/2005, a fulltime staff of the partnership, 
Anonymous 
Face-to-
face 
Paldang-ho 
(lake) 
P1 16/12/2004, an expert member of the Paldang 
partnership, Dr. Kim SW 
Face-to-
face 
P2 21/1/2005, Dr. Kim SW Face-to-
face 
P3 07/06/2005, an expert member of the partnership, 
Dr. Kim KM 
Face-to-
face 
P4 29/09/2005, Dr. Kim KM Face-to-
face 
P5 2006.7.24, Dr. Kim KM Email 
P6 2006.12.2, a officer at the Maxium Load 
Management Dept, MoE 
Face-to-
face 
Gyeong-
nam Water 
Forum 
K1 15/12/2004, executive office chief of Gyeongnam 
Water Forum, Mr Lee, SY 
Face-to-
face 
K2 4/1/2005, Mr Lee, SY Face-to-
face 
K3 18/2/2005, Mr Lee, SY Face-to-
face 
KM 25/3/2005, 2005 Gyeongnam Water Forum Meeting 
observatio
n 
KM 25/3/2005, 2005 the meeting of Gyeongnam River 
Network preparatory committee 
Meeting 
observatio
n 
K4 17& 20/7/2006, Mr Lee, SY Face-to-
face 
Others O1 15/12/2004, Daegu office for LA21, executive staff 
chief, Mr Ryu, BY 
Face-to-
face 
O2 15/12/2004, Yeongnam Men & Nature Community, 
Dr Ryu, SW 
Face-to-
face 
O1-
1 
13/1/2005, Daegu office for LA21, Mr Ryu, BY Additional 
Phone 
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O3 23/1/2005, the staff of Water Committee, Seoul 
KFEM, Mr Kim NJ 
Phone, E-
MAIL 
O4 25/1/2005, the ex-staff of the River Network, Ms 
Lee, JH 
Face-to-
face 
O5 23/6/2005, a participant of water resource 
subcommittee, PCSD, Dr Lee MH 
Face-to-
face 
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CHAPTER 5 EXOGENOUS FACTOS BEHIND PARTNERSHIP 
EMERGENCE:  INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
MULTI-LAYERED WATER GOVERNANCE IN KOREA IN 
THE 1990S 
Introduction 
This chapter explores three path-dependent changes in water institutions in 
Korea in the 1990s; (i)examining how national and local actors responded to 
the recent water governance reforms: (ii)national policy reforms and:(iii) 
local capacity building in Korean contexts. For these discussions, 
Mahoney’s periodization approach is used.Mahoney’s periodization 
approach is particularly useful in depicting institutional changes at macro 
scale. In this study, a particular emphasis is made on the roles of national 
government. The national state has mainly controlled Korean water 
governance since the 1960s (See the brief explanation in section 1.3). 
However, despite the state’s control over water resource management, 
participatory governance reform was introduced due to a series of water 
crisis prevailed in the 1990s. This study examines the degree of changes to 
the centralised water governance and how this change in state-led water 
management could be related to the development of water partnerships in 
Korea.  
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Figure 5.1 Institutional changes before the emergence of partnerships: Modified IAD 
framework  
(See the boxes in the top left for the exogenous factors; analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 are 
shaded.) 
 
The analysis in this chapter is built upon capacitybuilding for water co-
governance both at the national and local levels in Korea in the 1990s (See 
the boxes in the top left of Figure 5.1 above). At the national level, the 
analysis explores the different paths taken by LA21 campaigns in Korea and 
reveals the implications of these local capacity-building campaigns for the 
development of water partnerships. Subsequently, at the local level, the 
Saving River Campaigns established since the mid-1990s will be 
investigated as another factor that was influential to prompt changes to 
Korean water governance. Urban rivers have become a new agenda item for 
water resource management through the popular adoption of conservation 
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campaigns and subsequent rehabilitation projects. These changes show how 
local and national actors interpreted the recent reform ideas derived from 
global politicsand the ecological conservation of water resources in the 
1990s.  
 
5.1 National policy: Stability and change in centralised water 
governance in Korea 
The physical conditions of water resources in Korea are challenging for 
sustainable managementdue to seasonal differences in water availability 
and related control problems. Korea remains dependent on its rivers as the 
primary source of drinking water and supplies for other usages; there is 90% 
dependency on the four major rivers (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 for the 
map). The artificial dams were also built in these rivers to regulate their 
flows (MY, Han 2000). This dependency represents a serious challenge to 
conventional water resource management, if experiencing the degradation 
of water quality and hydrological conditions. The typical Korean hydraulic 
profile, which shows highly seasonal, mostly summer, rainfall with rapid 
run-off to steep sloped rivers, exerts severe pressure on managing water 
quantity and quality. The four rivers are vulnerable during humid summers 
with flood risk, and the water quality and ecosystems in the rivers are 
threatened in dry winters with the danger of drought. In addition, 
eutrophication has been identified as a chronic water quality issue in the 
artificial lakes, created by dam construction (Prime Minister's Office (PMO) 
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2002). 22 
 
5.1.1 State-driven water governance under the pressure of rapid 
socioeconomic development 
State-led socioeconomic development and centralised water management 
The centralisation of Korean water governance has been shaped through 
rapid, state-driven socio-economic development under the guidance of the 
‘developmental state’ (Woo-Cumings 1999). National agencies with 
affiliated public corporations operated as implementation tools, covering 
two major functions of management- supply and pollution control. Along 
with the trend of state-driven, rapid economic growth, Korea has 
experienced massive socioeconomic developments over the four and a half 
decades since independence in 1945 (e.g. GNP from 380 USD in 1960 to 
6,600 USD in 1990; urban population rate from 35.8% in 1960 to 89.3%in 
2003) (Ministry of Environment 2003; Korea Statistical Information Office 
2005). According to CH, Chang (2007: 12), the rapidity of economic 
development and the resulting social transformation in Korea is, “truly 
spectacular…Better nutrition and health care mean that a child born in 
Korea today can expect to live 24 years longer than someone born in the 
                                               
22These lakes serve as key water withdrawal sources in some river basins, such as Paldang on the 
Han River, Daechong on the Geum River, Juahm on the Youngsan River and Mulgum on the 
Nakdong (See Prime Minister's Office (PMO) (2002). Water Management White Paper (MulKwanRi 
BaekSeo). Kwacheon, OPM.). 
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early 1960s (77 years instead of 53 years). In terms of such life-chance 
indicators, Korea's progress is as if Haiti had turned into Switzerland.” This 
miraculous economic growth started from the first 5-year plan for economic 
development established by Dictator President Park Jung-Hee’s 
administration in the late 1960s. Thus, rapid economic growth was possible 
because this ‘development dictatorship’ gave priority to often highly 
polluting, industries, rather than other development paths (Moon 2004; 
Kwon 2006: 44)23. 
 
The rapid economic changes and politically volatile social conditions of the 
Korean development path altered the physical conditions of water 
management. First, until the early 1990s, the state-led economic growth 
focused on strategically nurturing the priority sectors of the Heavy 
Chemical Industry (HCI) including machinery, electronics, automobile, 
shipbuilding, chemical and high-technology sector of semi-conductor and 
biotechnology (HJ, Chang 1993). These factories, located in the major river 
basins and coastal cities, have been heavy polluters of Korean water sources. 
Second, in terms of land development that directly affects water resource 
managementa limited number of key public corporations dedicated powers 
and budgets to ‘National Strategic Projects’, which were represented the 
                                               
23 It was confirmed in the interview with the former minister of the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs (MOHSA) that attempts in the mid-1970s to slow down the rapid growth of national 
economy were too weak to be effective (Moon 2004) . 
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dominant land use decision-maker and acted without any proper public 
scrutiny and consultationuntil the mid-1990s (Koh 1995). The nation-state 
and the public corporations, at the expense of democracy and 
environmental conservation, integrated the functions of the regulator and 
the regulated in pursuit of higher economic returns. For example, the 
Korean Water Corporation (KOWACO), affiliated with the Ministry of 
Construction and Transport (MoCT), was able to mitigate the water 
provision deficit using huge revenues from the development of industrial 
complexes (MH, Lee 2003). This structural overlapping of economic and 
political interests in state-led land development was criticised both for a 
lack of accountability and the resultant negative environmental impacts, 
especially, on water resources (MR, Cho 2004). NGOs,in particular, strongly 
challenged the large development projects endorsed by the national 
government and carried out by public corporations. 
 
In addition to land development, the central government’s land regulation 
has shaped the features of water governance, particularly water pollution 
control in the major rivers. For example, in order to facilitate the rapid 
economic expansion of Seoul, the dictator President Park and his successors 
adopted multiple land regulation schemes outside Seoul and Gyeonggi 
province. These land regulationschemes included two zoning systems, the 
Water Sources Protection Areas and the Special Protected Areas. They were 
introducedin the late 1970s and 1990s respectively to address the chronic 
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pollution oftwo major water sources, the Paldang and Daecheong 
Lakes.24The application of the zoning systems lacked public consultation, 
which resembled the state-led large development projects mentioned earlier. 
The central government itself contradicted this land use regulation by 
allowing restaurants and hotel businesses to operate without installing 
proper wastewater treatment facilities near the regulated areas (CS, Kim 
2000). Thus, as Kim (2000) describes,pollution in the Paldang and 
Daecheong lakes was a typical example of ineffective implementation of 
state-controlled policy.  
 
The 1990s saw greater demand for procedural legitimacy as a result of 
democratisation movement, and therefore, observed changes in water 
governance. The public expressed their anger about severe pollution of the 
major water sources. Furthermore, with the growing awareness of 
democracy, the lack of procedural legitimacy became subject to public 
discussion, and social conflicts about the water usage and protection broke 
out (Koh, Kim et al. 2005). For example, after democratisation and the 
renewal of local autonomy, the de-regulation of land control in the water 
resources protected areas became a significant issue on the political agenda 
in the 1990s. For nearly a decade of attempting to incorporate environment 
concern in land regulation, recurring conflicts over local inhabitants’ 
                                               
24The Special Protected Areas were added in an expanded area surrounding the Water Sources 
Protection Areas because of an outbreak of pollution problems in the late 1980s. 
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property rights and management of water sources were observed. Local 
residents and local authorities in the regulated areas for water management 
raised their voices in favour of de-regulation and the enhancement of 
procedural legitimacy in water policy processes. Thus, the instrumental 
approach of national water policy resulted in complex and inter-related 
social problems after the democratisation. 
 
Furthermore, the state-led socioeconomic development at the expense of 
democratic decision-making caused tension in Korean society. Despite the 
absolute control of the authoritarian regimes until the 1980s (Tikhonov 
2007), the resistance of non-state actors and their social influence was 
recognised even during this period. Koo (1993: 231) indicates that modern 
social change in Korea is “a rather discontinuous, uneven and conflict-
ridden one determined not by some immutable logic of modernism but by 
historical contingencies and a dialectical process of social change.”Thus, the 
relationship between the nation state and the nongovernmental groups had 
“a history of mutual conflict” (Head and Ryan 2004: 2), which was far from 
the collaboration and shared responsibility of co-governance, fostered later 
in the formation of water partnerships.  
 
Institutional changes in the 1990s 
The rapid socioeconomic development of Korea gave rise to other 
significant institutional changes in the 1990s. Domestically, the new socio-
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political landscape was characterised by three central aspects: 1) Political 
democratisation in the late 1980s (KD, Kim 2008); 2) the soaring growth of 
civil society led by nationwide NGOs in the late 1980s and the 1990s (See 
Armstrong 2002); and 3) the re-application of the local autonomy system in 
1995 (DJ, Choi and Park 2001).25 In particular, the two consecutive centre-
left wing governments led by the late Mr Kim Dae Jung (1998~2002) and the 
late Mr Roh Moo-hyun (2003~2007) were the enablers that streamlined 
policies in favour of empowering local governments and civil society as 
well as ensuring environmental conservation. For example, in 1998, the 
President cancelled the Youngwol Dam plan, once a long-term national 
strategic plan to build a dam prepared by the only public corporation for 
water resource development, the then KOWACO (K-Water at the present). 
It was the first official cancellation of any nationally prepared dam plan, 
which was made as a response to nationwide protests based on 
environmental concerns. Such protestswould have been suppressedif these 
took place before the mid-1990s.  
 
Another reason for institutional changes in water governance was the active 
participation of the Korean government in the economic globalisation since 
the mid-1990s. The Republic of Korea joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
                                               
25Because the government system in Korea is based on the presidentialism, the local council and 
governments are independent to each other. 
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Development (OECD) in 1996 in order to integrate the economy into global 
markets (Business-Academic partnership at Seongshin Women's University 
2006). This led to institutional pressure from the international organisations 
to adopt stricter environmental policies and refine business management 
systems (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2006). 
Another substantial pressure was received when Korea suffered the Asian 
economic crisis of 1997, which was interpreted as the failure of Korea’s 
national economic growth model on the basis of seemingly idiosyncratic 
marriage of forced nationalism with rapid economic growth (See Woo-
Cumings 1999; Lim 2001). In addition, the economic crisis of 1997-98 
brought new liberal public administration ideas to government structures 
and services. These institutional changes gave a push towards the 
decentralisation of a traditional, centralised nation-state, which used to be 
the key controller of water governance in Korea. 
 
5.1.2 Water policy reforms following the pollution problems and 
governance crisis 
Water crisis becoming a crisis of governance 
The chronic pollution in its major water sources had haunted the Korean 
government from the late 1980s. Stemming from the country’s rapid 
industrialisation, the severely polluted four large rivers, the major water 
sources for the nation, had caused a national crisis by the 1990s. The 
government study that found out four rivers were contaminated of heavy 
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metal and bacteria were revealed by the Kyunghyang News in 1989 led to 
the announcement of the first ever nation-wide policy measure for water 
quality protection in September 1989, the Comprehensive Measure for 
Clean Water Provision (CMCWP)(National Archives of Korea 2006). 
Despite 7 years’ investment, the continued deterioration in water quality at 
Mulgum, a downstream area of the Nakdong River, became a serious social 
issue, as this area since the river supplied water to 4 million people. Other 
accidents ensued in early 1994, including the leakage of organic solvent and 
carcinogens that caused the interruption of water provision to 10 million 
people in the Nakdong River. Public debates were triggered over the 
accountability and capacity of existing water management systems (DC, 
Kim and Han 1994). Therefore, this pollution-focused water crisis in Korea 
became a constant source of public pressure on central government. 
 
In Korea, the strategic political priority for water supply had been for 
domestic and industrial uses in urban areas where nationwide population 
and industrial facilities were concentrated(SB, Shim and Lee 1996). As key 
sources of water supply, major rivers were largely managed by the central 
agency for construction under the River Act 1961; this was amended in the 
1980s to allow the involvement of local authorities. In order to address ‘the 
more significant usage’ of water resources, the new River Act 1999 divided 
rivers into three hierarchical orders, ranging from the National Rivers to the 
1st Local, the 2nd Local and the Urban streams based on their importance as 
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water sources. The classification and the allocation of management roles 
were done by the central agencies, i.e. the MoCT. This strongly centralised 
classification system had been efficient in developing water sources and 
providing basic water supply. Until the mid-1990s, there had been hardly 
any challenge to the fixed policy goals and related plans. This state-
controlled system became less effective, as local authorities started to 
compete with each other over the self-governance of their local rivers and as 
non-governmental groups raised questions about the current management 
system (Koh, Kim et al. 2005).  
 
In particular, the segmentation and the centralisation of water supply and 
river management systems became the target of nationwide criticism after 
the pollution accidents. Hence, water problems in Korea became both 
problems of water management and of governance more generally. The 
initial focus of the debates moved from demanding for more public 
investment in water infrastructure and by the stronger regulation of 
wastewater treatment to ensuring more coherent water management by the 
central government (Koh 1995)26. For instance, the debates in the major 
newspapers were about the fragmented management of water provision 
                                               
26 Koh (1995) finds that the key reason for water policy change in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
a series of water pollution accidents rather than governmental initiatives. She criticises the package 
of water quality control plans at that time as myopic, prescriptive and based on the lack of 
transformative perspectives in central government agencies such as MoE. Given that MoE was a 
young and relatively small agency, it was not strong enough to negotiate and compete against the 
traditionally strong initiatives of resource development launched by MoCT.  
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among three different ministries and local authorities(Associate Press in 
Daegu 1994; Editor's comment 1994). More fundamentally, they called for a 
switch in the national policy priority from emphasising economic 
development to giving consideration to environmental conservation (H, Im 
1994).  
 
In this time, public discourse became not only audible but also powerful in 
making the dominant decision makers, national state officials, more 
answerable for their decisions (SJ, Han 1998; CS, Kim 2000; MR, Cho 2004). 
The growing power of environmental NGOs provided the contesting 
scientific ideas and the expertise on organised demonstrations that 
influenced other civil society actors, while the NGOs themselves became 
active in setting a political agenda centred on environment issues (HY, Cho 
2000; MR, Cho 2004). 
 
State-controlled multi-layered water governance: consequences of ‘place-
based, participatory reform’ 
1995 in particular was a watershed year for Korean politics and water 
management. Water pollution in the major rivers and local development 
under the new autonomy27 system started to stimulate the water conflicts 
                                               
27In 1995, a full local election system was reintroduced since it was banned by the coup, led by the 
dictator Park Jung-Hee in 1961.  
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between regions, or between the national state and local residents. It was a 
defining moment in the history of Korean water policy because of the 
initiation of community hearings, led by senior officials in the Ministry of 
Environment. These hearings first took place in areas around the river 
basins where water conflicts were strong due to protests against 
government regulatory plans and the development projects of upstream 
regions. In particular, there was a conflict between the residents around 
Paldang Lake and the water consumers of the downstream Seoul areas in 
the Han River Basin. MoE mobilised five provinces and eleven central 
agencies to draft the Comprehensive Measure for Water Management 
(1996~2005, hereafter the CMWM) and managed the negotiations with 
those local governments in the regulation-affected areas of Paldang Lake 
(Ministry of Environment 2002a). 
 
Facing amounting social pressure, the Korean government chose to 
maintain its regulatory authority over water management by increasing the 
roles of the environment ministry (MoE) and creating a new cross-agencies 
coordination body, the Water Policy Coordination Committee under the 
Prime Minister. This responsive but conservative move was also reflected in 
another reform measure when the CMWM was rushed through to address 
the serious drought broke out in 1996. The CMWM  gave more emphasis to 
water governance in the four major river basins by means of  creating a 
taskforce team under the Prime Minister’s Office (Prime Minister's Office 
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(PMO) 2000). Instead of drafting a single nationwide plan, this measure was 
composed of four policy subsets and related acts, addressing each of the 
four major river basins separately(National Archives of Korea 
2007).However, in light of the governance reform initiatives in global water 
politics, the series of water policy reform hardly addressed the emerging 
agenda of ecosystem conservation for water management in the EU(see 
section 2.1 for the details).Thus, the structure of Korean water governance 
had become multi-layered involving various levels of co-ordination of 
policies, policy planning, river basin management and local government 
execution. (See Figure below and Table 5.1)  
 
Figure 5.2 The multi-layered water governance in Korea after the CMWM 
Source: Adapted from the PMO (2002) and Ministry of Environment (www.me.go.kr)  
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Table 5.1 The introduction of the CMWM to four major river basins 
Target river 
basins 
Related water 
sources 
Publication 
of policy 
plan after 
consultation 
Related Acts Enactment 
(year) 
Han River  Paldang lake 
and etc. 
November 
1998 
Act Relating to the 
Han River Water 
Quality Improvement 
and Community 
Support 
February 
1999 
Nakdong 
River 
Mulgum (a 
downstream 
withdrawal 
point) 
December 
1999 
Act on the Nakdong 
River Watershed 
Management and 
Community Support 
January 
2002 
Geum River Daecheong 
lake and etc. 
October 
2000 
Act on the Guem 
River Watershed 
Management and 
Community Support 
January 
2002 
Yeongsan 
River 
Juahm lake 
and etc. 
October 
2000 
Act on the Yeongsan 
& Sumjin River 
Watershed 
Management and 
Community Support 
January 
2002 
Source:(National Archives of Korea 2007; Ministry of Environment 2009).  
 
5.1.3 Implications of institutional change to Korean water governance 
The changes that the CMWM brought to Korean water governance were as 
follows: 
- In order to control the persistent pollution in the water sources of four 
major River basins, the CMWM included pollution control based on the 
pollution load in addition to conventional concentration-based control.  
- The consultation before policy implementation was adopted for the first 
time in Korea’s environmental policy.28 
- The basin-specific policy was introduced to reflect the unique features of 
                                               
28However, this progress in water policy had been criticised as one of the key problems in water 
governance in the early 1990s. 
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each river basin, which contrasted with the homogenous, top-down policy 
that had been in place before the CMWM.  
- The roles of regional governments were formally acknowledged in this 
basin-specific policy reform. The governors and mayors of provinces and 
metropolitan cities were invited to be governing members of the River basin 
committees in the four basins. This was in contrast to the previous water 
policy reform, which established a coordinating body under the Prime 
Minister’s Office in 1994 to address the problematic segmentation at the 
national level only.  
- Lastly, when the conflicts over water regulation and land development 
broke out after the application of the local autonomy system in 1995, the 
CMWM managedthese conflicts through direct communication with local 
communities (Ministry of Environment 2002a).  
 
However, the key features of the centralised water management and the 
lack of interest in co-governance development continued. For instance, the 
participatory process introduced through the adoption of CMWM 
remained weak. Only those actors from the public sector were invited to sit 
on the new co-ordination organisations, which arethe river basin 
committees. Moreover, the communication among the members from the 
different central agencies and local authorities was limited. This was 
worsened by the absence of any planning role for other organisations 
(including local governments as well as NGOs) below the river basin level 
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in the Acts mentioned in Table 5.1 above. As a result, despite thebasin-
specified plans in the Table 5.1, the empowerment of local stakeholders 
below the provincial level remained relatively tokenistic(JK, Kim 2002).29 
 
The limited participatory reform faced some challenges later on. According 
to the mid-term evaluation for this plan in early 2003, the water quality of 
the Han River failed to meet the goal (Prime Minister's Office (PMO) 
2002).30 Furthermore, the negotiation with the local communities resulted in 
the dilemma of communication and policy enforcement. To persuade the 
opposing local communities in the Paldang area in the Han River basin for 
the enactment of the CMWM, the MoE compromised the first feature of the 
CMWM and exempted thisarea from the full compulsory application of this 
new pollution regulation. The central government agreed to implement 
voluntaryapplication (Interview #P6). 
“Initially, the new pollution regulation was introduced as 
‘voluntary option’ in the Han River basin because the central 
government wanted to de-regulate complicated land regulation in 
the areas near Seoul…Later, when this voluntary option made 
trouble with the MoE” (Mr Cho, an official at the Ministry of 
                                               
29  For example, this basin-specific planning scheme was criticised for just adding one more 
administrative unit, namely the River basin committees 
30Facing strong criticism of the water source supplied to half of the national population in the capital 
region, the MoE aimed to improve the Paldang Lake to 1st degree drinking water standard - below 
BOD 1.0 mg/L- by 2005, whilethe same agency targeted to improve three other basins up to the 2nd 
and the 3rd degree of water quality standard. 
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Environment, Dec. 21, 2006).  
The conflict between the MoE and the local communities in Paldang 
reignited when the MoE tried to reverse the decision to the voluntary 
regulation and to make the application compulsory in 2003 (Prime 
Minister's Office (PMO) 2002). This conflict will be examined in greater 
detail in the case of Paldang partnership in Chapter 6.  
 
The previous analysis has identified the key participants in Korean water 
governance at the national, basin and local levels and the way their 
relationships have been shaped through the history of water crisis and 
reforms. The Korean government, which traditionally led economic growth 
and controlled the market (HJ, Chang 1993), had to react to this new 
challenge with their own initiatives. The resilience of centralised water 
governance structure, shaped in times of state-led economic development, 
meant that the changes through water policy reforms were incremental. 
Whilst the state control continued to be present in the recent water policy 
reform measures, the multi-layered structure of water governance known 
as the CMWM managed to involve provincial and metropolitan 
government leaders in the basin management processes. At the same time, 
the nongovernmental actors at all levels and governments at community 
level wereinvited to consultation, but only to its initial stage. Thus, the 
CMWM shows the limited extent to which the centralised Korean water 
governance allowed newcomers, such as local authorities and 
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nongovernmental actors, into formal policy processes. Under the 
democratisation and devolution of the 1990s, these newcomers came to gain 
greater power, and the limited CMWM collaboration anticipated the 
emergence of co-governance water institutions.     
 
In the next two sections, new paths of developments will be analysed, 
which are in contrast to the rigid and incremental change in national water 
policy. These new paths show signs of empowerment of local actors and 
collaboration between government and nongovernmental actors.  
 
5.2 Local capacity building 1: the LA21 movement and national policy 
reforms 
As outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Agenda 21 is referred asan action 
plan of the United Nations (UN) related to sustainable development and 
was an outcome of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. In Chapter 28 
of Agenda 21, local actors’ role in Agenda 21 is emphasised. Local 
programmes to actualise Agenda 21 is called as LA21(UN/DSD 1993). 
 
The organisational structure, operation and the agendas of LA21 are 
strongly related to the concepts of co-governance institutions. The 
initiatives of local governments and NGOs led to the rapid increase in the 
number of LA21 action plans and local officesbetween 1997 and 2000(GG, 
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Kim 2005).31  This critical juncture of this institutional change had been 
initially planned and implemented at the local level. Thus, local actors were 
able to experience ‘co-governance’ through the LA21 campaigns by leading 
this bottom-up and swift development of LA21 planning publications. 
Therefore, it was a new path development of local initiative and 
participatory governance, which later nurtured the creation of water 
partnershipsin urban areas in particular.  
 
Table 5.2 describes how these LA21 movements came to create the critical 
juncture in Korea, which laid the foundation for achieving the 
empowerment of local actors. The following sub-section explains this in 
detail.  
 
                                               
31 This result of the LA21 movement in Korea was acknowledged in the WSSD in Johannesburg, 
2002 as ‘a best practice’ achievement (Kim 2005). 
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Table 5.2 Paths of institutional changes: the LA21 movement in Korea (1960~2000s) 
Paths Incidents Period 
   
Precondition 
State-driven economic development 
with minimum environmental policy 
1960s~1989 
 ↓  
Critical Juncture 
NGOs participation to United Nations 
Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) 
1992 
Participation of local authorities starting 
from Busan 
1994 
 ↓  
Reproduction 
period 
Creation of the Presidential Commission 
for Sustainable Development in Korea 
and wide spread of permanent offices 
for LA21 
1999~ 
 
5.2.1 The critical juncture: global reform discourse on sustainable 
development 
Water governance reform in Korea was related to the international 
promotion of the LA21 campaign. In 1992, a comprehensive plan of action, 
Local Agenda 21 was endorsed by international, national and municipal 
leaders at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Local Agenda 21 
campaign aims to empower local stakeholders to plan a comprehensive 
sustainable development in a consensus-based way (Conca 2006). At local 
level, it is envisaged that alocal office for LA21 is formed as a partnership 
composed of local government-NGOs-private actors, planning and 
delivering Local Agenda 21 action plans. As well as delivering a Local office 
for LA21, national and global participants play ‘support roles’ to the 
campaign, which is designed to operate in a structure of multi-level 
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governance. Lastly, LA21 covers not only traditional environmental 
management topics such as air, water and ecology but also planning, 
culture and local governance. Particularly, the Chapter 18 of the LA21 guide 
is devoted to the protection and sustainable management of freshwater 
resources(UN/DSD 1993).  
 
The beginning: NGOs’ participation in global reform dialogues 
The start of the LA21campaign in Korea was initiated by the NGOs that 
participated in the UNCED in 1992, resulting in the first published agenda 
for a small satellite city, Ansan near Seoul in 1994. This humble start was 
picked up by city officials in a metropolitan city, Busan, which then had 
further knock-on effects on other local authorities.  
 
Local actors working together on LA21 
Whereas the participation of NGOs in the UNCED in 1992, the active 
participation of Korean local authorities in the LA21 movement was the 
other critical juncture for institutional change. There were two driving 
forces for local authorities to join the movement: the re-introduction of a 
local election system in 1995 and the active enforcement of global dialogues 
by the NGOs to encourage the local authorities’ involvement.   
 
The reintroduction of a full local election system in 1995 proved to be one of 
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the significant institutional factors behind the empowerment of local actors 
and the development of co-governance institutions. The elected authorities 
and their fiscal power enabled local authorities to adopt autonomous and 
more consensual planning such as LA21. However, the local authorities did 
not yet have sufficient experience, and planning power whilst the central 
government maintained its traditional developmental state management 
(KR, Seong 2000). The collective power of local NGOs was another key 
driving force for LA21 progress at local level (Local Autonomy Research 
Institute 2005). Thus, even if each local NGO might turn out to be weak in 
influencing a particular local authority, joint action by multiple local groups 
through social learning, mutual understanding and communication had the 
potential to generate significant momentum to maintain the LA21 
movement. Therefore, the Korean LA21 movement was based on various 
opportunities provided by working arrangementsbetween local authorities 
and local NGOs.   
 
After the worldwide promotion of the 1992Rio summit, experts from local 
authorities and NGOs were globally encouraged to participate and lead the 
LA21 movement. For example, informal actors were invited to work 
together in  preparing workshops and independent pre-research works 
before the Global Forum in 1994 held in Manchester, U.K. (MJ, Yu 2005). In 
Korea the spread of the LA21 initiatives to a number of cities started in 
Busan when the city officials prepared a regional follow-up conference, the 
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4th Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEAC 
hereafter) (Ministry of Environment 1992)32 in 1995. The regional trans-
national discussion that took in place in 1995 triggered the beginning of the 
LA21 campaign in the host city, Busan. Thus, the LA21 movement in Korea 
was strengthened by the combined efforts of national and local 
governments’ involvement and NGOs initiatives under the influence of 
global reform dialogues.  
 
Domestically, interest inthe LA21 campaigns was stimulated through access 
to the international dialogue around LA21. For example, a Korean non-
government board was organised for the first timeto participate in the 
second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 
1996. The two year preparation period resulted in 126 Korean participants 
from NGO and local governments (JI, Gu 1996). Habitat II validated the 
legitimacy of proactive local actions for sustainable development (JG, Seo 
1996). In other words, while the notion of sustainable development had 
been recognised in 1992 and 1994, the details of ‘local action’ were discussed 
at the 1996 conference. Local NGOs and public bodies in Korea experienced 
the learning processes by witnessing this international dialogue together 
                                               
32  The multiparty discussion group in North East Asia that comprised China, Japan, Mongolia, 
Republic of Korea, and Russia, along with experts from UNEP (United Nations Environment 
Programme), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), and ESCAP (UN Economic and 
Social Committee for the Asia and the Pacific) participating as observers, which officially started in 
1992.   
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despite the inevitable variance in localising this global reform discourse to 
meet diverse local contexts.  
 
Whereas the traditionally passive local authorities have become more active 
insupportingNGO-initiated partnerships by providing funding and 
institutional support, central agencies still played a significant role in 
steering the movement. The MoE reported the national action plan to the 
UN in 1996, following Cabinet-level approval of the outcomes of national 
consultation, and began to actively engage in promoting LA21 by 
publishing the 'Guide for Creating Local Agenda 21' in 1997(Ministry of 
Environment 1997). Since its publication, the MoE hasrun nation-wide 
information briefings on how to publish a LA21 plan for local authorities, 
which helped the spread of LA21 into more local authorities (DM, Park 
2000). Despite an impressive increase in local initiatives and voluntary 
planning, the central government played a major steering role in the rapid 
growth of the LA21 movement, at least, in terms of numbers of published 
LA21s. Therefore, the critical juncture of LA21 promotion in Korea 
happened in the mid-1990s through newly established interaction between 
local and global actors with the support of national agencies. Then, the 
synergy of this interaction resulted in a rapid increase in LA21 planning 
publications by local actors(See Figure 5.3below).As a result, during the ten 
years from the mid-1990s, almost all municipalities published their own 
LA21 action plans. 
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Figure 5.3. Trend of LA21 in Korean Local Authorities  
(Source: KCLA21(2005a; 2005b)) 
Note: The number of permanent local offices for LA 21 implementation in 2003 is not 
available in published reports. 
 
5.2.2 The reproduction period: introduction of environmental 
governance at the national level 
The LA 21 movement of Korea reached its reproduction period as described 
in Mahoney’s periodization(See Section 3.2.1), when this movement 
hadmatured enough to sustain a stable formalised system beyond its 
quantitative growth (see Figure 5.3 above). In Korea, since public bodies 
and their activities are based on written laws, unlike common law culture, 
the introduction of the LA21 movements into formal policy systems means 
the beginning of stable institutional processes. In Jeonju, one of urban 
partnership cases for this research, about 150 people from environment, 
education, gender, culture, religion groups participated with city 
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government officials, academics and private firms at the establishment 
ceremony of the local permanent office for LA21 on 18/02/2000 (Jeonju 
office for LA21 2000).The apparent achievement of a more stable LA21 
movement indicates the maturity of the institutional change, which 
involves the creation of formal institutions such as permanent local offices 
and legislation of local bylaws and national laws.  
 
Another indication of the stable institutional adoption of LA21 is the 
growth of coordination bodies, e.g. the creation of a national council for 
LA21, a voluntary network of local offices in 1999, and the Presidential 
Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD) in 2000. 33 Both 
organisations have provided learning and coordination effects. Whilst the 
Korean Council for Local Agenda 21(KCLA21 hereafter) was more focused 
on promoting LA21 though local offices, the PCSD, one of the highest-level 
organisations for sustainable development in the hierarchy of government 
organisations,was designed to encourage central government to 
mainstream the notion of sustainable development into public policy and 
planning. Thus, the LA21 movement in Korea created the permanent offices 
for LA 21, co-governance organisations at the local level, which was then 
                                               
33 The first national meeting of Local Agenda 21 held in Jeju-do in 1999 was a good chance for 
actors in local and national level to recognise the rapid progress in LA21 movement in Korea. 
Following the first in Jeju-do and seven another meetings of local office representatives, the national 
association of local offices, ‘'Korean Council for Local Agenda 21(KCLA21)’ was created in June 
2000. 
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orchestrated by a nation-wide coordination body, KCLA21. 
 
As one out of the four features of the reproduction period discussed in 
Chapter 3, the official institutionalisation of the LA21 movement sowed the 
seeds for co-governance at local level, creating the capacity for partnership 
development later on. As one of the positive outcomes of LA21 movement 
in Korea, there has been a significant change in the relatively weak capacity 
of local authorities. For example, local authorities’ financial commitment 
reached 97% of total budget for LA21, which was increased from 4 million 
US dollars in totalin 1999 to 11 million in 2005 (Korean Council for Local 
Agenda 21 2005a: 104). Thus, the local authorities, especially in the 
metropolitan cities and rich provinces such as Seoul and Gyeonggi province 
have become more prepared to lead the reproduction period since they 
could afford to pay the large set up costs. Due to the varying degree of fiscal 
capacity of local authorities, the availability of financial resources to be put 
into setting up local partnerships came to be uneven. In Chapter 6, how this 
uneven development of the movement is consistent with the development 
of urban water partnerships will be analysed.  
 
5.2.3 Implications of institutional change to Korean water governance 
Since the 1992 World Conference on Environment and Development, local 
government and NGOs in Korea have embraced LA21 capacity building. 
The LA21 campaign was a surprising example of state-society 
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collaborationin a society, where the conventional relationship between 
governmental and non-governmental bodies had been rather hidden 
and/or often antagonistic. Given the Korean context of ‘strong state and 
contentious society’ (H, Koo 1993), the adoption and creation of 
partnerships between state and non-state bodies initially gained approval 
from the actors of both sectors despite the fact that there had not been a 
thorough assessment of possible outcomes. While coordination for LA21 at 
national level emerged as a network organisation of local offices (KCLA21) 
and a strategic advisory body (PCSD), the networking of community actors 
at a local level was instituted between 1999 and 2000 through the rapid 
increase of newly organised local offices. For everyone in almost every 
participating council, there was a new experience of working together 
(collaboration) for local sustainable development (expanded environmental 
management). As KCLA21 (2005b) indicates, the local offices acted as a 
platform to accommodate diverse participants.  
 
Additionally, the empowerment of local authorities under the global 
promotion of sustainable development shifted the focus and attitude to the 
environmental agenda, in particular, the issue of local management of water 
resources. A traditional environmental conservation  approach focused on 
handling water crisesby remote public bodies, but this changed to an 
approach emphasising planning and quality of life issues with the sense of 
‘placeness’.The new approach stressed the importance of delivery by 
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participants themselves. For example, the Local Agenda 21 prepared by the 
participants in cities such as Incheon metropolitan city and Jeonju city 
considered water resources quality in the neighbourhoods(e.g. urban rivers), 
and stood in contrast to the central reforms, which focused on water sources 
for consumption. 34  The range of activities adopted under the LA21 
movement, including monitoring, workshops, and regular clean up of 
rivers and educational visit programmes, was accessible to 
nongovernmental actors in contrast to the implementation tools employed 
by the government reforms - e.g. investment in treatment facilities and 
regulation. Thus, the broader interests and softer campaign approaches 
came with more diversity among participants. Therefore, based on this 
positive impact of the LA21 process in Korea,which emphasisedsocial 
collaboration among different groups, it set the precedent for subsequent 
similar attempts to attract public and political approval when developing 
new environmental institutions. The legacy of LA21 campaigns for the 
water partnership cases will be examined in Chapter 6.  
 
5.3 Local capacity building 2: Saving River Campaigns and the LA21 
movement 
During the 1990s, Korea’s water governance focused on the pollution crisis 
and responsive pollution control measures. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the remit of water resource management has been expanded into 
                                               
34This aspect is deeply related to the Saving River Campaigns, to be analysed in the next section. 
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a broader spectrum of topics from its traditional concentration on water 
quantity and quality management to the more recent promotion of 
ecological conservation and watercourserehabilitation. Water issues have 
evolved with the progress of water institutions as problem-solving 
mechanisms. Within this cascade of institutional development, the mix of 
institutions such as water policy and organisations becomes more 
complicated. In short, there have been growing concerns and related 
institutional developments to conduct river ecosystem conservation in 
public and private sectors. 
 
Table 5.3 describes how these Saving River Campaigns came to create the 
critical juncture in Korea, which laid the foundation for achieving the 
empowerment of local actors. The following sub-section explains this in 
detail.  
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Table 5.3 Paths of institutional changes: the Saving River campaigns in Korea 
Paths Incidents Period 
   
Precondition 
Water supply and pollution control led 
by the national state 
The 1990s 
 ↓  
Critical juncture 
Government-funded research on river 
restoration; NGOs campaigns on saving 
Rivers 
1989~ 
Becoming a nationwide agenda by a 
popular restoration case in Seoul 
2003-5 
 ↓  
Start of  
reproduction 
period 
Network for saving river campaigns 
Becoming a symbolic policy agenda 
2003 
2006 
 
5.3.1 The critical juncture: the discourse of rediscovering hidden 
urban rivers 
Beginning with public funded research and nongovernmental campaigns 
By contrast to the LA21 initiative, international influence came late in the 
process of institutional development for river restorationin Korea. 
Following a river clean-up project initiated as part of the preparation  for 
the 1988 Olympic Games (known as the Han River Integrated Development 
Project), the MoCT and the MoE respectively funded pilot research projects 
in the early 1990s to see if the project could be expanded nationwide (See 
Table 5.4). A central government-funded research institute, Korea Institute 
of Construction Technology, embarked on the first public research on river 
environment management in 1991. The focus of these early academic 
projects was on how to apply the knowledge and technology developed 
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elsewhere in other countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Japan to 
Korean contexts.  
 
Table 5.4 below shows the list of historical incidents in relation to the River 
Saving Campaigns and water policy changes in Korea between the late 
1980s and 2000s.  
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Table 5.4 Chronology of Saving River Campaigns and programmes in Korea 
Paths of 
institutional 
changes 
History of water institutional changes in relation to Saving River 
Campaigns 
Critical 
Juncture 
1987. 
Clean-up projects for polluted river projects led by the MoE, 
renamed as Clean-up more natural rivers project, later in 1990s. 
 
1996.  
The first participatory restoration of Suwoncheon after successful 
campaign against the  plan to pave over the river in Suwon city  
 
1996.  
The 1st stage of river rehabilitation project started in 
Yangjaecheon 
 
1997. 
River environment management project in Osancheon, led by 
the MoCT, the 1st environment-stressed river management 
project after a long history of flood control and water front 
development by the same agency 
 
2000. 
Cancellation of Youngwol Dam project in the Dong River by 
President Kim, D.J.  
 
2000. 
Natural river improvement programme included in the amended 
River Act: the restoration of river channels to a near-natural state 
to improve aquatic habitat and for flood protection; 1987, 2000 
 
2002. 
MoE published the Guideline for River Restoration; the Korea 
Network for River and Watershed (KNRW), preparatory 
committee awarded the five best practices in saving rivers 
campaigns, and then organized 1st River Day held in 
Yangpeong near Paldang reservoir. 
Reproduction 
period 
2003-2005  
Cheonggyecheon rehabilitation project with the demolition of 
roadwork and park development took place at the centre of 
Seoul; the Korea Network for River and Watershed (KNRW) 
officially created 
 
2006  
MoE announced its long-term policy plan including ecosystem 
conservation, The Water Environment Management Plan (‘06 –
’15) 
Source: (River Researches Group ; SK, Oh 2003; BK, Lee 2006) 
 
Urban river rehabilitation projects gainedpublic attention as the media and 
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the nationwide NGOs initiated the Saving River campaigns in the mid-
1990s. The early success of the campaign was witnessed at local level. For 
example, a campaign was launched by local NGOs to stop the local 
government’s attempt to cover part of an urban river located in a historical 
city of Suwon, south of Seoul (MS, Kim 2003). This was the first successful 
case of participatory river rehabilitationand hailed as a textbook example of 
the consensus building approach. Suwon’s success paved the way for more 
support from the central agencies (See Table 5.4 above). For instance, the 
MoE and the MoCT separately funded two other rehabilitation projects in 
1996 and 1997. Thus, nongovernmental actors at national level such as the 
YMCAas well as major daily newspapers (e.g. Chosun Ilbo) started the 
Saving River campaigns (SC, Cha 2006). The involvement of local actors in 
Suwon and Seoul,developed river rehabilitation projects under the support 
of the central government. As with the LA21 movement, even though 
knowledge of restoration techniques and the rationale for actiondrew upon  
previous lessons from Western countries’ experience (HS, Woo and Kim 
2000), the key driving force behind institutional development was domestic. 
 
Becoming a nationwide agenda through a popular project in Seoul 
These publicly funded, minor programmes emerged as an issue on the 
national agenda through the Chonggyecheon rehabilitation project in Seoul. 
Located at the centre of the capital city, theproject was to complete the 
demolition of old overpasses and restore the river hidden underneath. 
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Itwas a defining incident for the Korean public because a symbol of the 
economic development pressure, a road and bypass, was replaced by the 
‘river’. This symbolic transition was a key issue in the local mayoral election 
in Seoul in 2002, which eventually became a nationwide social topic(MS, 
Kim 2003). When the project was completed in less than three years in 2005, 
it attracted a large number of visitors, 10 million in 1 year and 8 months (YK, 
Kim 2007) as well as international recognition (Vidal 2006). As ‘Mayor Lee’s 
signature achievement’, this was a major factor in bringing him to national 
media attention and eventually to his presidency by winning the 
presidential election in December 2007 (Sheridan and Wehrfritz 2008). This 
case thus proved that a river restoration project might be a useful item for 
election campaigns, which appeals to other local politicians.How the 
political significance of river rehabilitation boosted through the adoption of 
the popular Seoul project, triggered the creation of water partnerships will 
be analysed further in Chapter 6. 
 
Despite putting the issue of river rehabilitation on the national agenda, the 
Chonggyecheon project actually compromised the initial design of 
participatory processes and environmental aspects, including the 
participation of residents and businesses in the neighbourhoods. First, in 
order to complete the project before the end of the mayor’s term, the mayor 
cancelled the original plan that had aimed at a more participatory co-
governance modelin the midst of carrying out the project. Second, the 
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degree of restoration was more like an artificial waterfront development, 
which coincided with the much criticised practices in the US (Committee on 
Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems: Science and National Research 1992), 
discussed in Chapter 1. The 12 kilometres of the riverbanks became an open 
waterway park, filled with expensive purified water and far from the 
ecological habitat of a natural river. One of the original supporters for 
restoration plan, the renowned novelist, late Park Kyung-Ni criticised that 
the process of construction work became ‘development project’ rather than 
conservation plan(KN, Park 2004). Third, the outcomes of the restoration 
were not impressive in terms of co-governance due to a bribery scandal 
involving a deputy mayor, and the exclusion of local stakeholders. From the 
start of the project, there was no proper consultation procedure to involve 
local residents and businesses in the adjacent commercial blocks even 
though the demolition of the commercial areas had been included in the 
plan (MR, Cho 2003). In this respect, the traditional role of the city 
government, as provider on the one hand, and local citizens as mere 
consumers on the other, remained intact in the case of Seoul. This limited 
participation of non-governmental actors during the restoration project was 
far from co-governance practices found in water partnerships. 
 
5.3.2 The reproduction period 
Apart from the dual grant schemes run separately by the MoE and the 
MoCT, described in Table 5.4 above, the major outcomes of the Saving River 
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Campaigns were the guidelines published by the MoE in 2002 and the on-
going publications by the River Research Group (www.river.re.kr). At the 
same time, the scattered cases of river restoration projects at community 
level began to create a network of experienced actors who would learn from 
each other and develop larger capacity. This included the launch of River 
Day, an annual conference to celebrate and share the experience of river 
conservation and management, initiated in 2002 and led by several NGOs 
and local partnerships with financial help from the MoE and local 
authorities. The regular conference came to play a role as an open forum for 
information sharing and encouraging community works by acknowledging 
the progress of river conservation at various scales and in different contexts 
(Interview #O4, an organiser of the first River Day, 2004. 12)(SK, Oh 2003). 
Thus, the establishment of this networked organisation and information 
sharing meant the creation of political templates for river restoration 
campaigns.  
 
The national state acknowledged the discourse of river restoration in public 
policy much later than the creation of a river related network. The MoCT, 
which has been at the centre of channelization of natural rivers for the 
purpose of water supply and flood control, amended the River Act by 
including an additional aim ‘more river nature friendly maintenance and 
conservation’ in September 2005. Soonafterwards, it created the River 
Environment Division, which oversaw the river 
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environment 35 .Subsequently, river rehabilitation was officially 
acknowledged in national policiessuch as in the MoE Water Environment 
Management Plan and the amendment of the River Act by the MoCT in 
2006. The MoE’splan covering 10-year period aims to promote the water 
environment as a whole, which includes not only the traditional interest in 
the quality of water supply sources but also the enhancement of more 
natural water ecosystems (Ministry of Environment 2006).This formal 
change in national policy is meaningful in terms of addressing the broad 
spectrum of integrated water management (KU, Kim, Koh et al. 2007: 19).  
 
The 2006 River Act amendment in particular  aimed to include the river 
environment and restoration, as well as the land use of floodplains in river 
management, which had been largely ignored in mainstream river 
management (MS, Kim 2003). One of the motivations behind the changes in 
the long-lasting dual system was that the then President Roh ordered the 
two key ministries to work together and tackle the problems of segmented 
management after reviewing the PCSD’s policy assessment of the 
restructuring of water management systems (Interview #O5).However, the 
related policy strategy and detailed action plans did not take place (KU, 
                                               
35  Given the then President Roh was about to decide the innovation of water management 
organisation including an option to merge the river-related affairs of the MoCT with the MoE 
(interview with a PCSD subcommittee member, 2006); the institutional progress led by the MoCT 
included a strategic defence of organisational interests. As President Roh decided to maintain the 
traditional dual system by creating the apex coordination committee and the legislation of IWRM in 
October 2005, the MoCT’s concern for  river restoration remains tokenistic. 
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Kim, Koh et al. 2007) before the next presidential election in 2007. Thus, this 
orchestration of national policy change in 2006 implies two contradictory 
aspects of this new institutional development. First, the significance of river 
ecosystem management, including rehabilitation projects, had begun to be 
taken seriously in the public policy arena. Second, this change in the 
national water plan, mentioned above, remains incomplete, and thus, 
symbolic and not stable.  
 
5.3.3 Implications of Saving River Campaigns to Korean water 
governance 
The case of saving river campaigns showsthe on-going dynamics of 
institutional change in relation to a new field of water management, that is 
river ecosystem management. When compared with the LA21 movement, 
the international influence on institutional developments in river 
restoration in Korea was recognised albeit research-based one. Instead, 
publicly funded academic works and NGO activities started the domestic 
institutional development, which became an issue on the national agenda 
through thepopular Seoulexample. Apart from Seoul case, in comparison 
with the traditional way of depending on the central agencies for policy 
planning and implementation, a range of actors and groups, mostly local, 
voluntarily participated in the delivery of river restoration projects.This will 
be examined in details in Chapter 6. Some evolved from a pilot experiment 
in locally adaptive restoration, while others chose to adopt landscape 
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rearrangement and waterfront redevelopment. Given its popularity and no 
national plan to foster co-governance institutions for river ecosystem 
management by 2006, river ecosystem management may trigger the 
development of co-governance institution where local actors independently 
initiate it. In other words, when the experience of collaboration and local 
empowerment (e.g. the LA21 movement) meets a popular topic (the saving 
river campaigns), the creation of co-governance institutions is more likely to 
happen.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, national water governance was analysed after the brief 
discussion of the general background of social changes in Korea before the 
1990s. The next two sections covered the new incremental changes of 
governance reforms at the national and local levels: the LA21 campaigns 
and the Saving River Movement respectively. The chapter concludes with 
the recognition of the development of multi-layered water governance in 
Korea in the 1990s (See Figure 5.2). The theoretical identification of these 
exogenous factors here provides two critical contexts before the case 
analysis in the following two Chapters (See the left-top side of Figure 5.1 
earlier). 
 
The first part of the chapter examined recent developments in state-led 
multilevel water governance in Korea, as stimulated by the recent water 
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crisis. It sets the governance context for Mahoney’s periodization analyses 
of water partnerships in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Thus, it is argued in this 
section that the significance of socioeconomic development and institutional 
consequences is striking in the shaping of Korean water governance. Before 
usingMahoney’s periodization analysis, the key physical conditions of 
Korean water management need to be presented. 
 
Korean water governance was changed and restructured in the 1990s. There 
has been diverse institutional development involving nongovernmental 
actors and local authorities in formal and informal water governance in 
Korea. The background analysis found that highly centralised water 
governance has incrementally changed towards participatory governance 
through the national reforms. Yet, despite providing a foundation of locally 
specific management, the functions of coordination,continued at the 
ministry level. Thus, reformative measures including the introduction of 
public consultation procedures and the creation of the river basin 
committees resulted in their co-existence with the top-down, regulatory 
system within the multilevel water governance. The key drive of the 
reforms to address severe water pollution in the major rivers explains this 
consequence of institutional mix, which was rather domestic. Therefore, the 
centralised nature of Korean water governance persisted but the addition of 
participatory procedures and basin roundtable committees meant the 
beginning of more complicated structure of governance.   
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In comparison with the national policy change mentioned earlier, two new 
institutions as part of local capacity building were initially promoted at 
different levels, through global and nation-wide NGOs, respectively. The 
LA21 campaigns have a longer history than river restoration projects. This 
campaign played an incubating role for building water partnerships in 
Korea. In particular, the key players of LA21 and the Saving River 
Campaigns at local levels become crucial in the discussion of case studies of 
water partnerships in the following chapters. In addition, the analyses of 
the LA21 and Saving River Campaign cases indicate that local rivers have 
become a significant field for new institutions.  
 
At the same time, Mahoney’s periodizationanalyses show thatthe newly 
developed institutions in local capacity building and river rehabilitation 
emerged recently in Korean water governance. Even though the existing 
water governance remained in the control of the central agencies, the 
change towards more collaborative governance was anticipated given the 
growing power of nongovernmental actors. The examples of LA21 and the 
Saving River Campaigns demonstrate this.  
 
How these new paths of collaborative local resource management emerged 
confirms the previous discussion about the motivation of institutional 
emergence and the significance of management topics. It was evident that 
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the LA21 movements had been led by the combination of national policy 
and local capacity building related to global reform discourses with the 
rapid growth of NGOs. Saving River campaigns were initiated by 
nongovernmental actors such as NGOs and a newspaper but the river 
restoration projects were selected and partly funded by the central 
government. The interests in the ecological management of water resources 
have been increased by the continuous work commissioned to the public 
research groups from the MoE and the MocT. Local river and ecosystem 
rehabilitation were less contested and remained politically peripheral. At 
the same time, the key issues in water governance in the 1990s were 
pollution control and consumptive water usage, reflected in national water 
reform. Hence, both institutional changes faced little resistance, which is 
quite different from environmental conservation issues contesting 
development projects in Korea (See Koh, Kim et al. 2005). This chapter thus 
reveals that water governance in Korea started to develop along multiple 
paths since the 1990s. Therefore, the institutional development of co-
governance will be analysed in Chapters 6 and 7 in relation to this multiple 
path development of multi-layered water governance at different scales and 
addressing different management aims.  
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CHAPTER 6 INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCE 
OF WATER PARTNERSHIPS IN KOREA:A 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the emergence of six water partnerships in Korea by 
using a modified IAD framework, developed in Chapter 3. This 
comparative case study is to understand the institutional development of 
co-governance institutions under less explored context. The discussionswill 
show how the apparently autonomous development of co-governance 
institutions could emerge in highly centralised contexts, andhow the 
national and local actors applied the reform discourses about co-governance 
in the emergence of partnerships. The notion of social basin is employed to 
capture the changes in the relationship between the slowly shifting nation-
state-dominated water governance and the newly established institutions, 
water partnerships. Six water partnerships, which emerged between 2000 
and 2004, are selected for this research.  
 
6.1 The emergence of six water partnerships: Overview and the initial 
structures 
The selected six water partnerships are namely, Jeonju partnership, 
Daecheong lake partnership, Busan city partnership, Incheon city 
partnership, Paldang lake partnership and Gyeongnam Water Forum (See 
the locations of the cases in Figure 4.2).Jeonju was the first and Daecheong 
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came as the second in 2001, whereas the remaining four were established in 
2003 and 2004. This section provides the overview of how the six 
partnerships were formed with an analysis of the initial structures found in 
each case. The summarised initial structures of partnerships will be used in 
the section 6.2 for comparative case study depending on the classical IAD 
framework.  
 
Management functions as a factor for certain types of partnerships will be 
examined in the division of two subgroups out of six cases. Three similar 
partnerships emerged in urban areas, mainly for river rehabilitation projects, 
and three other cases created in regional areas, largely for water 
conservation. In terms of scale of management and the nature of the 
problem to be solved, the regional cases are different from the urban 
partnerships. The ones at the regional scale work beyond the boundary of a 
single municipality. Additionally, the key programme of the regional 
partnerships is related to the conventional management of regional water 
sources that had previouslyoperated through central government. Thus, a 
comparative analysis of these regional partnerships provides a more 
comprehensive explanation of co-governance institutional development in 
the management of key regional water sources. 
 
6.1.1 Urban water partnerships in Jeonju, Busan and Incheon 
Jeonju water partnership 
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Created in 2000, Jeonju water partnership was one of the first co-
governance institutions to emerge in Korea. Jeonju is the provincial capital 
of Jeollabuk-do, a southwest province. This historical city is built on the 
Jeonju River basin (Jeollabuk-do government (Jeollabuk-do cheong) ; Jeonju 
city government (Jeonju-si cheong)) (See Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1 The Rivers in Jeonju city  
(Source: Adopted from Environmental GIS service by MoE, available from EGIS.GO.KR ) 
 
A debate about the then mayor’s proposal for land use along the riverside 
in 1998 resulted in the creation of a water partnership in Jeonju. An 
ambitious ex-technocrat-turned-local politician, the mayor WJ Kim had 
proposed 2 billion Korean won (₩) (Official exchange rate, average period 
in 1998, 1 USD = 1,401.44 ₩)(International Monetary Fund 2012)for the 
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Jeonju River Park construction plan during his election campaign (SH, Park 
1999).36 However, the park plan announced was heavily criticised by local 
NGOs and experts, mostly under the umbrella of an LA21 campaign 
(Interview #J1, current general secretary of Jeonju Office for Local Agenda 
21, 2005). A few active members of the LA21 campaign, ranging from 
professors to the NGOs activists, persuaded the mayor and local officials 
using documented evidence that similar development projects that installed 
fountains as aerators to improve water purification in other cities had 
suffered from a secondary pollution backlash (Jeonbuk KFEM (Korean 
Federation of Environmental Movement) 1999).37 After visiting a case site 
(Daegu Metropolitan City) at the beginning of 2000, all the participants 
joined the debate and concluded that the Mayor’s River Park Plan was 
likely to fail both financially and environmentally (Jeonju city government 
(Jeonju-si cheong))(Interview # J1).  
 
Mutual learning from the Daegu visit obviously persuaded the city hall and 
                                               
36 He proposed six major development projects including the World Cup Stadium development 
project to renovated Jeonju city. Given that Jeonju had been selected to hold one of the 2002 World 
Cup games, Jeonju city was hoping to boost its growth with the new leader.   
37 In 1997, Daegu city government built the river park in the town centre, where the lack of instream 
flow was to be overcome by pumped discharge from a downstream sewage treatment plant. This idea 
was to renovate the typical dry urban river to the more natural landscape of fountains in the 
beginning; however, it soon caused major problems. The energy-pumping sewage discharge killed 
hundreds of fish; moreover, it also caused an extensive negative odour (Park, S.-H. (1999). Interview 
of the mayoral candidates of the Honam region Kyunghyang News. Seoul, Society team (2008). 
Cover story: Nationwide copycats of Cheonggye-cheon. Newsmaker (Weekly Kyunghyang). 
759.)(Interview #J1). 
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the conflict situation was shifted into negotiation. When city hall gave up 
the waterfront development plan, the NGOs and the local academics started 
to debate how to realise their anti-park campaign into a policy draft. The 
campaigns were divided into two sections: (a) a comprehensive 
rehabilitation versus (b) a modification of the park plan towards nature-like 
restoration. The comprehensive rehabilitation idea was proposed by an 
environmental group, the Jeonbuk KFEM, which argued for the cancellation 
of all artificial interventions after removing the previous built structures, 
concrete-channels and car park (See Jeonbuk KFEM (Korean Federation of 
Environmental Movement) 1999). The rest of the members of the anti-park 
campaign supported the modification idea because they believed this idea 
was to form the consensus with the city hall, hence, it was a practical, 
compromisingsolution (Interview #J2). The key points of modification were 
(1) Cancellation of the park project and revision to restoration;(2) Adoption 
of a heuristic approach, developing and implementing a pilot restoration 
plan; and(3) Cancellation of the controversial inflow maintenance option. In 
August 2000, the Jeonju water partnership was created by the majority at 
the negotiation table, the mayor, city officials, local NGOs (exceptthe Jeonju 
KFEM) to modify the River Park plan.  
Initial structure of Jeonju water partnership 
A broad range of stakeholders was invited to join the Jeonju partnership, e.g. 
local NGOs, affiliated experts and civil servants in the city government. 
There were 14 original participants in August 2000 comprising six city 
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officers (City mayor, local government officers), six NGOs (general 
executive Jeonju citizen commission, local NGO campaigner, 2 experts of 
Jeonju office for LA21) and 2elected city council members. The Mayor and 
the head of a local NGO shared the Committee chair, while a smaller set of 
six key members acted as a working group. Because of its unofficial 
organisational status, the working group operated without any statute or 
articles of association. The Jeonju water partnership was designed as a task-
force team to supervise the first restoration projects and subsequently took 
on an advisory role after completion of the projects. 
 
Table 6.1 Composition of the Jeonju water partnership in 2000 
Composition Numbers of people 
Local government officers 6 
Elected local councillors 2 
City-based NGO 6 
Water partnership staffs 2 
Sub-total 16 
Source: (Jeonju partnership 2000) 
 
Busan and Incheon metropolitan partnerships 
In 2003, following the development of the Jeonju partnership, water 
partnerships between local governments and non-governmental actors 
emerged in two metropolitan cities, Busan and Incheon. Busan, the second 
biggest city, located in the south-eastern Korean peninsula, is home to 3.5 
million people (Figure 6.2), while Incheon, the metropolitan city next to the 
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capital city, Seoul, accommodates 2.5 million people in 2005 (Figure 6.3). 
Both are port cities that have used the adjacent large rivers under the 
national government’s authority as the source of water provision, but 
numerous small-scale streams that feed into these rivers suffered from 
contamination and lack of instream flow (See Appendix II for more 
information about two cities). 
 
In Busan, an active alliance of NGOs demanded the creation of a 
partnership, later further influenced by an exogenous event, the 
Cheonggyechoen restoration project in Seoul in early 2003. In February 2002, 
seventeen local NGOs formed the Alliance for Saving Busan Rivers (Busan 
Alliance hereafter) to advance the campaign for urban streams. They shared 
the history of water conflicts over the control of pollution in the Nakdong 
River (see section 5.1). The Busan Alliance agreed on campaign goals, which 
included the rehabilitation of urban streams into natural ecosystems, the 
recreation of river ecosystems not only for their environmental value but 
also for community integration, and finally, the recovery of the eco-belt of 
Busan city (JK, Lee 2003). With the support of the Busan office for LA21 as a 
mediator, city government officials and the Busan Alliance reached an 
agreement on the urban stream campaign. Soon after, they co-participatedin 
fieldtrips to investigate earlier rehabilitation projects within Korea and in 
Japan: they also co-hosted workshops and a joint research project on six 
local streams(River Network 2004). In May 2003, the passive city hall agreed 
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to create a partnership with the other participants of the workshop shortly 
after the completion of the Cheonggyecheon project in Seoul(River Network 
2004).38 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Satellite image (LANDSAT) of the Busan Metropolitan city  
(Source: Adopted from Environmental GIS service by MoE, available from EGIS.GO.KR) 
* Yellow line indicates the boundary of the city area (the North-east rural county is 
omitted) 
 
In Incheon, the initiative was taken by the mayor who was inspired by the 
popularity of the river rehabilitation projects adopted in Seoul and Busan. 
There had been rather quiet but continuous campaign for local rivers led by 
the local NGOs under the umbrella co-ordination of the LA21 movement. 
                                               
38 The participants of a 2-day workshop in September 2002 announced the ten agreements on local 
river management. A loose networked form of NGOs and the city hall led a project that published 
maps about local streams in January until early 2003. 
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Two exogenous events occurred in early 2003 and influenced the mayor 
(Interviews # I1 and I2): the completion of the Cheonggyecheon project in 
Seoul and the creation of a water partnership in a rival metropolitan city, 
Busan. The newly elected Mayor, Mr Lee (BK) endorsed the urban stream 
master plan co-drafted by an array of local NGOs and the city government 
officers in May 2003.39 This planled to the establishment of a partnership in 
September 2003.  
 
This triggering event from outside was significant to the following two 
cases in cities. As analysed briefly in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3.1), the 
Cheonggyecheon river restoration project at the centre of the capital city 
earned the mayoral election to Mr Myeong Bak Lee. As interviewed city 
official in Busan, a full-time staff at the partnership and an NGO worker in 
Incheon explained, through the local election, this locally cultivated issue of 
saving urban streams had become a nationwide agenda (HK, Kang 2007), 
eventually influencing Busan and Incheon cases (Interview #B2) (Interviews 
# I1 and I2). Additionally, the interviewees also indicated that they were 
inspired by the precedent cases through the information sharing in the 
River Day and the documents published by the MoE. The political 
motivation of the mayors in Busan and Incheon was clear in forming 
                                               
39 The incremental growth in watershed-based community campaigns, as with the Busan case, had 
been mainly led by local NGOs and nurtured by the Busan office for LA21; however, the 
characteristics of the movement in Busan had been stronger (See section 5.2.2).  
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partnerships with non-governmental actors. As a result, unlike the Jeonju 
case, these two metropolitan partnerships were created without any local 
conflicts about the water resources but emerged in different ways. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Satellite image (LANDSAT) of the Incheon Metropolitan city 
(Source: Adopted from Environmental GIS service by MoE, available from EGIS.GO.KR) 
* The yellow line indicates the boundary of the city area (the islands in the west-north 
area are omitted. 
 
Initial structures of metropolitan partnerships 
In terms of initiation processes, the features found in the initial structure of 
Jeonju case were not the same in the other two urban partnerships in Busan 
and Incheon. While informal oral promises and agreement comprised the 
start of partnership organisation in Jeonju, the partnerships in Busan and 
Incheon were prepared through a formal process, involving the set-up of 
preparation committees, where participants including city government 
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officers, elected city council members, NGO campaigners and experts 
became engaged in social learning and discussion. This was before the 
establishment of actual partnerships.  
 
In terms of formal institutional development, Incheon city government 
quickly adopted the demand for urban river management by NGOs and the 
Busan office for LA21’s into the comprehensive plan for reshaping local 
rivers. This in July 2003 gave official confirmation of the creation of the 
partnership and endorsement for the urban river rehabilitation projects. The 
key non-governmental actors wereallowed to join the formal institutional 
development throughout the whole process, while the formal preparation 
committees were also involved in informal events, such as workshops and 
fieldtrips following the co-research project on six Busan rivers, funded by 
the local office of the LA21. Thus, the processes to create two metropolitan 
water partnerships were similar. They collectively declared the importance 
of the urban river rehabilitation campaign through collaboration between 
government and non-governmental actors. 
 
The initial structures of urban partnerships after the actual establishment 
were found in two types. The two metropolitan cases in Incheon and Busan 
show differences in their initial structure, although the way the partnership 
emerged and the scale of management were similar, as discussed earlier. 
The first structure of the Busan partnership was a single committee 
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comprising seventy-eight individuals from various backgrounds, from 
schoolteachers to the city’s vice-mayor. This structure shared similarities 
with Jeonju partnership. In contrast, the Incheon partnership was organised 
in a multi-layered structure (See Figure 6.4 below). The co-chairs, allocated 
to the Vice mayor and the citizen representative, were to make decisions 
with three committees: Planning & Management Committee, Coordination 
Committee and Stream Network Committee. To facilitate the partnership 
operation, the Citizen & Government United Office was created with a 
fulltime staff of three city officials and two civilians.   
 
Figure 6.4 The organisational structure of Incheon Water Partnership  
(Source: (Incheon water partnership and Incheon Regional Environmental Technology 
Development Centre 2004)) 
 
6.1.2 Regional water partnerships in Daecheong, Paldang and 
Gyeongnam 
Daecheong water partnership 
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In 2001, 2003 and 2004, three regional partnerships were respectively 
developed to manage the water resources that had deeply been in the hands 
of the central government.  
 
The first one among the three regional ones, Daecheong partnership was 
created in 2001 (See Figure 6.5 below for its location). A public organisation 
initiated the creation of Daecheong partnership in contrast to the proactive 
roles played by nongovernmental actors in the Jeonju and Busan, urban 
partnership cases. While the basin-wide participation of various actors 
began as part of thedecision-making process for the CMWM (See Section 
5.1.2), greater dialogue was precipitated by the largest ever spread of algae 
occurred in the Lake in 2001. Subsequently, a state owned water-supply 
enterprise, KOWACO (recently changed to K-Water) initiated and fully 
supported the Daecheong water partnership. In summer 2001, as Ms JH 
Park, the ex secretary general of the partnership, said in the interview #D3, 
the KOWACO Dam Department, with the support of the executive level, 
proposed to local NGOs that they would fully fund the Daecheong Lake 
Networked organisation. 
 
The Chungcheong region’s local NGOs shared similar history of water 
conflict with the NGOs in Busan, which had been allies in the Dam issue in 
the early 1990s. By accepting a generous funding suggestion from the 
KOWACO, the local NGOs agreed to create a partnership, despite some 
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reservations about it being potentially limited to a roundtable function 
without any real engagement with the policy process. Following a 
workshop about the Daecheong Lake management, all participants signed 
the memorandum and the Daecheong Lake Rehabilitation partnership was 
created in April 2002 (Daecheong Water Partnership (Daecheong-ho Bojeon 
Undong Bonbu)).  
 
Figure 6.5 The Daecheong Lake basin (the white circle above the Jeonju watershed) 
based on the administrative division within the Geum River basin Area 
(Source: Adopted from Environmental GIS service by MoE, available from EGIS.GO.KR) 
 
Initial structure of Daecheong partnership 
Among the six cases, the Daecheong Lake partnership started with the most 
comprehensive structure including multiple tiers of different units. After 
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signing the memorandum of the association, the preparation committee led 
by the NGOs organised a legally registered corporation aggregate, 
composed of four sub-basin networked organisations, having four fulltime 
staffs, the board of trustees, the working committee, and the executive 
committee (Interview #D2). During the five meetings that involvedlocal 
NGOs and KOWACO, the eight organisations identified the scope of 
possible membership, persuaded them to participateand arranged pre-
workshops and events before the creation of the partnership. While NGOs 
showed increasing interests in the idea of forming a partnership from the 
early period, the formal government organisations and educational 
organisations preferred to be involved only after the partnership’s 
establishment. Thus, the leading power to shape the organisation through 
mobilising ideas and vision has been in the hands of NGOs, especially the 
ones in the preparation committee, listed in Table 6.2below. 
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Table 6.2 The composition of the preparation committee in Daecheong 
type Participants The first-order organisations 
NGOs 4 
Daejeon/Chungnam Green Korea  
Chungbuk KFEM 
Chungju CEEJ  
Daejeon KEFM  
Research 2 
Professor at the Hanbat University 
Professor at the Korea National University of 
Education 
Local 
governments 
3 
Daejeon Met City Water Management Dept. 
Chungcheongnam-do Water Quality 
Management Dept.  
Chungcheongbuk-do  Water Management Dept. 
SOE 
(KOWACO) 
2 
Head of Environmental management dept.  
Head of Daecheong Dam management 
Sub-total 11 - 
Source: (Daecheong Water Partnership 2004) 
 
Paldang water partnership 
In Paldang case, a central agency, the Ministry of Environment, proposed 
the idea of organising a partnership with the local authorities in the 
protected water source region of the Paldang Lake sub basin (seeFigure 6.6 
below). In 2002, it was obvious that the Paldang Lake’s water quality had 
not improved to the target level, despite more than 1 trillion Korean won of 
investment (Ministry of Environment 2002a) mobilised through the series of 
national water reforms (See section 5.1.2). In response to this in May 2003, 
the MoE proposed a policy draft to reverse the 1994de-regulated land use 
policy, this time enabling a public consultation process. This draft provoked 
immediate opposition from seven county governments. During the tense 
public consultation process, the MoE led the formal procedure and 
proposed to opponent groups a partnership to work together on policy-
making in the affected region in July 2003. An ex member of the Paldang 
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partnership, Dr SW Kim stated in the interview #P1, local groups were 
initially surprised by the central agency’s shift of attitude but joined the 
preparation process to create a partnership (Interview #P1). Soon after the 
MOE’s suggestion, three community representative meetings, three pre-
committee meetings and seven citizen and county official meetings paved 
the way for the formation of the partnership between central government, 
local counties and community representatives.  
 
 
Figure 6.6 Paldang Lake watershed with other sub-basins of the Han River Basin  
(Source:(Ministry of Environment 2006)) 
 
To be brief, in Daecheong and Paldang, the public water organisations 
persuaded the non-governmental actors into a field of water management 
when they could not control pollutions in two water sources. As the 
interviewees mention, the historical tension between the public and non-
governmental organisation that had mostly been caused by the lack of 
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procedural justice was eased by the proposal of the state agencies 
(Interviews #D3 and #P1). The active involvement of the stakeholders was 
promised through the creation of the partnerships, where the impressed 
NGOs to join.  
 
Initial structure of Paldang partnership 
The Paldang partnership, known as ‘the Paldang Water Policy Council’, 
was formed in a two-tiered structure, which was composed of the executive 
committee, and the working committee with a small group of 
administrative and expert staff. However, this structure was distinct from 
the Daecheong case in terms of formality and in itsdirect relationship with 
the MoE. First, the partnership is the legally bound negotiation body 
composed of local actors in the public sector and civil society, water experts 
and the MoE officers in the interest of better water conservation in the 
Paldang Lake.Second, the MoE (a central agency in charge of water 
regulation) mostly led the discussions in the initial stage in terms of 
involving local governments and community representatives (those affected 
by water regulation). According to an interview with a MOE officer, the 
MoE persuaded the community groups involved in the violent protests to 
join a partnership instead of pursuing a prosecution (Interview #P6). In the 
same interview, aMoE official explained the background to this 
impressively pro-active willingness to go beyond the formal boundary of 
public consultation in 2003, as being the result of pressure from community 
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groups in the Paldang Lake since the incident in 1998,  
‘[t]he inner atmosphere of newly formed government led by the 
President Roh, a human rights lawyer, wanted the harmonious 
management of the issue rather than enforcement of public power. 
At the same time, personal characteristics of then MoE officers in 
charge preferred peaceful communication as a conflict 
management tool.’ (Interview #P6)  
Thus, the initial structure of the Paldang partnership was a negotiation 
platform over the regulation of a specific regional water source between 
four parties: the MoE, the county governments, the community groups 
from affected counties and the provincial government (See Table 6.3 below). 
With the active participation of the MoE and county government, two 
fulltime experts joined to assist the establishment of the partnership.  
 
Table 6.3 The composition of the Paldang partnership 
Organisational memberships Numbers of people 
Central government 1 
River basin authority 2 
Local government officers 8 
Community group 8 
Partnership staffs 2 
Sub-total 21 
Source: (Paldang Water Partnership 2008) 
 
Gyeongnam water partnership 
Unlike the two public-initiated regional partnerships introduced above, the 
Gyeongnam Water Forum (GWF hereafter) was initiated and managed by a 
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few local NGO campaigners. The province of Gyeongsangnam-do – in short, 
Gyeongnam – is the geographical base of Gyeongnam Partnership (see 
Figure 6.7. below). The initial momentum was provided by 14 NGOs that 
had been members of an umbrella organisation, Civic Federation for Masan 
Bay Watch, which conceived the idea of a provincial wide debate at the 
workshop on GO-NGO collaboration in April 2003. They were inspired by 
the recent success of global and domestic water events in 2003, e.g. World 
Water Forum in Kyoto, Japan and Chuncheon Water Forum in Chuncheon, 
Korea (Interview #K1). Then, the head of the working committee at the 
Gyeongnam partnership, Mr SY Lee, pointed out in the interviews (#K1, K2) 
that a few campaigners of KFEM Water Research and Information Centre in 
Masan city and Changwon city started to persuade local actors to join the 
preparation committee and engage in fundraising.  
 
Two preparation meetings with local NGOs, the provincial government and 
Gyeongnam office for LA21, were held in Feb. and Mar 2004, with a 
relatively low participation by NGOs– 6 and 8 groups, respectively. Finally, 
nearly a year of preparation ended when the Organisation Committee for 
Gyeongnam Partnership announced its opening ceremony on World 
Environment Day, March 22, 2004. ,. Subsequently, the first Gyeongnam 
Water Forum was held with the attendance of 200 people on Mar 26-27. 
Thus, in comparison with the previous two partnerships, theproblems in 
water resource management in Gyeongnam (further discussed in 6.2.1), 
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existed but were not enough to trigger the creation of partnership. As found 
in the interviews with the full-time staff (#K1, K2), a fewpolicy 
entrepreneurs proactively shaped the emergence of Gyeongnam 
Partnership. 
 
Figure 6.7 Modified GIS land cover map of Gyeongsangnam-do  
(Source: Adopted from Environmental GIS service by MoE, available from EGIS.GO.KR) 
Initial structure of Gyeongnam partnership 
In the case of Gyeongnam Partnership, the initial structure, known as the 
Organisation Committee for Gyeongnam Water Forum seemed to represent 
a comprehensive participation of stakeholders, although a small number of 
key actors did most of the work. The details of the membership in the 
organisation committee are shown in Table 6.4 below. This partnership was 
formed in three levels of sub-units: a leading activist from a local NGO, the 
197 
 
Organisation Committee itself and its members. The committee was 
legitimated by the support of a wide range of membership basis. The key 
actor in creating this partnership was one local NGO activist, Mr Sang-Yong 
Lee of KFEM (Korean Federation of Environmental Movement), with help 
from his senior colleagues. KFEM and Gyeongnam University supported 
this campaigner by providing administrative and management assistance. 
Due to this concentration of activism, the role of local NGOs and other 
organisations was limited in the actual practices of Gyeongnam Partnership, 
especially in the very early stages of partnership formation. 
 
Table 6.4 The composition of the Organisation Committee for Gyeongnam Partnership 
Organisational memberships Numbers of people 
Central government 1 
River basin authority 1 
Local government officer 1 
Local council 1 
Public research and education 1 
Public Owned Corporation 1 
City-based NGO 3 
Community group  
Private research and education 6 
Private organisation  
Local Office for Local Agenda 21 1 
Water partnership staff *1 
Sub-total 15 
Source: (Organisation Committee for Gyeongnam Water Forum 2004) 
 
6.1.3 Summary 
In all six-partnershipcases, the management functions of water resources in 
partnership emergence influenced the creation of different types of 
partnerships. The newborn partnerships in metropolitan cities were to 
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apply the latest management topic to the newly found water resources, 
local streams. The regional water partnerships were developed to address 
the polluted water sources for consumption and the general water issues.  
 
The creation of the six partnerships in Korea showed the embedded 
development of co-governance, which is far from that influenced solely by 
small and informal organisations (See the details of the US and EU cases in 
Chapter 2).40While the local actors were active to apply the co-governance 
idea in cities, the governmental bodies took the initiatives in developing the 
partnerships in two regional cases in Daecheong and Paldang.Unlike the 
other five cases, the local NGO in Gyeongnam led the whole development 
of the partnership, the Gyeongnam Partnership.The previous history of 
water governance again influenced the development of the Daecheong and 
Paldang regional water partnerships, which was less obvious than the 
experiences found in the urban cases. The overview of six cases supported 
the need for an analysis of embedded development of water partnerships in 
Korea.  
 
The initial structures of six partnerships were diverse in terms of boundary 
and scales of organisations. Despite the relative similarity in terms of 
management scale and period of creation, two distinctive types of the initial 
                                               
40 In terms of factors on the partnership emergence, six cases were far from the US style (small and 
informal organisations) and the EU case (top-down planning of partnerships). 
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structures were found in the analysis of the six cases. The first type was the 
roundtable organisation composed of stakeholders. Jeonju, Busan and 
Gyeongnam belong to this category (Jeonju partnership 2000; Organisation 
Committee for Gyeongnam Water Forum 2004; Busan Development 
Institute 2006). The second type was the multiple tiered structures, found in 
Incheon, Daecheong and Paldang cases (Daecheong Water Partnership 2004; 
Paldang Water Partnership 2008). Hence, despite the similarity of the key 
water issues within the subgroups of urban and regional partnerships, 
locally embedded variations in the institutional development of water 
partnerships were observed.  
 
Hence, regarding the dividing six cases into two sub-groups, the initial 
structures of six partnerships did not match with the division of urban and 
regional sub-groups. This finding confirms the locally embedded 
development at large, which are tuned to local contexts. In contrast to water 
partnerships in Western Europe were formed in nearly homogenous type 
under the guideline of the European Union’s top-down policy, these 
Korean cases were shaped into two categorised structures. Those are 
roundtable and multi-tiered ones respectively (See the details in section 
2.2.1) using a modified IAD framework, the following section examines the 
three surrounding arrangements (i.e. preconditions) before the emergence 
of partnershipsin order to address the details of contextual factors.  
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6.2 Using the IAD framework to explain the emergence of water 
partnerships 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the IAD framework explains the 
emergence of an institution through the interactions between actors and 
three preconditions. Under an ‘initial structure’, rationally bounded actors, 
who are constrained by surrounding social, economic, political and physical 
settings, initiate an ‘embedded’ institutional development. In other words, 
three preconditions (physical conditions, attributes of community and 
rules-in-use with norms) may act as triggering factors, resources or 
constraints in the creation of water partnerships by concerned actors. Thus, 
this section will examine to what extent these three preconditions explain 
the rather diverse development of the six water partnerships, starting with 
the analysis, and the initial structures of water partnerships. 
 
6.2.1 Physical conditions: chronic water problems as a necessary 
condition for partnership emergence 
The severity of the water problem or the existence of problematic conditions 
in terms of river environment cannot explain why the partnerships 
suddenly emerged since the early 2000s in Korea. Daecheong partnership 
was the only one that had severe pollution problem in the related water 
resource right before the partnership emergence. However, the chronic 
problem of algae bloom in the Daecheong lake was worst ever in 2001 after 
the completion of Yongdam Dam in the upstream (Ministry of Environment 
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2002b). Actually, this issue became a local agenda because the conflict over 
building an additional dam between the Chungcheong Region, Daecheong 
Lake basin and the adjacent Jeollabuk-do. The worse algae bloom in the 
Daecheong Lake sparked the anger of local residents in the area, mostly the 
Chungcheong region. Because the proposal of the KOWACO directly 
triggered the creation of the partnership, the physical condition and 
attributes of community were one of the necessary conditions for the 
creation of the Daecheong partnership.  
 
The urban partnership cases had chronic problems with regard to water 
resources and management. These formed the necessary conditions for the 
partnership emergence. Urban rivers in Korea, including those in the three 
cases studied here, have rarely been used as water sources because of 
pollution and the centralised regional supply system (see section 1.3). 
Furthermore, modification of the river system, via straightening and 
channelization, was a predominant feature of the urban streams. For 
example, the Jeonju River had seen a non-sustainable ecological system, 
vulnerable to seasonal run-off and secondary pollution, with an offensive 
odour and sporadic fish kills(SH, Choi 2005). By 2001, 96.2 % of the river 
channels in Busan had been artificially changed (Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation 2001), while 61.2 % of rivers inIncheon including those 
in the rural islands had seen their channels modified by 2005(Incheon water 
partnership and Incheon Metropolitan City 2005). The Jeonju River 
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waterfront had been covered by impermeable materials and used for car 
parking and local commercial purposes without proper management until a 
new usage of this river was proposed. Water quality problems persisted in 
the major rivers due to intensive urbanisation in the floodplains. Although 
neglected urban streams showed some improvement in water quality from 
the late 1990s, water quality problems remainedin most urban streams in 
Incheon. Despite their poor condition for more than three decades, policies 
addressed by the MoCT and even the MoE had rarely considered the water 
quality of urban rivers seriously until the Saving River Campaigns started 
in the 1990s. Thus, an explanation needs to unpack why these particular 
cities observed the creation of water partnerships.  
 
The chronic water problems in the Paldang and Gyeongnam Partnership at 
the regional scale were deeply related to the failure of existing governance 
in pollution control. The Paldang case has always been a centre of water 
management debate in Korea because of its political salience (D, Chung 
2004). As a supply source for the largest population in the capital region, the 
Paldang Lake has been strongly related to the early stages of Korean water 
management, led by the public corporations, mainly for the purpose of 
rapid economic development. When the application of the latest regulation 
in pollution control failed in 2003, the MoE initiated the partnership with 
the local riparian counties (see section 5.1 for the series of regulatory reform 
measures). In Gyeongnam Partnership case, a local NGO that had 
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campaigned for local water problems initiated the organisation of a 
partnership. The chronic problems in the local water resources have existed 
but remained trivial for partnership creation. In details, there were the inter-
regional conflict over the water allocation of the Nakdong River (Special 
team 1991; SH, Choi 2007), pollution of the Nakdong River due to the 
population increase (Ministry of Land Transport and Maritime Affairs 2008). 
Again, these two cases indicated the physical conditions could not explain 
the emergence of partnerships in these areas. 
 
6.2.2 Attributes of community 
In all six cases, the participants of the partnerships did not have any direct 
economic interests in water resources management (See Tables 6.1 to 6.4 
and Figure 6.7 above). This contradicts the claim of the classical IAD 
framework.Based on the rational choice approach, the conventional 
framework understands the emergence of new institutions as the creation of 
problem-solving mechanisms, mostly drawn from the direct economic 
interests of participants. Thus, the motivations that inspired or pushed the 
participants in the urban partnerships needs to be explained through the 
modified framework in relation to the Mahoney’s periodization analysis 
conducted in the previous Chapter 5.  
 
Local conflicts within communities about water resources triggered the 
creation of partnerships in Jeonju, Daecheong and Paldang to some extent. 
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This factor did not matter in Busan, Incheon and Gyeongnam. In the Jeonju 
case, the issue of land use at river waterfront triggered partnership 
development. In fact, the river’s water quality had been improved through 
the gradual development of wastewater treatment facilities during the late 
1990s, funded by top-down water policy reform. While the MoCT report in 
1995 stated that no species of fish were found in the Jeonju River, there were 
14 fish species in the upstream and 5 species in the city area by 1999 
(Interview #J1). Cooperation based on the experience of past conflict was 
also found in the case of Daecheong (Interview #D2). The central 
government persuaded the local governments and residents to join the 
partnerships in the case of Paldang partnerships. Thus, whereas conflict 
over urban stream management or development triggered local actors to 
form partnerships in Jeonju and Daecheong, the conflict did not determine 
the formation of other partnerships (See the section 6.3. for the details). 
 
The scales of communities in three regional partnerships contradicted 
another presumption (discussed earlier in Chapter 3): the smaller the 
partnership scale, the better the cooperation. While one of the three urban 
partnerships was compatible with this idea, the Jeonju case, this 
presumption did not hold in the regional partnership cases. Three regional 
partnerships covered more than one municipality: two provinces in 
Daecheong, seven counties in Paldang and one province in the Gyeongnam 
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Partnership. 41  Therefore, the scale of the communities was hardly a 
determinant in the formation of regional partnerships, which needs further 
explanation.   
 
6.2.3 Rules-in-use and norms 
The rules-in-use were not as clearly observed in these six cases as 
emphasised in the literature (Ostrom, Burger et al. 1999; Blomquist, 
Heikkila et al. 2004) (also see section 3.1.1). The members from six 
partnerships mentioned that there were no rules to punish or reward 
members within each partnership (Interview #J1, B3-1, I1, D5, P4 and K1). 
Hence, no partnerships used any sanctions when the rules were not 
enforced. This was deeply related to the fact that there were no direct 
economic interests promoting the formation of the partnerships as co-
governance institutions.  
 
Instead, two norms were found to be evident in six water partnerships. The 
first norm was the conservation of related water resources. This was evident not 
only in practice but also in the forms of most of the partnerships. In the 
cases of urban partnerships, ‘saving our rivers’ were broadly used as the 
key aim for partnerships (Interview #J1, J2 and J3; Busan Water Partnership 
                                               
41 The communities for the Daecheong and Paldang partnerships were the area served with supplies 
of water from the two lakes, whereas the attributes of community for Gyeongnam partnership were 
the administrative district, Gyeongnam and its relations with the only water source, the Nakdong 
River and its tributaries. 
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(Busan Hacheon Sal-li-gi Simin Undong Bonbu) ; Incheon Water 
Partnership (Incheon Hacheon Sal-li-gi Chujindan)). Both Incheon and 
Busan metropolitan partnerships formally acknowledged this co-
governance discourse in the official documents (Incheon water partnership 
and Incheon Regional Environmental Technology Development Centre 
2004). In particular, the six points in the Declaration statement on the 
inauguration of the Busan partnership in May 28, 2003, listed below, clearly 
indicate the principles of co-governance around the theme of ‘saving our 
rivers’ discourse. 
“The partnership’s (‘Undong Bonbu’ in Korean) missions are:  
1. To draft the detailed action plan for saving the local rivers to 
with an ecosystem rehabilitation priority;  
2. To develop the citizen-led saving river campaign as a citywide 
environmental movement;  
3. To reactivate the local community by bringing back the history 
and culture of rivers;  
4. To stress the transfer to watershed-based integrated 
management;  
5. To pursue a byelaw enactment as institutional support of the 
saving river campaign and; 
6. [for all members of the partnership] to act under the principles 
of co-planning, co-management and responsibility sharing.” 
(Busan office for LA21 and Gwangju office for LA21 2003: 70) 
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As shown above, in Busan, the notion of saving local rivers was combined 
with the notion of ‘co-operation between local actors’. This was in 
comparison with the situation in Jeonju where ‘co-management’was more 
emphasised. For the regional partnerships, the water sources of the Paldang 
Lake, the Daecheong Lake and the Nakdong River and their local streams 
were regarded as the object to be ‘revived’ or ‘saved’ despite the different 
degree of emphasis on this norm (see section 6.3.1) (Daecheong Water 
Partnership (Daecheong-ho Bojeon Undong Bonbu) ; Organisation 
Committee for Gyeongnam Water Forum 2004; Paldang Water Partnership 
2008).  
 
The second common norm was consensus-based decision-making, in other 
words, ‘keeping agreement among the participants’, though the degree of 
enforcement of this rule differed in each partnership. There has been 
consensus to maintain a political ‘balance’ among the members of the 
partnership after KFEM, a radical NGO, withdrew from the project 
(Interview #J2).42 The similar preference to this reciprocity was found in 
Incheon (Interview #I1), Daecheong case (Interview #D5) and Gyeongnam 
Partnership (Interview #K2). However, this norm was found weak in Busan 
and Paldang where internal conflicts were evident (Interviews #B3 and Bp1 
                                               
42 For example, the city hall avoided enacting bylaws or creating permanent offices and the rest of the 
members agreed with this unofficial status of the partnership instead of creating internal tension by 
challenging the city government. 
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and #P3).  
 
To sum up, the preconditions based on the IAD framework revealed that 
the development of water partnerships in Korea was contextually 
complicated. The chronic problems in the local water resources, either 
abandoned or unsuccessful managed were found to be necessary conditions 
for emergence of partnerships to some extent. However, three 
preconditions cannot explain completely why and how particular actors 
decided to apply the co-governance idea. Thus, a modified analysis 
framework is applied in the next section for a more comprehensive 
explanation of the regional partnerships’ emergence.  
 
6.3 A modified IAD framework: additional analytical elements 
Based on the interconnectedness of multi-layered water governance, it is 
argued in this thesis thatto explain the emergence of the water partnerships, 
there is a need to consider exogenous factors (See Figure 6.8 below). This 
study proposes three factors beyond the geographic and administrative 
scope related to each partnership: (i) co-governance reform discourses 
promoted globally; (ii) national water policy reforms; and (iii) local capacity 
building fostered at the national and local levels. Each of these three factors 
is explained in sequence in the following sub-sections.  
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Figure 6.8 Modified IAD framework 
 
6.3.1 Reform discourse of co-governance 
There was no evidence that the emergence of water partnerships in Korea 
was directly intervened by any international organisations or 
formal/informal international agreements. Instead, the document analysis 
found that the reform discourses rather than direct economic interests in 
water resources inspired those local actors who initiated three urban 
partnerships and the Daecheong regional partnership (see section 4.2.1).In 
the Jeonju case, before the creation of its partnership the co-governance 
discourse was cited repeatedly as ‘people-public co-operation’ in the 
partnership documents, related newspaper articles. The fieldwork 
interview for this study with the previous campaigner for Jeonju LA21 also 
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testifies this (Interview #J2) (SJ, Cho 1999; BJ, Park 2004; SH, Choi 2005)43.  
 
With the nongovernmental actors accepting the mayor’s new proposal, the 
notion of co-governance in this case was changed from ‘public participation 
in policymaking’ to ‘co-management’, and ‘working together’ in the 
delivery of public services (Interview #J1 and J2). The notion of 
collaboration between nongovernmental actors and the government was 
the most frequently quoted idea in the documents produced by all three 
urban partnerships (Hwang 2004; Incheon water partnership and Incheon 
Regional Environmental Technology Development Centre 2004; Incheon 
water partnership and Incheon Metropolitan City 2005; Busan water 
partnership 2006). As pointed out in section 6.2.2, this co-governance 
discourse was adopted by the local actors without there being conflicts over 
the urban streams in Busan and Incheon. Among the regional partnerships, 
the Daecheong partnership was unique in which adopted the co-
governance discourse rather stressing the virtue of ‘unity of the 
Chungcheong region’ (See Figure 6.4) (Daecheong Water Partnership 
(Daecheong-ho Bojeon Undong Bonbu)). 44  Therefore, all three urban 
                                               
43 The Jeonju partnership did not announce any missionary statement and published only workshop 
papers on the rehabilitation projects. Thus, the documentary analysis on governance discourses were 
used in the relevant publications and the interview scripts were used to counter-check it. 
44  Furthermore, the emphasis on the region, the lake basin, was found stronger than that of 
‘collaboration’, shown in the catchphrase of the partnerships: ‘Daecheong, the Future of 
Chungcheong’. In the establishment announcement, the term, ‘250 million people in the cities and 
provinces (of Chungcheong-do)’ was used three times and the term, the Chungcheong-gwon 
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partnerships (that is, partnerships in Jeonju, Incheon and Busan) and one 
regional partnership in Daecheong were inspired by the co-governance 
discourses of ‘collaborative management’ of ‘our local resources’.  
 
In contrast, the procedural legitimacy of transparent decision-making was 
the prominent virtue that sparked the creation of the Paldang partnership 
and Gyeongnam Partnership. The co-governance discourse for the Paldang 
case was about ‘being equal for negotiation’ between government and 
regulation-affected regions. This was related to the nature of participatory 
decision making rather than ‘co-management of shared resources’. For 
instance, co-governance in the Paldang case was interpreted as ‘co-existence’ 
with the dual aims of promoting better lake management and enhancing 
the quality of life in the Paldang community (Paldang Water Partnership 
2008). In the case of Gyeongnam, the partnership’s representative indicated 
in his interview that the networked organisation was created in order to 
contribute to solving water problems by promoting ‘information sharing’ 
and ‘better co-operation’ among wide range of social actors(Yang 2004: 294). 
By repeatedly using discussion and agreement, he emphasised the norm of 
participation among diverse stakeholders, whichwas expected to bring 
                                                                                                                                
(Chungcheong region) was used once, while the collaboration related term, ‘collaborative 
commitment’, was also used once. (see Daecheong Water Partnership (Daecheong-ho Bojeon 
Undong Bonbu). "Daecheong water partnership's homepage."   Retrieved Dec 12, 2006, from 
http://www.daecheong.or.kr/.) 
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open debates.45In the case of Paldang and Gyeongnam, the emphasis on 
‘local water resources’ was relatively weaker. This was because the focus of 
the Paldang partnership was on how to balance conservation and economic 
development (Interview #P3) and the focus of the Gyeongnam Partnership 
about more general water-related issues that go beyond the ones about the 
Nakdong River. Thus, the co-governance discourses were locally 
interpreted and adopted in largely two different ways. This explains that 
water partnerships in Korea are influenced by the political motivation of 
participating actors.  
 
In the next section, how these different interpretations of co-governance 
discourses occurred will be examined by connecting Mahoney’s 
periodization analysis to the six cases.  
 
                                               
45 These two co-governance discourses were evident in the five key activities of the Gyeongnam 
partnership:  
  1)  Projects to promote joint participation and cooperation among civic, government, industrial and 
academic actors;  
  2) Projects to organise comprehensive discussion and consensus-based agreement to represent the 
voices of management, users and consumers of water resource;  
  3) Projects to boost the campaigns to save Nakdong river and water resource in Gyeongnam, 
especially water quality enhancement;  
  4) Campaigns to promote the diffusion of wastewater treatment technology and of water saving 
projects along with research and;  
  5) Water Forum and other relevant academic, cultural events. See Yang, U.-J. (2004). To save the 
Nakdong River and Water Resource of Gyeongnam. 2004 Gyeongnam Water Forum, Bugok, Korea. 
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6.3.2 Application of co-governance discourses at the national and local 
levels 
As discussed in Chapter 3, institutional development tends to be locally 
embedded by the domestic actors who applying reform ideas generated not 
only from locally but also from nationally and/or globally. The examination 
of co-governance discourses in the partnerships partly backed this 
proposition, but needs more explanation about which particularfactors 
within the water governance structure fostered the reform discourses.  
 
Continuous development of national water reform 
The national water reforms significantly influenced the creation of the 
regional water partnerships. In particular, the Daecheong and Paldang 
cases confirm that the creation of co-governance institutions resulted from 
the incremental development led by central agencies or public corporations 
that provided a surprising gesture to the local actors in order to keep the 
lead in centralised water governance. In contrast, this was not the case in 
other partnerships in Jeonju, Incheon, Busan and Gyeongnam. For three 
urban partnerships, the local streams to be addressed by the partnerships 
were not in the charge of the central government. The political significance 
of the water resources in the case of Gyeongnam was not great as the ones 
in the Paldang and Daecheong based on the history of land use regulation 
about the source water areas, as discussed in Chapter 5. Thus, the path of 
the central water governance was strong influence to all six partnerships. 
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Given the results of the Mahoney’s periodization analysis in Chapter 5, the 
water issue in the Paldang area was a prototype of water management 
model that has been closely connected with land use regulation. Here, the 
influence of national reform was clear. Until 1998, the water management in 
the Paldang area featured fragmentation, involving 16 agencies with 
overlapped work scope and jurisdiction. Contradictory regulation with 
weak enforcement was also apparent. The long river flowing through three 
provinces, one metropolitan city and the capital city, entailed complicated 
water usage and riparian land development patterns. For example, the 
economic development of upstream rural areas had been under control. 
Furthermore, eight large dams and one weir in the Paldang region heavily 
modified the water environment in order to provide water provision to 
highly populated downstream urban areas. The size of supplied population 
(24 million people was roughly half of the national population) was 
dependent on the Paldang Lake. This dependence made the issue of water 
management in this region more salient than other regions. Series of strong 
protests were observed in the 1990s, which were by local communities 
around the Lake against the national water policy(Korea Statistical 
Information Office 2005). The politicisation of the issue increased the 
tensions between the state and citizens. 
 
In the Paldang case, the collaboration between the central agency (MoE), the 
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group of local governments and community representatives was branded 
as a ‘win-win strategy or choice’ from the beginning, a term used mostly by 
the initiator, the MoE. Given the partnership’s focus on information sharing 
and participatory policymaking, the Paldang partnership was created as a 
result of the recent policy reform, the updated version of the CMWM 
throughenhanced participation.The Paldang members interpreted co-
governance discourse as ‘a dialogue’ for conflict management, ‘negotiation’ 
for more consultation with local communities and ‘collaborative decision-
making’ over water quality regulation(Paldang Water Partnership 2008). It 
was confirmed in the two interviews with the previous research fellow, Dr 
Sang-woo Kim and the then research fellow, Dr Kyeong-min Kim 
(Interviews #P2&P4).The initial discourse was instrumental in conflict 
management through a consensus-building process because the MoE 
needed to choose a more radical form of institutional development after a 
series of national water reforms.  
 
In the case of the Daecheong partnership, the recent national water reform 
acknowledged and institutionalised the notion of a locally shared resource, 
the Daecheong Lake. For example, when the public consultation started for 
the first time in the Geum River Basin, local NGOs spoke with one voice 
about how the CMWM needed to be applied in the Basin. This was found in 
the interview with Ms Jeong-hyun Park, ex secretary general of the 
Daecheong partnership and then secretary general of Daejeon Green 
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Federation (Interview #D4). Additionally, the engagement with the CMWM 
provided opportunities of social learning for basin-wide NGOs as well as 
for local authorities and water organisations.46 The ‘commonality’ of the 
shared water resource in the Lake came first, rather than having roundtable 
cooperation. Furthermore, the notion of working together for a common 
resource, the Lake, was frequently used to link the diverse local 
communities, from the largest consumers in the metropolitan city to the 
regulated in the small and relatively poor agricultural areas. Another 
exogenous factor to motivate the initiator, KOWACO (now K-Water), was 
the increasing pressure against the building of dams without public 
consultation(See section 4.1.1). However, local capacity building was also 
significant in the creation of the Daecheong partnership.  
 
Local capacity buildings: LA21 movement and saving river campaigns 
In contrast to the Paldang case influenced by the policy reform, local 
capacity building achieved by two social movements in the 1990s were 
consistent with the key argument of this study. Namely, the combination of 
global politics, national policy reform and local capacity building motivated 
and allowed local actors to form the water partnerships. The 
                                               
46 During the debate before the enactment of the Special Act, the roundtable of NGOs within the 
Geum River Basin was formed: Geum River Conservation Network – Geum Gang Bojeon Network 
in Korean- in 2001. The participation of various stakeholders were limited and seemed rather 
compromise to silence varied voices (Interview #D4). The Network that originally aimed to monitor 
the government’s policy making and implementation was not effective in addressing the conflicts. 
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incrementalchanges in water institutions, particularly the legacy of local 
capacitybuilding, were found to be critical to the active adoption of co-
governance institutions. The local actors in three urban partnerships, the 
Daecheong partnership and the Gyeongnam Partnership, were able to 
create partnerships owing to the national reforms and the local capacity 
building of LA21 and saving river campaigns. However, the LA21 
movement in the Paldang case was relatively weak in the forming the 
partnership. The LA21 movement in the Paldang area remained in the 
hands of the county government and managed to publish the LA21 strategy 
only (Interview with an expert member of the Paldang partnership, Dr KM 
Kim: interview #P5).  
 
Mature and capable Local NGOs 
The creation of the Daecheong water partnership was possible because the 
local NGOs were prepared to adopt the co-governance discourse for the 
creation of the partnership. The local NGOs had a chance to build a 
consensus about the better management of the shared resource, the 
Daecheong Lake, while attempting to resolve the historical conflicts with 
the water supplier, KOWACO and the neighbour province (JH, Park 2005). 
When the algae bloom problem became severe in 2003, following the 
conflict over a dam building, criticisms of the water management were led 
by the regional NGOs, which became a crucial factor in prompting the 
writing of KOWACO’s proposal to form a partnership with local NGOs 
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(Interview #D3). Unlike Paldang that did not see active formation of a 
partnership in spite of a similar experience of conflicts, the Daecheong 
partnership benefited from the presence of mature and capable NGOs that 
led the creation of partnership.   
 
In the case of Gyeongnam partnership, in contrast to the previous two 
regional partnerships, the event-focused networking discourse was actively 
proposed and implemented by local nongovernmental actors with the 
emphasis on relational, procedural governance. According to an interview 
with the campaigners in the 2005 Gyeongnam Partnership (interview #KM), 
the legacy of a nongovernmental event, the Chuncheon Water Forum, 
partly supported by the MoE, turned out to be the only direct exogenous 
factor in the creation of Gyeongnam Partnership. Due to a relatively low 
degree of central agency interests inregulation in the province, the local 
actors took the initiative of exploring the institutional development of water 
partnerships. Instead of demanding institutional changes on the part of the 
central government agencies, this voluntary initiative by local actors in the 
Gyeongnam Partnership soon found partners in the local provincial 
government and the LA21 organisation (Interview# KM). In other words, 
these local institutions came together to create the partnership, because they 
experienced locally independent resource management. This positive 
condition provided a platform for mature local NGOs, which were rather 
different from the intervention of the central government into the Paldang 
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and Daecheong cases. , Thus, leadership by a few local campaigners47 was 
the critical factor in the creation of Gyeongnam Partnership, even though 
national water reform and local capacity building were contributing factors.  
 
The legacy of the LA21 movement 
The three urban partnerships in Incheon, Jeonju and Busan showed an even 
higher degree of local capacity building, which influenced the creation of 
partnerships through engaging with the LA21 movement and the Saving 
River campaigns.In the Jeonju case, the experience of collaboration through 
the LA21 campaign and the leadership of local NGOs persuaded the mayor 
to create a water partnership and the river rehabilitation project. This 
experience was also shared by Incheon and Busan. In all cases, the political 
salience of the ‘saving river campaign’ around the time of partnership 
preparation was critical. Particularly, influential was the river restoration 
project in Seoul (Interviews # Bp2 and I1). 
 
In Jeonju, collaboration between the city government and NGOs became 
relatively stable because of pressures for the restoration project and the 
institutional legacy of local collaborative governance through the Jeonju 
office for LA21. There was no attempt to go beyond the project such as 
enacting bylaws or creating a permanent office. Mr Shin, a member of the 
                                               
47  This exceptional leadership was acknowledged at the national level when the only fulltime 
campaigner received Environment Activist award given by MoE in 2004.  
220 
 
partnership, described the situation when the partnership was given 
responsibility to manage the restoration project: 
‘Public and private actors felt united because we were desperate to achieve 
the first ever experiment…with huge responsibility’ (Interview #J1).  
Additionally, the institutional legacy of local collaborative governance 
gained through the process of the LA21 campaigns provided the critical 
human resources for the partnerships, ranging from full-time facilitating 
campaigners to environmental professionals. For example, the previous left-
wing local movement groups merged into a new social movement 
organisation, 'Citizen Action 21' in 2000, comprised of activists who had 
gained experience through the democratisation movement of the 1970s and 
1980s. This increased the power of environmental advocacy in Jeonju. The 
composition of the Jeonju partnership was different from the 1980’s Korean 
democratic movement and more like a new society movement with strong 
emphasis on the city itself. In addition, the participation of local business 
actors was hardly observed apart from the Presidential award winner for 
Environment Day 1997, Samyang Sa's case: "the company volunteered four 
cleanup activities per year in the River. As a whole, the different paths of 
NGO empowerment and emergence of strong leadership resulted in a first 
ever-official partnership, the Jeonju office for LA21. This shows that the 
legacy of the rapidly emerging LA21 campaign was critical to the 
generation and operation of water partnership owing to representativeness, 
feasibility and the power of negotiation. Thus, the outcomes of LA21 
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campaigns nurtured the capacity of NGOs and attracted a diversity of local 
NGOs; subsequently, the accumulated power of non-governmental bodies 
led to the government-NGO partnership for rehabilitation projects. 
 
The Local office for LA21in Incheon and Busan also fostered the emergence 
of water partnerships in the metropolitan cities during the early stage of the 
urban river rehabilitation campaigns. The growth of the LA 21 movement 
was synchronised with the application of local autonomy in the mid-1990s. 
For example, the involvement of nongovernmental actors in city policy had 
been practiced through the LA21 campaigns since 1995 in Busan and 1998 
in Incheon.Thus, generally, the LA21 campaigns provided the foundation 
for all members to be active in urban river rehabilitation campaigns.  
 
Especially in the case of Busan, the participation and activities of non-
governmental actors were more significant than those of local government 
actors were. A broad range of non-governmental actors organised the 
Busan Alliance for the campaign, and then engaged a dialogue with the city 
government, influencing the creation of the partnership. In Incheon, the 
local NGOs and experts who joined the LA21 campaigns led the 
partnership development process along with political support from 
anelected member of the city council, Mr Young-En Sin, and local media 
(Interview #I1). Therefore, the locally embedded development of co-
governance institutions complemented the similar institutional legacy of 
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local capacity building from the LA21 movement.  
 
The spectrum of different backgrounds found in partnership members in 
Incheon and Busan is wider than in Jeonju. In particular, in contrast to the 
tradition of very limited public participation in Korean environmental 
policy, the scope of members of Busan and Incheon partnerships showed a 
significant capacity for community engagement through co-governance 
institutions. The members in Incheon and Busan partnerships included, for 
example, secondary school teachers, employees of a community welfare 
centre, community groups and local experts. In Incheon, the local 
universities and the local media groups also took part, about 6,600 citizens 
in total participated in a series of events in the course of partnership 
creation. Hence, the key actors in creating water partnerships in Busan and 
Incheon were an array of non-governmental groups, from citywide 
professional organisations to community groups assisted by a local office 
for LA21.  
 
The legacy of Saving River Campaigns 
The issue of degraded river environments gained attention when the 
nationwide campaigns for clean streams started in the mid-1990s, though 
this issue was not reflected in the CMWM in 1996 (See section 5.3.2). 
Concerns over urban streams soon developed into an awareness of the need 
for better management, mostly recognised in the Local Agenda 21 
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campaigns. Thus, a history of collaborative governance through LA21 
campaigns played a key role in fostering water partnerships, but the trigger 
point for creating partnerships was different from each other in Incheon 
and Busan. 
 
In the Busan case, the fight to save a local stream, Oncheon River, inspired 
the subsequent creation of networked organisations for several urban 
watersheds, eventually leading to the creation of a partnership (See CS, Kim 
2005). In 1995, community groups and county governments had begun the 
‘Oncheon River SOS campaign’ and small-scale waterfront park projects to 
save the local stream. At that time, the Busan office for LA21 played a key 
role in this growth of urban stream networks through grant distributing 
schemes (JK, Lee 2003) and led a dialogue between the joint committee of 
county and city government officials and the Oncheon River Network. Six 
meetings wereheld in 2001, involving the networking NGOs and the 
county-city governmentsto discuss the Oncheon River master plan. 
Subsequent rehabilitation projects composed the first stage of a social 
learning process for building co-governance for these participants. 
Simultaneously, new actors, such as schools, small community-based 
organisations, experts and social enterprises, started to engage in this urban 
stream management. These new actors had not previously been involved in 
any environmental campaigns. This was in contrast to the rich experience of 
citywide environmental NGOs, whichtraditionally campaigned on water 
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issues over the Nakdong River.  
 
In the case of Incheon, as soon as the LA21 campaign started in 1998, the 
rehabilitation of one of its local streams, the 7.63 kilometre-long Jangsu 
River was subject to discussion. This led to the setting up of an annual 
theme, ‘Rivers in Incheon city’ by the Subcommittee for Water Resources 
under the Incheon office for LA21. The campaign expanded to cover 
another stream, the Seunggi River, by means of mobilising community 
partnership group and forming a network called ‘People love the Seunggi 
River’ in 2000 and another one in Gulpo River in 2001. However, the initial 
LA21 campaigns had no immediate policy influence. This lack of political 
influence was a common drawback to the general LA21 campaign, and 
remained the case until the newly elected Mayor, Mr Sang-soo Ahn ordered 
the development of a master plan for urban stream management in 2003.  
 
The division of labour and acknowledgement of diverse participants in 
Incheon’s saving river campaigns was more developedthan in the Busan 
case. For example, the small community watershed partnerships, such as 
the Seunggi partnership and the Gulpo partnership with the Incheon office 
for LA21, had been active in educational programmes, including 
participatory monitoring, before the creation of a citywide partnership. The 
organisation of the citywide partnership and river rehabilitation plan with 
professional and financial support in Incheon contributed to the rise of 
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community-based, small-scale diverse campaigns. In comparison with the 
Busan case, these sub-community campaigns were significant elements of 
co-governance discourse in Incheon.  
 
To conclude, the national and local institutional changes enabled the 
members to organise the partnerships to realise the co-governance 
discourses. Three additional elements of co-governance discourses, public 
water reform and local capacity building experiences through the LA21 
campaigns and the Saving River movements, provided a more 
comprehensive understanding of the emergence of three urban water 
partnerships in Korea’s highly centralised society. In contrast, the saving 
river campaign were weak in the Paldang, Daecheong and Gyeongnam 
where three regional partnerships were created to cover the conventional 
management issues such as water pollution control and regulation. Hence, 
even though the creation of water partnerships was apparently 
independent, various aspects of the multi-layered water governance 
intertwined in the development processes of the partnerships. 
 
6.3.3 Social basins: before and after the creation of partnerships 
In this section, the concept of social basins as ‘a sub-basin, a local or regional 
unit of government, or a hybrid unit’ (Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005: 35)will 
be used to reveal the relationship between the partnerships as new co-
governance institutions and the existing multi-layered water governance. 
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This notion of social basin is chosen to capture the changes in the structure 
of water governance after the operation of the water partnerships. This 
section will verify the research questions proposed in Chapter 3. The notion 
of social basin will lead a comparative case study to investigate the 
interactive development between water partnerships and multiple-
structured governance before and after the creation of water partnerships.  
 
Urban partnerships 
There was an empty space for the urban partnership to generate co-
governance to be in charge of conserving the ecosystem of urban streams in 
Jeonju. The local rivers in Jeonju did not receive the attention of the 
centralised water governance and were left to local government and actors. 
For example, the Jeonju River and a shorter stream, Sam River had been 
remotely governed under the larger river basin governance structures that 
included different river functions (See Figure 6.9). Each function, such as 
water supply, water quality management and flood control in the expanded 
social basins, was not coordinated or integrated with any plan or 
organisation. Before the emergence of Jeonju water partnership (Yang 2004), 
water governance in the Jeonju River had been typically multi-layered, 
involving various actors such as central agencies, affiliated local offices, the 
larger river basin committee and local governments (See Figure 6.9). Each 
one of them exercised some sort of control, andthe local government mainly 
worked as a coordinating agent for theseexternal governmental agencies 
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before the partnership was created.  
 
Figure 6.9 Jeonju social basin: Expansion and contraction of the Jeonju watershed 
 
The three characteristics of the water governance before the creation of the 
partnership of Jeonju River were listed as below. To begin with, the 
management was functionally segmented. While general river planning 
and maintenance projects were the key responsibilities of the MoCT, (or the 
relevant local Construction department), water quality management and 
related land use regulation remained the hands of the Ministry of 
Environment and relevant departments in the local government. According 
to the different purpose of usage and demand-supply contexts, three 
providers - local government and two public-owned corporations (Korean 
Water Corporation, then-KOWACO) and Korea Rural Community and 
Agricultural Corporation, KARICO)) participated in the complicated water 
supply system. Furthermore, flood control and water quantity monitoring 
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were the responsibility of the Yeong-san River Flood control Office, which 
belonged to the Yeongsan River Basin area under MoE management.  
 
Another characteristic was hierarchical division of river management. Two 
urban streams and tributaries have been managed by different 
administrative units depending on how each stream and tributary was 
categorised on the basis of management priority by the central government. 
As explained in Chapter 1, for example, the Jeonju River was divided into 
three sections: one 6.81km section as a national class river, 14.9km as the 
first-degree local and 10.79km as the second-degree local river.  
 
Lastly, overlapping and patchy links to the integrated basin management 
also characterised Jeonju’s water governance. In addition to the fragmented 
management discussed above, recent reform measures to promote 
integrated management resulted in the triple layered management system 
because of resistance from existing administrative units to the newly 
integrated river basin system (Interview # P6). In addition, apart from the 
typical functions of the Geum River Basin Committee, the Jeonju watershed 
and the institutions based in the watershed were rather indirectly connected 
to the larger river basin authority. The designated functions of the 
Committee based on the Special Act for Geum River Basin are more focused 
on water quality improvement including the introduction of water user 
charges, Total Pollution Load Management (TPLM) and a riparian buffer 
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zone. Apart from applying TPLM to the downstream section junction with 
the Mankyung River in 2007, the Jeonju watershed had not been included in 
the new basin management system. 
 
In the cases of Incheon and Busan, the situations were similar, and there 
was an empty space for new institutions to emerge. Busan and Incheon as 
metropolitan cities have more power and resources than small towns such 
as Jeonjuin Korea’s highly centralised public sector. For instance, the 
metropolitan city mayorswere in charge of local water purification facilities, 
wastewater treatment and weremembers of the respective River basin 
committees. Moreover, they were responsible for setting up long-term plans 
to check conditions and to manage the local rivers as stipulated by the River 
Act, even though management had been mainly limited to flood-control.48 
In general, management of the urban streams had been rather neglected 
until these resources became an opportunity for local actors.  
 
In the end, the emergence of the urban partnerships filled the gap in the 
existing water governance. A neglected function of urban river 
rehabilitation enabled an easy establishment of new organisations without 
support or even opposition of current power holder, the central 
                                               
48 There are committees open to non-governmental actors, such as the National River Management 
Committee based on the Act, but, it is criticised as an overlapping with the MoE-led River basin 
committees and lack of conflict management. See Kim, J. (2008). The key issues in the Bill of Water 
Act. Water Journal. 
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government. The independent feature of these partnerships resulted in no 
linkage between the urban partnerships and the existing water bodies. This 
will be Chapter 7, when partnership outcomes are discussed.    
 
Regional partnerships 
The social basins of the three regional partnerships covered the functions 
and geographical areas managed by the existing water governance. This 
was in contrast to the creation of very new institutions dealing with new 
management issues in urban partnerships. There have been close 
relationships with water agencies in Daecheong and Paldang and a 
supportive relationship with the local authority in GFW. For example, in 
the Daecheong region, the Geum River Authority matched the 
Chungcheong Region and the Daecheong Lake basin. In the case of 
Gyeongnam, the Forum targeted the inhabitants of the Gyeongnam 
province; however, in the process of partnership development, the 
Gyeongnam Partnership expanded its boundary beyond the province.  
 
Despite the overlapping with existing water bodies, the regional 
partnerships tried to differentiate themselves from the existing water 
management. As stated above, more participation in policy decision-
making was the starting point of the Paldang partnership. More 
information sharing and open debate were promised by the Gyeongnam 
Partnership. The Daecheong partnership was also created to cover the gaps 
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in the formal management, eventually evolving to explore in new topics 
such as river rehabilitation, and the voluntary agreement of water savings. 
These were in contrast to the existing water governance in the other three 
urban cases that were characterised as fragmented, multi-layered 
management systems. 
 
As a final point, two urban and regional subgroups created different social 
basins, which revealed the consequences of partnership development to 
address gaps in the existing water governance. While the urban 
partnerships filled in relatively unoccupied niche, the regional partnerships 
established a linkage with the existing water organisations. For example, 
the Paldang partnership was directly engaged with the national policy 
processes, while the Daecheong and Gyeongnam partnerships internalised 
the public organisations by inviting them as partnership members. 
Additionally, the management function played a significant role in theses 
social basins. River restoration, i.e. ecosystem conservation, in the three 
urban cases was ‘new wine in new bottles’. Urban partnership cases prove 
that this new topic attracted local actors with collaborative working 
experience to work together. The LA21 movement and Saving River 
campaigns had been stronger in cities rather than in rural areas where three 
other regional water partnerships were formed. Furthermore, polluted 
water as consumption sources in the major rivers triggered the emergence 
of regional water partnerships. The case studies found that water pollution 
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was differently interpreted by each regional partnership, and there was 
diversity in the ways in which each regional partnership addressed the 
issue. The Daecheong partnership operated through integrating the 
participants into the lake watershed. The Paldang partnership focused on 
how to influence and negotiate the national land use regulation. The 
Gyeongnam Partnership paid attention to improve information sharing 
among broader array of stakeholders of Gyeongnam water management. 
This diversity was in sharp contrast to the nearly identical idea of river 
restoration found in the urban cases.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the emergence of the six water partnerships in Korea 
using the classical and a modified IAD framework. The chapter has shown 
that the emergence of  the six partnerships was locally embedded. The 
nature of related water resources is significant feature to understand the 
dynamic development of water partnerships in Korea. The division of six 
cases into two subgroups is backed by these two different explanations for 
water partnerships.  
 
The analysis verified that three preconditions (physical conditions, 
attributes of community and rules-in-use with norms) were necessary but 
not sufficient factors to explain the partnership development. Above all, 
these three preconditions address social, political, cultural aspects of 
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communities as well as their interactions with physical environment. 
However, the preconditions found in the classical IAD framework cannot fully 
explain the political choices of local actors.Additionally, this framework hardly 
providesadequate explanation about partnerships developed at a large scale 
of water resources. Thus, additional elements, namely reform discourses, 
their application at the local level and social basins, were used to find out 
why the participants were motivated into applying co-governance idea to 
the management of the local water resources.  
 
The legacy of co-governance under the support of national government was 
a critical factor in the emergence of the urban water partnerships, the 
Daecheong partnership and the Gyeongnam Partnership. This finding is 
consistent with the analysis conducted in Chapter 5. Because there was no 
top-down institutional design, relationships between existing water 
governance and newly created co-governance institutions in the five cases 
apart from the Paldang partnership that included the representatives from 
the central agency. The legacy of the LA21 movement and Saving River 
Campaign built the local capacity for the urban partnership development. 
Comparatively, a local NGO without the assistance of the LA21 office 
initiated the Gyeongnam partnership. In Gyeongnam case, the combination 
continued to work by the strong lead of a local NGO that persuaded a 
broad spectrum of participants from national to local levels. Additionally, 
the Daecheong NGOs, similar to the Jeonju case, showed the mature 
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capability to lead the partnership development after the experience of local 
conflict over water pollution and allocation. The discourse of co-governance 
and water management reform in connection with national water 
managementwas found to influence local actors. 
 
The legacy of water reform and subsequent changes in water governance 
influenced the emergence of co-governance institutions in two protected 
water source regions. Again, the creation of three regional water 
partnerships was explained by the use of modified IAD framework. Two 
regional partnerships based on the major water sources, Daecheong and 
Paldang, were formed by local actors: however the public water 
organisations, the KOWACO and the MoE respectively took the initiative at 
the early stage, making suggestions to local actors. This combination of 
enabling support from the public and actual facilitation by local actors 
manoeuvred the development of partnerships in the highly centralised 
Korea. Thus, the legacy of national water reform, mediated by local actors, 
led to the development of two regional water partnerships.Therefore, given 
the diverse features of water partnerships in Korea, the scale of water 
management alone cannot explain the institutional development of co-
governance institutions in the regional partnership cases.  
 
The Korean cases using a modified IAD framework shows how the co-
governance idea has been adopted through complicated dynamics among 
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the global, national and local actors and governance systems. The analysis 
of social basins revealed that the emergence of the six partnerships shifted 
the existing multi-layered water governance in Korea. While there were 
new institutions to address new management needs in cities, 
complementary ones were developed to address enduring problems in 
regions. Furthermore, in the case of the urban partnerships, the lack of 
integration with existing governance structure could be a source of concern, 
but in the case of the regional partnerships, their independence could 
become an issue. How this different degree of relationship with existing 
governance structure works in the partnership operation, and their 
outcomes, will be analysedin the following Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES OF KOREAN 
WATER PARTNERSHIPS: A COMPARATIVE CASE 
STUDY 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a comparative case study of the outcomes of co-
governance institutions for water management in Korea. It is argued in this 
study that the outcomes of water partnerships are determined by their 
institutional developmentlinked with multi-layered water governance. To 
explore the dynamic features of the outcomes, three categories of 
assessment criteria are applied to the data collected for six cases. The seven 
analytical elements of the IAD framework are used to explain the results of 
a multiple-criteria-based assessment. Three additional elements are used to 
complement the IAD framework. The purposes and contexts of institutional 
development in these subgroups will provide a deeper understanding of 
co-governance. Therefore, the second research question, how the locally 
embedded development of water partnerships in Korea yielded certain 
outcomes is to be answered through the modified IAD framework.  
 
This chapter opens with an analysis of the outcomes of urban and regional 
partnerships, using the fieldwork data. The next section will focus on how 
the IAD framework explains the assessed results about the partnership 
outcomes. After the discussion on the analytical elements of the IAD 
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framework, the theoretical modification, developed in Chapter 3 will be 
applied to fill the gaps in the classical framework on the partnership 
outcomes. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the 
outcomes of the two subgroups to depict the collective operation of water 
partnerships in Korea.  
 
7.1 Outcomes of water partnerships in Korea 
7.1.1 Overview 
The attitude survey was conducted to reveal the partnership outcomes49 
with three sub-sets of evaluation criteria and the overall satisfaction.   
 
                                               
49 See Chapter 3 for the details of how this survey was designed and implemented.  
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Table 7.1 Selected evaluation criteria for the attitude survey 
Category Criteria  
Satisfaction with overall partnership outcomes  
Procedural 
issues 
‘Mutual understandings’ among members 
Learning and change beyond the original group: ‘More 
application’ and ‘Expansion’ in short 
Changes in attitudes, behaviours, institutions & practices: 
‘Citizen awareness’ in short 
Costs due to cultural and professional gaps among members: 
‘Gaps’ in short 
Transaction costs: ‘Cost’ in short 
Environme
ntal 
outcomes 
Water quantity 
Water quality  
Ecosystem sustainability 
Socio-
economic 
outcomes 
Trust building 
(capacity for) conflict management 
Source: Modified Connick and Innes (2003), Conley and Moote (2003), Innes and Booher 
(1999: 9), Rydin and Falleth (2006) and Kenney (2000) 
 
The majority of respondents of all partnerships were found to be satisfied 
with the partnership, which were consistent with the positive perception of 
the process-related and socio-economic outcomes at least. Out of 77 
members of the six water partnerships (response rate: 59.7%), it was found 
that 54% of respondents were satisfied with the outcomes of their own 
partnership (the sum of respondents chose ‘most agreed’ and ‘agreed’). The 
median data for each outcome indicator shows that the majority of 
respondents acknowledge that positive outcomes were produced by each 
partnership.As shown in Figure 7.1 below, between two subgroups of 
partnerships, the average median data of the positive perceptions about the 
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urban partnerships overall equal to or exceeded the ones on the regional 
partnerships (See Figure 7.1 below). In detail, among averagely positive 
perceptions about three sub-sets of evaluation criteria and satisfaction with 
each partnership, some 63.2% responded that process-related outcomes of 
their partnerships were agreeably and strongly agreeably positive. The 
percentage of positive perceptions about socio-economic outcomes (average 
60.8%) and environmental outcomes (average 38.7%) followed in rank. Why 
and how these differences in three categorised outcomes occurred will be 
analysed in the following sections of this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Perceived outcomes and self-satisfaction of the two sub-groups of 
partnerships (Average median)  
*: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
Members’ satisfaction with each partnership 
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The Table 7.2 below shows a positive overall endorsement from members in 
urban partnerships. Jeonju showed the highest (87.5%), followed by 
Incheon (63.6%), leaving Busan rating at 35.7%. In Busan, half of the 
respondents picked ‘neutral’ answer. This result shows their hesitance over 
expressing either positive or negative opinions over the overall partnership 
outcomes. Among the regional partnerships, Daecheong partnership 
members show the highest degree of satisfaction, while Paldang members 
show the lowest degree. The continuous internal conflicts found in the 
Busan and Paldang cases may be the reason for low satisfaction.  
 
 
Figure 7.2Satisfaction with each partnership (percentage)  
(r: regional partnership, average of subgroups is in Capital character URBAN, 
REGIONAL) 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
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Table 7.2 Scoring on Satisfaction with each partnership in the Likert scale and 
Percentage 
Cases 
Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral (3) Agree (4) 
Strongly 
agree (5) 
Jeonju 
(%) 
- - 
1 
(12.5%) 
5 
(62.5%) 
2 
(25.0%) 
Busan 
(%) 
- 
2 
(14.3%) 
7 
(50.0%) 
3 
(21.4%) 
2 
(14.3%) 
Incheon 
(%) 
- 
1 
(9.1%) 
3 
(27.3%) 
6 
(54.5%) 
1 
(9.1%) 
Urban:  
Sub-total 
(%) 
- 
3 
(9.1%) 
11 
(33.3%) 
14 
(42.4%) 
5 
(15.2%) 
Daecheong 
(%) 
2 
(11.8%) 
1 
(5.9%) 
5 
(29.4%) 
6 
(35.3%) 
3 
(17.6%) 
Paldang 
(%) 
- 
4 
(25.0%) 
7 
(43.8%) 
5 
(31.3%) 
- 
Gyeongnam 
(%) 
- 
1 
(9.1%) 
1 
(9.1%) 
9 
(81.8%) 
- 
Regional:  
Sub-total 
(%) 
2 
(4.5%) 
6 
(13.6%) 
13 
(29.5%) 
20 
(45.5%) 
3 
(6.8%) 
 
7.1.2 Process-related outcomes 
Based on the median marks for the six process-related criteria from mutual 
understanding to cost), ‘expansion of the current partnership activities’ was 
the much positively perceived criterionfor the urban and regional 
partnerships (Figure 7.3 below). ‘More application of the partnership 
practice into other fields’ was the much positively perceived one in the 
urban partnerships, while it was the second in the regional ones. The 
perception about mutual understanding and citizen awareness followed the 
previous two criteria. Unlike other criteria, the partnership members 
disagreed most with the criterion, ‘the difference between members (gaps)’. 
The average median data of the Jeonju and Incheon members indicated 
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‘neutral’. Busan and all regional partnership members averagely disagreed 
with this criterion. The perception on the other negative criterion, ‘the 
transaction costs’ was slightly higher than the opinion about the ‘difference 
among members’. The urban partnership members chose ‘neutral’ on the 
occurrence of transition costs. The members of the Daecheong and 
Gyeongnam selected ‘disagree’ (2 in average median data) on the occurred 
costs in contrast to the members of the Paldang partnership selection of 
‘agree’ (4 in average median data). 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Process-related outcomes in the Likert scale (median) 
 
7.1.3 Environmental outcomes 
According to the average median data as shown in Figure 7.4 below, the 
partnership members expressed ‘neutral’ opinion about the respective 
partnership’s outcomes in terms of environmental enhancement. This result 
Jeonju Busan Incheon
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indicated the lowest among the three categories of assessment criteria. The 
members of Jeonju from the urban group and Daecheong from the regional 
group were the only ones who expressed positive perceptions about the 
ecological improvement of local water resources, while the members of 
remaining partnerships chose ‘neutral’ to this criterion.  Regarding the 
improvement in water quantity, the median data from the responses in the 
Jeonju partnership was only ‘positive’. In terms of innovating water quality, 
the only positive median was calculated from the responses of the 
Daecheong members.  
 
Figure 7.4 Environment outcomes in the Likert scale (median) 
 
7.1.4 Socio-economic outcomes 
As shown in Figure 7.5 below, perceptions about the trust building 
indicated that members were in general positive about the role of the 
partnership in building trust, with the exception being Paldang. The 
Jeonju Busan Incheon
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average median data about this criterion was lower than the one about 
process-related outcomes. In terms of the partnerships role in conflict 
management, the members of sub-groups expressed different ideas. The 
urban partnership members perceived positively about the partnership’s 
role in conflict management with an exception of the Busan case (neutral). 
The members of the regional partnerships, instead, chose ‘neutral’.  
 
 
Figure 7.5 Socio-economic outcomes in the Likert scale (median) 
 
7.1.5 Summary 
In summary, the overall responses regarding outcomes perceived by the 
partnership members were diverse. These results disagree both with 
protagonists’ positivity and with sceptics’ negativity over the outcomes of 
water partnerships, which are briefly mentioned in Chapter 2. Some might 
overlook this result based on the immaturity of these partnerships, but this 
complexity of the partnership outcomes requires partnership studies 
Jeonju Busan Incheon
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approach that is more realistic. Thus, an analysis needs to explain why and 
how some partnerships performed better or vice versa. The following 
sections are dedicated to answering to these research questions.  
 
Among three evaluation criteria, partnership members expressed positive 
for process-related and socioeconomic outcomes. In spite of that, the 
responses about environment outcomes remained neutral or negative. The 
members of partnerships in each sub-group found their outcomes 
differently. Two regional partnership members in Paldang and Gyeongnam 
expressed doubts about the socio-economic outcomes, whereas the overall 
positive results were found in a regional partnership in Daecheong.  
Largely, the members of urban partnerships assessed their outcomes more 
positively than did those in regional partnerships. This result can imply that 
the management functions and the scale of management matter in the 
partnership outcomes.  
 
The survey results capture the diversity of the partnership outcomes 
beyond the division of two subgroups. The attitude survey revealed that 
Jeonju partnership among the urban group and Daecheong partnership 
among the regional group received positive outcomes in all three sets of 
evaluation criteria. In particular, the Jeonju partnership members expressed 
a generally positive evaluation apart from two criteria, ‘cultural difference 
among members’ and ‘transaction costs’. Whereas Jeonju was the only case 
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with completed rehabilitation project at the small scale, the Daecheong 
partnership brought an interesting diversity of positive outcomes to this 
comparative case study. The scale of water resources and the management 
topics in the Daecheong partnership were different from the Jeonju 
partnership. This case at the regional scale was inconsistent withthe 
proposition raised by Olson, which stated that more effective cooperation 
would be achieved if the scale of community was smaller.  How the 
Daecheong partnership showed this result will be analysed in detail in 
relation to the scale of community, in the section 7.2.3 and the co-
governance discourse in the section 7.3.1. 
 
The scale of water resources and the management topics that determined 
the emergence of two different types of water partnerships were not 
determinant factors in producing positive outcomes. Additionally, the 
outcomes of remaining four partnerships also need more elaboration. 
Slightly lower but still positive perceived outcomes were found in the 
metropolitan cities in comparison with the successfully completed Jeonju 
case. The regional partnerships such as the Paldang and the Gyeongnam 
achieved positive process-related outcomes and trust building of socio-
economic outcomes but not in the rest of criteria. How and why these 
results occurred will be analysed in the next sections with the classical IAD 
framework and a modified one in order.  
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7.2 The IAD framework analysis on the partnership outcomes 
In this section, an attempt will be made to show how some out of the six 
partnerships produced better or worse outcomesabout process, socio-
economic aspects and environment, analysed in the previous section than 
others.Given that a significant focus of this study is to understand the 
contextual development of co-governance institutions, how the seven 
analytical elements of the IAD framework (see Table 7.3 below)affected the 
assessed outcomes is investigated employing the data on partnership 
operations using the comparative case study method. Of course, as this 
analysis is addressing actual partnership outcomes, it is not necessary to 
discuss ‘(4) potential outcomes’ here.  
Table 7.3 Seven analytical elements for intra-action arena of partnerships 
Analytical 
elements 
and Rules-
in-use 
Analytical elements in Action situation 
 
Rules in use 
(Operational; 
Collective-choice) 
(1) the set of participants  entry & exit rules 
(2) the specific positions to be filled by 
participants  
position rules 
(3) the set of allowable actions and their 
linkages to outcomes  
scope rules 
(4) the potential outcomes  authority rules 
(5) the level of control  aggregation rules 
(6)the available information  information rules 
(7) the costs and benefits payoff rules 
Source: Ostrom, Gardner et al. (1994: 37-43) 
 
7.2.1 The set of participants 
An array of stakeholders participated in the six water partnerships, 
whichreflected the internal politics of each partnership. In some cases at the 
larger scales, the multi-layered structures were found. The Daecheong case 
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showed that the multi-layered structure of well organised four distinct 
tiersin a large scale partnership could produce positive outcomes. The 
highest level, the Secretary General, his/her advisory committee and the 
board of trustees comprising the national assembly members and basin 
authority heads and the second level– executive assembly– led the 
partnership activities. The third layer with administration and 
implementation function consists of Standing Committee and Permanent 
Office and the fourth layer down to community level contains five sub-
basin network branches in five local authorities and three research clusters 
of education & outreach, research & survey and policy analysis, 
respectively. Thus, the scale and organisational framework of the 
Daecheong partnership are more comprehensive and self-contained in 
comparison with other partnerships.  
 
The other example was the Incheon partnership, which was a multi-layered 
network with a working group. Supported by a bylaw, this partnership was 
formed with a pyramid structure of three layers. This partnership showed 
the efficiency in decision-making in comparison with the other 
metropolitan partnership in Busan. This was confirmed in an interview 
with a fulltime staff (NGO) of Incheon Partnership, Ms Hyae-Ja Choi 
(Interview #I1). The Busan partnership had the broad but thin involvement 
of membership within the relatively static structure. Until the creation of a 
subcommittee in 2005, Busan partnership showed a slow progress in 
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conducting the river restoration projects.This was apparent in Busan’s 
lowproportion of streams,50which have been restored (13.8%) (see thetable 
below). The result was affected by the way in which members led the 
restoration projects. In Incheon, the partnership took charge of restoration. 
In Busan, the city government and borough authorities directly managed 
the projects and consulted the roundtable structure of the partnership.  
 
Table 7.4 Planned or completed restoration length in two metropolises 
Features Busan Incheon 
Length (km) 26.6 km in 6 streams 38.56 km in 5 streams 
Project Period 2003~2011 May 2003 ~ Dec. 2007 
Restoration length 
proportion of the total 
urban streams  
13.8% 54% 
Source:Busan water partnership (2006); Busan Metropolitan City (2005); Incheon water 
partnership and Incheon Metropolitan City  
 
The regional partnerships such as the Paldang and the Gyeongnam cases 
achieved positive process-related outcomes through the participation of 
stakeholders, which had been absent in the formal policy process in Korea. 
The agreement over the national regulation about the water quality control 
by the Paldang partnership wrote a new history in public policy history in 
Korea. The success of the event, the Water Forum run by the Gyeongnam 
partnership was evident.  
 
                                               
50 One of the reasons for the contrasting project progress was the relatively challenging nature of 
river conditions, e.g. the coverage of urban streams, 96.02% in Busan, and 58.11% in Incheon in 
2004. See River Information Centre and Ministry of Land.Transport and Maritime Affairs. (2010). 
"River Management GIS (RIMGIS)."   Retrieved January 28, 2008, from http://www.river.go.kr . 
250 
 
However, there was a problem with the availability of data about the 
outcomes of the regional partnerships. For example, the Paldang 
partnership has been operating mainly to coordinate the conflicting 
interests of the stakeholders instead of implementing projects. In 
comparison with the implementation functions of the urban partnerships, 
environmental outcomes of the regional partnerships in particular could not 
be backed by data and the survey results.  On top of that, given the survey 
was conducted only 2-3 years after partnership creation, the overall 
negative perceptions about the environmental and socioeconomic outcomes 
can be understood in terms of a ‘time-lapse’ effect of co-governance in 
practice. Given the respectively different types of positive outcomes, the 
scale of management in relation to the partnership outcomes needs to be 
understood in their contexts. 
 
The Paldang and Gyeongnam cases showed that the lack of representation 
was problematic. In Paldang, the partnership only invited the officials from 
the Ministry of the Environment (MoE), which missed the participation of 
the related ministries such as the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation (MoCT). Given the degree of complexity and overlapping 
nature of the jurisdictional responsibilities for the management of Paldang 
Lake (Chung 2004), the bilateral partnership between the MoE and the 
locals excluding the water supplied regions surrounding Seoul may only 
depict some of the issues. Dr Kyeong-Min Kim, a water expert for the 
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Paldang partnership pointed out that the lack of representation by these 
other agencies meant that negotiation over issues beyond the MoE’s remit, 
such as land regulation managed by the MoCT, took extra time to reach a 
conclusion (Interview #P3). This would affect the outcomes of co-
governance. In Gyeongnam, the working body of the partnership included 
only a few NGO campaigners. The Forum campaigner also found that it 
made sense to stick to the most commonly agreed topics. In an interview 
with the leader of the Gyeongnam partnership, Mr Sang-young Lee, he 
stated that  
‘…it was agreeable that some local communities in conflict over 
water management, e.g. Jinju city over expanding the Namgang 
Dam, were reluctant to join the Forum(Interview#K3).’ 
This explains why the survey response to the conflict management element 
was rated very negatively and why members highlighted the transaction 
cost problem in the case of Gyeongnam.  
 
The above explanation shows why some partnerships at the larger scale 
with multi-tiered structures were more effective than other partnerships: 
the cases of the Daecheong and the Incheon. The lack of representation in 
the Paldang and the Gyeongnam partnerships was consistent with the weak 
role of the partnerships in conflict management, shown in these cases.  
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7.2.2 The positions: the key actors within the partnerships 
Two distinctive types were found in terms of members’ positions in the six 
cases: 1) 'balance between multiple leading actors' and 2) 'single or a few 
leaders'. The former included the Jeonju, Incheon and Daecheong 
partnerships and the recent Gyeongnam, whereas the latter involved with 
the partnerships in BusanPaldang and Gyeongnam in the initial stage. The 
positions of members reveal the power of relations within partnerships, 
which indicate who are the key actors in each partnership.  
 
On the one hand,the balanced relationships among members were shaped 
through the commitments of multiple leading actors in Jeonju, Incheon and 
Daecheong. The multiple key actors and the balance among them were 
secured through the exchange of 'reciprocity'. As Ostrom (1998) argues, 
reciprocity with trust and reputation boost cooperation, in a relatively small 
social group. In Jeonju, the city government offered a dramatic cancellation 
of the River Park Plan by the then mayor and further positive efforts within 
a limited budget. Two local activists participated the office for LA21 in 
Jeonju, Mr Jaecheol Shin and Mr Jaebyeong Kim made their voices in 
unison in the interview. They stated that the NGO members also tried to 
keep the conflict-free environment within the Jeonju partnership with the 
exchange of ‘reciprocity’ of commitment (Interview #J1 and #J2). The 
similar pattern was found in Incheon (Interview #I1). The city government 
supported to create the bylaw, stable funding and other resources for 
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businesses, which were matched with the commitment from the NGOs and 
the local academics. The key actors in the Daecheong partnership were the 
water supplier (KOWACO) and local NGOs, most of the NGOs had been 
active since the preparation process. Given the positive outcomes of these 
three partnerships, the committed leading actors and the representation 
balance among them may be another critical factor in institutional 
development of co-governance. However, keeping the balance among 
diverse members was not a ‘free lunch’, which is reflected in the relatively 
high recognition of 'costs’ in the evaluation of partnership outcomes. This 
issue is to be re-visited later in this chapter in section 7.2.6.   
 
On the other hand,in the cases of Busan, Paldang and Gyeongnam, single or 
a few leaders led the partnerships. Furthermore,the partnerships could not 
manage the shaping of ‘the reciprocal commitment’, which were present in 
other three partnership cases, discussed above. The lack of commitment 
reciprocity resulted in the lower level of mutual trust, reflected in their 
weak conflict management. The Busan city government’s lack of 
commitment became a continuous source of internal tension among 
governmental and non-governmental actors. For example, the NGO 
campaigner who was one of the two appointed executive secretaries in the 
Busan partnership has been practically the actual leaders of the partnership. 
Then secretary general of the office for LA21 in Busan pointed out that the 
city government has been quite passive in terms of leading that partnership 
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(Interview #B4). This was in sharp contrast to the Incheon partnership. The 
case in Incheon saw more active roles of city government. Furthermore, the 
initial city government members of the partnership were replaced with new 
officials, especially high-ranking ones such as the vice mayor and the head 
of the environmental policy department (Interviews #B1 and #B2). The non-
governmental groups with a strong will and driving force felt betrayed by 
the city government’s lack of support, e.g. the limited budget allocation, 
and the loss of accumulated mutual understanding with their city 
government counterparts due to their replacement. This explains the lower 
outcomes in conflict resolution in the Busan case.51 
 
In the Paldang case, the tense balance between the two key groups, the MoE 
and county governments, was apparent in the initial partnership process. 
By contrast, two other actors, Gyeonggi-do and community representatives 
proved to be relatively passive, with weak voices. The community 
representatives had less experience than the NGO campaigners had 
(Interview #P3), while Gyeonggi-do was inhibited by its supervisory role to 
approve and monitor the much discussed new regulation system based on 
the pollution load in addition to conventional concentration-based control 
applied in the seven counties. (Interview #P2) The spectrum of strong and 
                                               
51  Two partnership staffs – one civil servant and one paid NGO campaigner- were appointed 
according to the Code of Operation, however, the combination of the continuously circulating 
position of a 6th degree civil servant and a NGO campaigner without a permanent office was a key 
challenge to the partnership for the first two years (Interview #B1).  
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weak voiced actors shows the highly political situation in which the 
Paldang partnership was embedded.  
 
When the public bodies supported the partnerships financially and 
attempted to control co-governance institutions with the strong NGOs, 
internal conflicts were inevitable. The public bodies funding the regional 
partnerships took a passive, tokenistic commitment to realise co-
governance, whilst the NGOs tried to make the most of this opportunity in 
the Busan, Paldang and Gyeongnam cases. Due to the limited support of 
fulltime staff, the civil servants had to combine the partnership work with 
their primary employment and had no incentive to actively engage with 
partnership activities, which led to the public staff being described by NGO 
participants as ‘being less enthusiastic’(Interview #B2; #B3). The Paldang 
partnerships failed to motivate the local counties to work together apart 
from the negotiation about land regulation (Interview #P1). The  Nakdong 
River Basin Environmental Office, the Gyeongnam’s key funder,did not join  
a creation of co-governance organisation about river management, which 
ended up being composed of mere NGOs members (Meeting observation 
#KM). The Nakdong River Basin Environmental Office offered 8.5 million 
Korean Won in 2003 (Meeting Observation #KM).  
 
One of the reasons for passive involvement of the public actors was the 
cultural aversion against the information sharing with the non-
256 
 
governmental actors when there have been conflicts about policy 
implementation (Interviews #B1, #O2 and #P6). A similar pattern of 
conflicts and management was observed in the Paldang case. Thus, given 
the relatively high conflict within the partnership with less committed city 
government in Busan, the key to shape this reciprocity tends to be in the 
hands of the public bodies, especially in this state-driven society.  When the 
existing water management bodies remained passive in engaging with non-
governmental groups, either internal conflicts increased or collaborative 
decision-making was limited. Therefore, extra efforts of governmental 
actors are called for in order to maintain a newly emerged co-governance 
on conventional management issues. 
 
According to the IAD framework, these positions assigned to the actors 
determine the possible actions, which are linked to the outcomes, to be 
examined in the next section.  
 
7.2.3 Allowable actions (authority) and the potential outcomes 
According to the IAD framework literature, allowable actions, one of the 
analytical elements is supposed to be directly linked with the outcomes in 
comparison with other elements (Ebenhöh 2007; Poteete, Janssen et al. 2010). 
For this study, the types of activities were the key feature of this element. 
Based on the outcomes assessed at the beginning of this chapter, this section 
reviews how the allowable actions were linked with the results of 
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partnership outcomes survey. For this reason, the outcomes element in the 
analytical elements of the IAD framework will notbe analysed separately in 
this study.  
 
The highest perceived outcomes of the Jeonju partnership were possible 
through clear and focused activities involving a few committed members 
empowered through the path dependent LA21 campaigns. For the Jeonju 
partnership, the high level of agreement among its members enabled their 
passionate persuasion of local residents, who were sceptical about replacing 
the parking lot in the riverbank with a more natural riverside (Interviews 
#J1 and #J2). 
 
In terms of the environmental outcomes, the Jeonju was the only case that 
showed some evidences of improvement. For example, the river 
rehabilitation project covering the 7.2 km section in the city centre 
transformed the artificial channel into a natural type of river with meanders. 
Only one year after the completion of the project, the fish population in the 
stream became more diverse: increasing from 14 species in 1999 to 20 in 
2003 in the upstream and 5 to 17 in the middle section. By 2003, 25 species 
were found in the restored stream including the rare native fish, Shiri, 
which is usually found only in clean water; this was hailed as a great 
achievement by academics. It was positive to see that further efforts to 
extend the restored section in the Jeonju River were being made and that 
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the city government announced its intention to restore the four other 
sections of the river in the city (Jeonju city official, Mr. Lee H-H, Interview 
#J4). Improved water quality in the restored section confirms the positive 
results of the perceived outcomes in Jeonju. For example, the Biological 
Oxygen Demand (BOD) at three points in the River consistently dropped 
from 2.3 before the project to 1.0, from 3.5 to 1.7 and from 6.7 to 1.2(Ministry 
of Environment and National Institute of Environmental Research). Water 
quality improvement was achieved by eco-friendly vegetation in the 
riverbed and banks, as well as by an enhanced sewage collection system. 
However, after time, insufficient instream flow led to the occurrence of the 
repeated incidents of dead fish floating in the River.The maintenance of 
water quality after the rehabilitation project remained a serious issue in 
Jeonju (the meeting observation #JM).  
 
Similar to Jeonju, the Gyeongnam and the Paldang partnerships also had a 
limited number of activities but their activities were continuously 
intervened by the conflicts, which eventually affected the outcomes. The 
key activity of the Paldang partnership was policy consultation regarding 
the adoption of a pollutant load-based water quality standard system. For 
example, when just after an agreement among the members of the 
partnership to apply binding pollution load-based regulation 52 , the 
                                               
52 The participants (except one county, Y-cheon si) of the Paldang partnership agreed to accept the 
maximum pollution load, this additional regulation as compulsory in Sept. 2005 and all of the seven 
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‘Presidential Committee on Balanced National Development’ announced a 
plan that did not reflect the agreed demand of seven counties. This 
announcement effectively nullified the painful and hard negotiation 
processes. In 2005, during the fieldwork for this study, this politically 
motivated decision from outside of the partnership stopped all the formal 
meetings of the partnership until the MoE proposed another negotiable idea 
to persuade the local governments and community representatives 
(Interview #P2). This negative aspect was reflected in the survey result. The 
Paldang partnership members expressed relatively negative opinions about 
‘more application of partnership in other fields’ (12.5% of the respondents). 
 
For the Gyeongnam Water Forum, the avoidance of contested topics, 
limited opportunities for open debate over complicated, and highly 
politicised, water governance issues, and thus reduced the possibility of 
experiencing social learning. By avoiding discussionsabout politically 
sensitive issues, they could attract financial support from the Basin 
authority and the provincial government as well as a number of audiences 
(about 200 in the 1st and about 300 in the 2nd Forum) (Gyeongnam Water 
Expo and Forum organisation committee). In other words, channels that 
link the partnership to palpable outcomes were too controlled for 
participants to learn and develop co-governance practices that might work 
in the contexts of Gyeongnam. The great majority of Gyeongnam 
                                                                                                                                
counties and community members agreed in Feb 2006. 
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respondents also expressed neutral feelings about the outcomes in conflict 
management. This result is related to the limitations of the event-focused 
partnership programmes, despite creating a new opportunity for 
stakeholders to share information.  
 
In contrast to the Jeonju, Paldang, GyeongnamDaecheong, Busan and 
Incheon partnerships saw a broad range of activities conducted. However, 
the process-related outcomes were only evident in the Daecheong 
partnership. In Daecheong, the range of participation broadened as 
previously passive groups in the upstream areas became engaged, but this 
resulted in more debates between upstream and downstream regions. Since 
the partnership chose to build ‘solidarity within the Basin of Daecheong 
Lake’, as a wide-ranging watershed organisation, representativeness has 
matured to more collaborative governance. For example, the exchange visit 
programmes between cities and counties were well received by participant 
regions. These programmes were linked with the positively perceived result 
in trust-building by the Daecheong members.  
 
However, in terms of environmental outcomes, no large-scale partnerships 
(i.e. Busan, Incheon and Daecheong) proved to yield positive outcomes. 
Two metropolitan partnerships were conducting several river restoration 
projects that covered more than a watershed in 2007 (Busan Water 
Partnership (Busan Hacheon Sal-li-gi Simin Undong Bonbu) ; Incheon 
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Water Partnership (Incheon Hacheon Sal-li-gi Chujindan)). Rather the on-
going rehabilitation projects resulted in unstable water quality in the rivers 
(Interview #B2). 53  Despite the positive Perceptions about water quality 
enhancement in the Daecheong partnership, in fact, water conditions in 
large river basins were not dramatically changed the emergence of co-
governance institutions. As Figure 7.6shows, there has been little 
improvement in BOD and COD data. This confirms the difficulty in the 
management of multi-use water resources and the slow changes in 
institutionalising reform ideas.  
 
Figure 7.6 Annual Water Quality Trend of the two Lakes (unit: mg/L) 
*: Paldang data is the monitored one at the Paldang Dam station.  
Source: (Ministry of Environment and National Institute of Environmental Research) 
 
 
In summary, the types of partnership activities did not affect the outcomes 
too much. Also, their related scales of partnerships could not explain these 
                                               
53 In terms of water quality data, the assessment of Busan case is difficult due to the complex 
intertwined situation, while rivers in Incheon show an understandable instability in BOD data due to 
the ongoing projects.  
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diverse outcomes. The types of partnership activities varied from 
supervising the rehabilitation projects, running informal public education 
programmes, allocating the grants to local organisations to consultation of 
national water policies. Interestingly, the Daecheong partnership with the 
broadest range of activities and the Jeonju partnership with the narrowly 
defined activities were found successful in the outcomes survey. The 
documentary analysis and interviews supported their achievement in 
process-related, environment and socio-economic outcomes. In this regard, 
the classic IAD framework needs to be complemented in order to 
understand the partnership outcomes occurred in Korea. 
 
7.2.4 The level of control (aggregation) 
All six partnerships have platforms such as management committees to 
control partnership operations as well as to influence members’ behaviours. 
Local actors facilitated the operation of the urban partnerships,whereas 
central agencies managed the conventional water governance. The 
voluntary organisation of local actors means no linkage with the existing 
water governance. For example, the flood control and the water supply for 
insteam flow management needed coordination with the regional offices of 
the MoCT and the MoE in addition with the provincial governments. 
Without the linkage, the river rehabilitation projects in the three cities 
suffered from either insufficient water flow or the flood control in 
connection with the sewage and wastewater treatment facilities. The 
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negative perceptions about the environmental outcomes are directly related 
to this issue. This aspect contradicts the significance of self-governance by 
Ostrom, which indicates that ‘boundedly rational individuals’ led the 
autonomous institutional processes with ‘no external enforcers’(2007: 48). 
 
In the regional partnerships, the level of control by the public bodies was 
stronger. This intervention was managed differently in each regional 
partnership. Additionally, the low commitments of the public organisations 
produced the negative impacts for partnership outcomes. The most self-
contained comprehensive network found in the Daecheong partnership 
inherits challenges due to the uneven commitments of public actors, in 
particular, local government representatives. The report for the 3rd Annual 
General Assembly, held at Yuseong, Korea on February 23, 2004 indicates 
that the actual implementation of various campaigns within the 
communities and basin scopes was actually carried out by the NGOs. 
Furthermore, the only node of interaction with the basin water governance 
outside the partnership boundary was the participation in the advisory 
committee. An NGO member of executive committee had worked as a 
member of advisory committee for River Basin Management Committee. 
Despite the intervention and the low commitments of some powerful actors, 
the Daecheong partnership managed to produce impressive outcomes. 
Again, this result was inconsistent with Ostrom’s proposition, which claims 
that voluntary local organisationscan be effective in managing shared 
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natural resources.  
 
The success story of the Daecheong partnership was not repeated in the 
Paldang and Gyeongnam cases. The written responsibilities of the Paldang 
partnership have been published in the 572nd Ministerial order of 
Environment in 2006. Among the five responsibilities, the first indicates the 
partnership’s complementary role in relation to the national policy-making. 
This could make local actors feel uncomfortable when being part of co-
governance institution as their presence in the partnership would suggest 
being co-opted by the previous adversary, i.e. the central government that 
used to be authoritative until the democratisation in the 1990s. The passive 
participation of some county governments and overall community 
representatives was to some extents caused by the MoE-branded attempts 
to formalising a governance structure (Interview #P4). This imbalance 
resulted in the neutral perceptions about trust building and the 
continuously observed internal conflicts.  
 
In Gyeongnam, the actual decision-making was concentrated within the 
hands of a few NGO campaigners. The campaigners worked hard to 
operate and create the water partnerships, however, their commitments 
contrasted against passive participation of stakeholders nationwide to the 
Water Forum. The observation of the Gyeongnam Water Forum by the 
author in 2005 confirmed this contrast among the active minority and 
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passive majority. The degree of co-governance was found weak when the 
partnership managed to create the River Network sub-committee but failed 
to involve any public organisations (Interview #K3, KM). Government 
officers were reluctant to commit themselves beyond participating in events, 
which indicates the broad but low level of co-governance in Gyeongnam.  
 
This analytical element, level of control, explained the limited scope of three 
urban partnerships, which resulted in relative poor environmental 
outcomes. However, the invention observed in three regional partnerships 
brought uneven outcomes. For example, the level of internal control was 
high in successful Daecheong case. In contrast, the other two cases in 
Paldang and Gyeongnam showed low internal control, following 
fluctuating outcomes.  
 
7.2.5 The available information 
The partnerships that produced their own information produced positive 
perceived outcomes. In Jeonju, as members of the LA21 campaign, local 
academics joined the regular meetings with city officials to provide a 
flexible consulting system. In addition to the enhancement of ecosystem 
sustainability, the Jeonju partnership produced an innovative outcome – a 
pilot scheme to find native species that were adapted to local conditions. 
The partnership questioned the standard river restoration design, which 
had been, for the most part, imported from West European or Japanese 
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experiences and looked for site-specific vegetation in the 20 pilot beds 
(Interview #J1 and meeting observation #JM). Thanks to this, Jeonju river 
restoration project was completed with the locally proven plants, which 
was found to contribute to enhancing bio-diversity in Jeonju (BJ, Park 2004). 
This case proved that uncertainty as one of the difficulties in water 
management was overcome by ‘trial-and-error’ activities that were based 
on the principle of locally adapted management.  
 
The Daecheong partnership served as a knowledge centre by not only 
collecting information from each member but also producing new 
knowledge itself. In fact, collecting information was not easy, due to the 
uneven commitment of public actors who held the official information 
related to water, but new local knowledge continuously accumulated 
through community campaigns and the activities of research clusters. 
Newly published information has been actively disseminated via an on-line 
information warehouse on the partnership’s website. For example, there are 
new maps created by a local NGO with funds provided by the partnership, 
depicting not only the lake watershed but also the cultural heritages of local 
communities. The partnership also published monthly newsletters, research 
reports and educational documents. Like the Jeonju case, these active roles 
in information production and sharing made positive impacts on the 
outcomes of the Daecheong partnership. 
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The Gyeongnam provided access to government documents and the 
opportunities to hear the talks of governmental officials in the Water Forum 
(Interview #K2). For example, a government official from Gyeongsangnam 
province came to unveil and discuss the 10-year demand management plan 
of water resource. When the first Forum-led participatory policy process 
and compliance was held, the Nakdong Basin Office disclosed information 
about new regulation based on the pollution load. This type of open 
discussion about national regulation was unprecedented in the province 
(Interview #KM). The Forums played a role as an information warehouse 
by covering comprehensive water management topics that ranged from 
technological to policy ones. Such information became an alternative source 
of knowledge, which was one of the merits and achievements of the Jeonju, 
Daecheong and Gyeongnam partnerships.  
 
However, despite the broad range of the information produced by the 
Daecheong and the Gyeongnam partnerships, the degree of debate was 
subject to criticism within partnerships. In the Daecheong case, internal 
criticism (JH, Park 2005) has repeatedly pointed out the need to pay more 
attention to policy issues, and to establish clear and detailed goals 
(Daecheong Water Partnership 2004; Daecheong Water Partnership 2005). 
In Gyeongnam, the agreement among the spectrum of national, local and 
community participants after the 1st and 2nd Gyeongnam Forums 
appeared less impressive. Criticisms were also raised against the low level 
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of activity of the Organisation Committee, and the ways in which debates 
avoided politically sensitive topics. Additionally, locally produced 
knowledge was rarely found in national policy documents and academic 
research papers. Given the positive outcomes produced by the Daecheong 
partnership, information clustering by the partnerships without having 
politically sensitive discussion mighthave been ‘safe’ tactic for short term. 
This risk-avoid tactic of the partnerships can be dilemma to co-governance 
institutions I for long-term because co-governance is required to address 
not only co-production by stakeholders but also conflict management 
among different social interests over water management. This dilemma was 
supported by the growing political tension over water resources 
management, which has grown since the 1990s in Korea.  
 
The lack of information sharing and production was directly linked to the 
lower achievement of the partnership outcomes in the Paldang case. The 
information produced and/or used in the Paldang partnership was rarely 
publicly accessible with the exception of their quarterly published 
newsletters, called ‘Paldang Sarang’, and its less active website, - 
www.paldang.or.kr-. The continuous internal conflict without a third party 
mediator prevented the staff from doing anything more than dealing with 
the painfully repetitive negotiations about regulation (Interview #P3).54 
                                               
54Additionally, one research project, on ‘the current conditions of local communities’ daily lives and 
perceptions on water quality management in the Paldang Water Source Areas’, conducted by a 
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Based on the interview with a staff member, the fatigue and confusion of 
permanent office staff with the partnership’s roles persisted due to the 
extended and fierce negotiation process. The internal conflict undermined 
the opportunities of producing and sharing informationby the Paldang 
partnership, which was found related to the relatively low achievement of 
this partnership outcomes.  
 
In the case of the metropolitan partnerships in Incheon and Busan, two 
research organisations played an important role. A MoE- funded local 
research hub was created in Incheon and was named as the Incheon 
Regional Environmental Technology Development Centre (IETEC).In 
Busan, NGO campaigners created a private research institute, called as 
Hacheon Research Centre. These two research organisations played an 
external supporting role for the partnerships by undertaking on-going 
research projects. Furthermore, the IETEC in Incheon provided academic 
style engineering information for actual rehabilitation projects. The 
Hacheon Research Centre in Busan organised citizen-monitoring 
programmes and supplied social movement information to include a 
rationale and vision for campaigns to save urban streams (Hwang 2004). 
The range of information that powerful members brought to the co-
governance institutions played a significant role with regards to resolving 
                                                                                                                                
private consulting firm in 2004, endorsed by the partnership, was made available to this researcher 
only after repeated requests during the field work in 2005. 
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internal conflicts (Interview # B1) and cause greatly the successful operation 
of the partnerships.  
 
Additionally, the active use of external information and the interactive 
distribution by the metropolitan partnerships provided a platform for 
partnerships to communicate with local citizens. For example, unlike the 
unofficial and flexible Jeonju partnership, both metropolitan partnerships 
operated more formally, with official mission statements and publications. 
In addition, these partnerships were more openly reviewed and promoted 
by local newspapers, which made information about partnerships more 
abundant and accessible.  
 
To summarise, some partnerships managed to incorporate relevant 
information into locally adaptive knowledge, which apparently influenced 
the outcomes. The first and second analytical elements of the IAD 
framework, namely, the positions and sets of participants, influenced the 
availability of information. As discussed earlier, thanks to the variety of 
participant organisations, the available information on the Daecheong 
partnership was the most comprehensive among the six cases. 
 
7.2.6 The costs and benefits 
Two different types of assessment criteria, namely, transaction costs (‘Cost’ 
in short)and costs due to cultural and professional gaps among members 
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(‘Gaps’ in short), capture the awareness of members regarding the costs of 
the partnership operation.  Unlike other criteria, the responses to these two 
negative outcomes vary according to affiliated partnership and indicators. 
While the majority of respondents in Jeonju thought that, the difference 
among members was evident, while Busan respondents (57.2%) and 
Incheon respondents (45.5%) disagreed with this. However, transaction 
costs were perceived to be high by a majority of Incheon respondents by 
63.7%, while the respondents in Jeonju and Busan doubted the negative 
occurrence of such costs.   
 
Based on the survey and interview results, the participants in all six 
partnerships started to acknowledge the costs of co-governance during the 
operation of the respective partnership. Because all six partnerships were 
funded by the public bodies with fixed annual budget, the awareness of 
costs did not affect the operation and possible outcomes of the six 
partnerships. Thus, no feedback loop was found in terms of transactional 
costs in six partnerships.  
 
On the contrary, the partnerships showed more sensitive responses to the 
impalpable costs such as costs due to cultural and professional gaps among 
members (‘Gaps’ in short).  Two reasons were found in the case studies. 
First, the successful partnerships with strong participation of members 
expressed concerns with the cultural costs within the organisations. This 
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“participation fatigue” was perceived by the members in Jeonju and 
Incheon. Two partnerships worked as ‘task-force’ team to manage river 
rehabilitation projects. The case of Gyeongnam partnership counter proved 
this reasoning. Because the most members participated the annual Forum 
only and a few staffs covered the most activities in the Gyeongnam 
partnership, the members’ awareness of costs was the lowest among the six 
cases. Second, the recurrent aspect of the Paldang partnership, internal 
conflict and consequential negotiation processes was shown again the 
higher remarks on the transactional costs and gaps among members. Given 
the perceptions of partnership members tend to emphasise positive aspects 
of the outcomes, as discussed in Chapter 2, addressing the internal conflicts 
in the multi-stakeholder organisations is critical in terms of managing 
operational costs.  
 
Furthermore, the IAD framework literature (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999)regarded sanctions as a key enforcement in the operation of 
collaborative management of natural resources, but in the case of six 
partnerships, there was no particular sign of imposing these. Instead, some 
partnerships excluded the source of potential conflicts. For instance, an 
outspoken NGO with a strong view was excluded from the Jeonju 
partnership, while sensitive issue about the polluted water in downstream 
was all together dropped from the discussion in Daecheong. The previous 
secretary general of the Daecheong partnership put it this way in the 
273 
 
interview:  
‘It was a reciprocal position of the NGOs to drop sensitive issues 
for the host, KOWACO, such as the regional tap water provision 
plan for the downstream area around Gongju city, from the 
discussions, in return for financial support for the partnership 
(Interview # D3).’ 
Politically sensitive topics were also dropped from the Gyeongnam 
partnership. For example, the Incheon partnership with written codes of 
conduct reported less internal conflict than Busan, which had no such 
bylaw. Given the compromised discussions within the partnerships and the 
degree of conflict management found in the case analysis above, setting up 
political sanctions preferably with written codes of conduct might be more 
desirable in the Korean case in the future. 
 
7.2.7 Summary of the classicalIAD framework analysis 
The results of the case studies and the survey confirm the intricate 
relationships among the seven analytical elements of the IAD framework. 
Whilst the allowable actions were directly connected to the partnerships 
outcomes, the composition of the members, the level of control and the 
information affected the operation of the partnerships. In six Korean cases, 
the information and costs did not affect the outcomes directly but were 
regarded as the consequences of the partnerships operations.  
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The application of analytical elements to six cases reveals that to a certain 
degree,the comparative analysis using the classicalIAD framework explains 
how partnerships achieved the outcomes. The operations and outcomes of 
the Jeonju partnership fit with the classical IAD framework as being a 
group of committed members that managed a clear project about the water 
resources at the scale of a relatively small homogenous community. The 
commitment of the key members explained well the other high achiever, 
the Daecheong partnership as well.  
 
However, this study found that the inter-relationships between the actors in 
the six water partnerships cannot, by themselves, explain their outcomes. 
The general composition of participants could not explain why certain 
partnerships were more productive-e.g. Jeonju and Daecheong partnership 
being the best performers and two metropolitan partnerships (Incheon and 
Busan) in the second rank. The scope and aggregation elements provide 
only a partial explanation on the diverse range of water resource issues 
managed by municipally organised partnerships. Additionally, the 
outcomes that are related to the wider existing water governance structure 
in the country cannot be explained thoroughly. The next section is 
dedicated to examiningthe exogenous factors that may complement the 
conventional IAD framework in order to understand the diverse outcomes 
yielded by six water partnerships in Korea. 
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7.3 Modified IAD framework in partnership outcomes 
The empirical analysis is expanded now to examine how the exogenous 
factors affected the partnership outcomes. These exogenous factors include 
the discourse of co-governance, the application of the reform discourses at 
the national and local levels.  
 
7.3.1 Discourse of co-governance 
The Daecheong partnership utilised the co-governance discourse in their 
various activities. The strong local initiative and the homogeneity of 
regional culture have been eagerly picked up by the Daecheong partnership. 
It was critical in motivating the partnership to adopt an innovative initiative 
to save water as well as to connect the urban consumers to the lake 
residents. The Daecheong partnership successfully undertook water saving 
campaigns through encouraging urban citizens in the housing complex to 
sign a voluntary agreement to monitor and change their water use 
behaviour. Hence, the Daecheong partnership managed to represent the 
region more broadly by stimulating the participation of more passive urban 
consumers and by creating networks that linked them to the regulated in 
rural areas. This innovative activity was related to the historic disputes over 
the building of the Yongdam Dam in the upstream basin. Additionally, the 
local networks with a history of concerns over forestry and water-related 
animals were given grants to maintain their specialties, which broadened 
the partnership’s structure and activity base. 'Working together' as an 
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aspect of 'co-governance' was interpreted in the local context and portrayed 
well in the programmes, which resulted in better perceptions about the 
partnership outcomes. 
 
Other partnerships found difficulties in maintaining the co-governance 
discourses that affected their creation during the operation of the 
partnerships. For example, the Paldang partnership could not establish 
'consensus' about 'sharing responsibility'. It was mainly because the 
partnership could not go beyond the initial agenda, that is, the negotiation 
about the land regulation (Interview #P2). As stated earlier, the lack of 
balance between the commitment of members in the Busan and the 
Gyeongnam partnerships failed to build the trust based on reciprocity, in 
contrast to the cases in Jeonju and Incheon. The internal conflict in the 
Busan partnership was not well managed because there was no agreement 
about what co-management meant55. As a mid-level civil servant indicated 
(Interview #B2), the internal conflicts were due to an unwillingness to 
negotiate with other members or different ideas. The initial agreement to 
work together through the creation of partnerships was not sustained 
without extra efforts during the partnership operation. Given the cases 
suffered from the internal conflict, extra efforts to keep the discourse of co-
                                               
55 After the initial promise to legitimate the partnership by a bylaw was finally rejected by city 
government, there have been continuous disagreements about how to fund administrative costs and 
support the partnership executives, including the non-participatory process of stream rehabilitation 
projects in a local river. 
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governance were critical in order to yield better outcomes.  
 
7.3.2 Application of the reform discourses at the national and local 
levels 
The national water policy reforms that influenced the creation of 
partnerships, in particular, at the regional scale constrained the operations 
of the six partnerships. Because the contexts in which the regional 
partnerships were created were greatly shaped by the series of water policy 
reforms in the 1990s, the regional partnerships played complementary roles 
to the multi-layered governance. Because the Basin committees were not 
open to nongovernmental members, the partnerships were not invited to 
participate in formal water governance. In contrast, all three partnerships in 
cities suffered the low in-stream flow problem that needed coordination 
with the existing water governance, which was reflected in the poorly 
perceived environmental outcomes. Furthermore, the large rivers, which 
were the key sourcesof water for consumption, frequently became a 
constant cause of tension between governmental and nongovernmental 
actors.56The difference between the regional and urban partnerships was 
the inclusion or 'overlapping' of governmental members with the ones in 
                                               
56  For example, in Busan, when a city-owned public service delivery unit, the Nakdong River 
Environment Development Group built banks in the environmentally challenged intensive 
agricultural area of the Nakdong River mouth, the environmental NGOs confronted the city 
government in 2004.In the end, the partnership was unable to facilitate a constructive discussion 
(Interview #B1). 
278 
 
the basin committees.  
 
The legacy of local capacity building through either the LA movement orthe 
Saving River campaigns was strong in the cases of Jeonju and Incheon. For 
example, it was possible to produce positive outcomes with the high degree 
of process-related outcomes perceived by members in Jeonju, which had 
been built up through the LA21 movement. In terms of wide participation 
among members, both Incheon and Busan metropolitan partnerships 
showed a progress compared with that of the Jeonju partnership. While the 
Jeonju partnership was organised by previously active local participants, 
NGO campaigners and academics who had joined the LA21 movement in 
the metropolitan partnerships saw the involvement of new comers. They 
include private enterprises such as the local broadcasting station and 
factory-owning companies, secondary school teachers, and diverse 
community groups, or citywide NGO campaigners with specialist interests 
in river environment, human welfare, local culture, history and so on.  
 
For regional partnerships, the locally nested reform discourses were found 
in the Daecheong partnership that drafted and published the LA21 for the 
Daecheong Lake through the collaboration with the local offices of LA21 
(Daecheong Water Partnership 2004). In Gyeongnam, rather than being the 
precursors of the partnership, the Gyeongnam provincial office for LA21 
was created simultaneously with the Gyeongnam partnership (Interview 
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#KM: executive secretary of Gyeongnam office for LA21). By including the 
working bodies in networked forms, the Forum has evolved from a mere 
issue-making event organiser to facilitator of co-governance. For example, 
in the beginning of the Gyeongnam partnership, some local NGOs in West 
Gyeongnam were reluctant to join the partnership participated in the 
federation of NGOs later (Interview #K4; Interview #KM: Meeting 
observation of River Network). The Paldang partnership was the only case 
without publishing or having any relation with the LA21. Without the help 
of the LA21, this partnership suffered from the too narrowly positioned 
agenda about the regulation of land use. Therefore, the legacy of locally 
nested water reforms again needed an extra effort to be sustainable and be a 
constructive factor to the partnership outcomes.  
 
7.3.3 Linkage with the existing water governance: Social basins 
As being defined as ‘as ‘a sub-basin, a local or regional unit of government, 
or a hybrid unit’ (Blomquist, Dinar et al. 2005: 35), the concept of social 
basins allows us to portray a stable and dominant national state and a set of 
newly emerged local actors in the development of six water partnerships in 
Korea. The social basin concept is introduced as a linkage between the IAD 
framework and the Mahoney’s periodization analysis of exogenous factors 
(see in Chapter 2). This is a useful concept for exploring the hidden 
relationships between the newly emerged water partnerships and existing 
water governance. An analysis of changes after the creation of the 
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partnerships in the social basins is presented here to elaborate the findings, 
and prove that the existing governance provided room for the creation of 
water partnerships, filling regulatory gaps in the existing social basins.  
 
Urban partnerships in Jeonju, Incheon and Busan 
The urban water partnerships in Korea contributed to the existing water 
governance by covering new fields of water management. In the Jeonju case, 
whereas central and regional governments managed traditional water 
provision and conservation, the urban partnership dealt with the 
restoration of the urban river more for leisure and aesthetic purposes than 
for consumptive use. In a similar vein, the ‘saving urban river’ campaigns 
and the other major programmes run by the partnerships in Busan and 
Incheon were quite independent from the existing water governance, due to 
the greater power and resources metropolitan cities enjoyed after 
devolution and the new participatory role given to the major River Basin 
committees.  
 
There was an informal platform to link the newly emerged co-governance 
institutions with the existing water governance system. The three urban 
partnerships are related to the federation of river-related organisations, the 
Korea Network for River and Watershed (KNRW), which organises an 
annual nation-wide conference, the River Day. Busan and Jeonju hosted the 
River Day Conference in 2004 and 2006 respectively. The Incheon 
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partnership and its precursors, the Local office for LA21 of Incheon and the 
Busan, Jeonju, Paldang, Gyeongnam water partnerships have participated 
in the competitions and frequently received awards. In particular, Incheon 
was selected as one of Champion cities in the 5th World Water Forum by the 
Istanbul Water Consensus in 2009(The 6th World Water Forum 2012). 
Given that the MoE, the MoCT and four major River Management 
Committees were the primary funders of the River Day events, there was a 
working relationship between the partnerships and influential central 
government players,  although this operated indirectly. This informal 
relationship of urban water partnerships with outside institutions was well 
established, whereas formal relationships with the water institutions 
relatively not fully formed. 
 
Apart from the state’s funding for a rehabilitation project, a lack of 
connection with existing water governance was evident. The simple 
organisation of the Jeonju partnership that mobilised local politics to the 
benefit of the project could not afford to reach beyond the scope of the 
projects (Interview #J1)(SJ, Cho 1999). Behind the success of the Jeonju 
rehabilitation projects, issues mainly related to long-term water 
management such as water quantity control remained unaddressed. This 
latent problem was also evident in the metropolitan partnerships in Incheon 
and Busan.  
 
282 
 
As for the outcomes, the lack of interconnection with formal water 
governance can be problematic in terms of co-governance outcomes in a 
hierarchical society like Korea. The Jeonju partnership was strongly united 
internally but poorly connected relationships with outside organisations: 
there was only indirect liaison with the basin authority and central agencies, 
and no connection with any community groups at sub-city scale. This 
liaison remained on an ad-hoc basis, and individualistic nature. In terms of 
missing links with existing governance, the lack of a legal requirement to 
establish an integrated watershed plan for urban rivers, such as the Jeonju 
and Sam Rivers was the key challenge for the partnership in terms of 
securing instream flow. To establish linkage between water institutions at 
different levels of governance required governance structure for integrated 
management. However, within Korea’s state-driven governance system, 
required governance structures were not provided by either the voluntary 
and or informal attempts to network.  
 
Developing linkage with formal water governance for water partnerships 
incurred external costs beyond the scope of partnership operation. In 
particular, the networked relationships of Incheon and Busan metropolitan 
water partnerships with other water institutions varied according to specific 
water issues and the partnership structures. For example, Incheon was 
relatively passive in terms of external dialogue due to the pressure of 
meeting the deadlines of the rehabilitation projects. Additionally, in 
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contrast to Busan, Incheon had been free from water conflicts among 
riparian municipalities such as Seoul and Gyeonggi Province (Interview 
#I1).Conversely, the Busan partnership tried to maintain good relationships 
with outside institutions because of the rise of water pollution and quantity 
issues at the large river basin level. The difference between Incheon and 
Busan is linked to the partnership structure as well. The Busan partnership 
had relatively loose and horizontal ‘roundtable’ style cooperation among 
multiple actors both within and outside the metropolitan area, while 
Incheon maintained the self-contained ones with a multi-tiered formal 
structure. Young partnerships found it costly to build liaison with water 
management organisations, unless the costs of independence were too high 
to maintain, as in the case of Busan. Thus, locally shaped social basins of 
three urban partnerships yielded positive and negative outcomes. For 
example, their self-governance succeeded in leading local river 
rehabilitation projects. However, once the projects ended, how these 
project-focused organisations and their self-governance would 
surviveremains unanswered.   
 
Regional partnerships in Daecheong, Paldang and Gyeongnam 
Unlike the urban water partnerships that experienced the expansion of 
existing social basins as explained above, the three regional partnerships 
contributed to the ‘thickening’ of the current governance by becoming a 
complementary tool. The key activities of regional partnerships remained 
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within the boundaries of conventional water management. Furthermore, 
these new institutions filled the functional gaps through various 
activitiesand their key achievements included ‘participatory programmes 
involving various basin-wide participants’ in Daecheong, ‘negotiation 
platform for new regulation’ in Paldang and ‘information exchange and 
education’ in Gyeongnam.   
 
In the cases of the Daecheong and Paldang partnership, their networking 
with outside organisations remained minimal. Instead, they emphasised 
networking within the partnerships. This meant ‘thickening’ rather than 
‘expanding’ governance(Himmelman 1994). For example, the Daecheong 
partnership pursued internal unity while it showed a passive and 
indifferent attitude to interactions with outside organisations (Interview 
#D5). Despite the government stipulation about regular reporting to the 
MoE57, few such communications were actually made because the reporting 
was not mandatory (Interview #D4). In fact, interactions with outside 
groups or actors beyond the basin scope occurred only through business 
trips. Active participation in water-related conferences was rare, and the 
Daecheong case had been little discussed in comparison with other urban 
                                               
57 The 37th article of the partnership specifies direct and regular reports to the Minister of 
Environment about the programme and budget planning as well as a statement of accounts. See 
Paldang Water Partnership. (2008). "Paldang water partnership's homepage."   Retrieved Dec 12, 
2006, from http://www.paldang.or.kr. The insiders within the partnership, including Lee (n.a.), 
interpret this as an alternative, complementary channel to stakeholders’ voices to the MoE, which has 
rarely been possible through existing water governance.  
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water partnerships.  
 
Similarly, the Gyeongnam partnership benefited from the close 
relationships with the Basin committee, but it experienced a limited 
agreement and direction of partnership programmes. The Gyeongnam 
partnership chose to develop its further organisational unit to conduct the 
environmental management only with NGOs members (Interview #K2), 
hence, the social basin of the Gyeongnam was changed from the thin and 
wide coverage of national, local and government, NGOs and private firms 
to more locally driven water management at the cost of excluded public 
actors. The regional water partnerships that benefited from the support of 
the River Basin committees remained complementary tool, which shaped 
the pre-fixed formal structure of the partnerships. This led to the limited 
outcomes of partnerships.  
 
Conclusion 
To address the second research question concerning the outcomes of the 
water partnerships, this chapter presented comparative case studies on six 
water partnerships in Korea. The water partnerships have produced some 
positively perceived outcomes based on the two categorised criteria 
assessment about partnership process and socio-economic aspects. Most of 
partnerships struggled to yield positive outcomes especially in 
environmental enhancement, which were anticipated because all of them 
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were at the early stage of organisation 
 
The outcomes were by no means the same across the partnerships.Overall, 
the Jeonju and Daecheong partnerships were found to have achieved the 
most positive outcomes, supported by the analysis of the attitude survey, 
interviews and documents. Among three categories of outcomes, the 
process-related outcomes were the most positively perceived, followed by 
the socio-economic and environmental outcomes in order. The small 
difference of the outcomes between the urban and regional partnerships 
indicates that the division of subgroups based on the management topics 
and scale of management were not significant in the outcomes as much as 
in the emergence of partnerships. 
 
The six relevant analytical elements of the classical IAD framework showed 
the independent, locally embedded operation of the six partnerships, which 
could partly explain the outcomes analysed above. The first and second 
analytical elements, the set of participants and their positions, explained 
why some partnerships with lack of power balance among members 
suffered the persistent conflicts. These analytical elements were linked with 
poorer achievement of outcomes in the Paldang, Busan and the 
Gyeongnampartnerships. The range of information available was also 
determined by the power relations within partnerships. Thesecosts and 
benefits related to the internal conflicts affected the partnership operations. 
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However, the allowable actions could not explain why Jeonju urban 
partnership and Daecheong regionalpartnership were successful in spite of 
their different range of activities performed at different spatial scale.  
 
In addition to the action arena analysis, the first additional element from the 
modified framework, that is, the co-governance discourse was only used 
and reinterpreted in the Daecheong partnership. The co-governance 
discourse adopted in this partnership was inspired by the spirit of regional 
unity based on administrative and cultural boundaries. It was the key 
addressing water resource issues on a large scale for a sizeable partnership. 
In Paldang and Gyeongnam, there was a lack of consensus building on the 
co-governance discourse, which meant that the partnerships have not 
developed beyond the initial level of information sharing. 
 
The modified framework highlighted the issue of linkage between the new 
co-governance institutions and the existing water governance. For example, 
although the Jeonju partnership benefited from the legacy of collaboration, 
the commitment of participants and the clear boundary of operation, the 
separation of the Jeonju case from the existing governance may entail costs. 
Switching to a maintenance committee after the completion of project 
delivery, this small-scale case confirms the high costs of co-governance 
institution in a state-driven society. Unlike the Jeonju case, the metropolitan 
partnerships and the Daecheong partnerships secured the link with the 
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existing governance, invested extra effort in a broader array of participation 
programmes, and furthermore, created a more formal sustainable structure 
to fit the Korean context. Given the on-going nature of their activities, this 
embedded development of co-governance may produce positive collective 
action outcomes; they appear not to be trapped by large group size but can 
utilise and benefit from the broader representation. The relatively positively 
perceived outcomes of these partnerships verify the potential strategy of 
larger co-governance institutions by taking advantage of economies of 
scalein partnership operations (Poteete and Ostrom 2004).  
 
In terms of change in social basins, two subgroups showed different 
evolution. First, the urban partnerships added a new field of water 
governance that is river ecosystem conservation, to the existing water 
governance. The environmental outcomes were directly linked to the 
existing water governance in all three urban cases, which meant that the 
outcomes resulted from a combination of the partnerships’ programmes 
and the actions of established water governance institutions. Because of the 
voluntary emergence of co-governance institutions in the urban cases, the 
urban partnerships’ connection with formal water institutions hardly 
occurred automatically. Even though the partnerships outcomes were 
directly affected by the existing water governance, urban water 
partnerships preferred less expensive relationships with informal 
organisations. Therefore, the expanded social basins in three cities were 
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only partly connected to one another and may result in the problem of 
segmented management. In the future, this result calls for further efforts 
atintegrated management.  
 
The social basins of the regional water partnerships under the strong 
influence of national water governance remained largely unchanged after 
the operation of partnerships. Their key activities and major agenda of 
regional partnerships have been shaped around conventional water 
management fields, e.g. water provision, pollution control and related 
regulation tools. This confirms the path dependent development of co-
governance institutions following state-driven reforms. The shaping of 
social basins in three regions was in contrast to that of the city cases where 
network was expanded to encompass the new field, river rehabilitation, 
beyond the conventional water governance. In other words, apart from the 
Daecheong partnership, the regional water partnerships played a 
complementary role to the existing water governance. Judging from the 
success in the Daecheong case, the future of regional water partnerships 
needs to be secured through the development of locally adjusted norms of 
co-governance and addressing the chronic reluctance of public 
organisations to embrace co-governance. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
This study has been focusing on investigating the water partnerships 
recently developed within state-driven, multi-layered water governance in 
Korea (Republic of Korea, or known as South Korea). At the beginning of 
the thesis, two questions were proposed: how and why certain water 
partnerships in Korea emerged;how and why they created certain 
outcomes.The key hypothesis proposed was that, in contrast to the common 
but simplified understandings, co-governance institutions were more likely 
to be created and operated by not only the collective efforts of local 
actors,but alsowith the combined effects of the exogenous factorson 
national and global scale. This study used six water partnership cases in 
Korean institutional settings to prove this claim.  
 
To verify this claim, this study first discussed the literature on current water 
management issues, water partnerships and institutional analysis. 
Subsequently, the author introduced extra analytical elements to an 
institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. Those were 1) 
water reform discourses, 2) nesting the reform discourses at the national 
and local levels of governance and 3) the change of social basins before and 
after the creation of water partnerships. Before applying a modified IAD 
framework to six partnership cases, a Mahoney’s periodization analysis was 
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conducted in Chapter 5 to identify the first and second extra analytical 
elements about “how the global water reform discourses (1) were nested by 
the national and local actors in Korea (2) before the creation of water 
partnerships”. This analysis found that there had been three water 
institutional changes at national and local levels in Korea in the 1990s.  
 
Subsequently, in Chapters 6 and 7, comparative case studies were 
conducted to analyse the creation and outcomes, respectively, of the six 
water partnerships depending on this modified IAD framework. To assess 
the outcomes and to compare them, an attitudinal survey complemented 
the main qualitative methodology. The results of the proposed modification 
of institutional analysis are presented into two sub-groups of cases, which 
were coupled by the water management functions and scales: the urban and 
regional partnerships. Two comparative case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 
ended with the analysis of changes in social basins. This analytical element 
of a modified IAD framework captured the functional and structural 
changes that had occurred within multi-level water governance since the 
operation of six water partnerships in Korea (until 2007).  
 
This final chapter is devoted to a discussion about how the findings of this 
thesis answer the two research questions. In the first section, the two 
research questions raised in Chapter 1 are revisited to remind why and how 
the questions were theoretically and empirically justified. A discussion of 
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the research findings from Chapters 5 to 7 will be rearranged to answer the 
two research questions, and then, will be placed into the detail by the 
empirical, theoretical and policy-related implications. In the next section, 
the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study are to be discussed. 
After aproposal of the limitations of this thesis, the chapter ends 
withrecommendations for water studies and future research.  
 
8.1 Research questions revisited 
Two research questions proposed in Chapter 1 represent two-fold stages of 
‘the development of water partnerships’ and ‘their outcomes’.  
1) How have co-governance institutions for water management emerged in 
Korea?  
2) How and why have certain water partnerships produced certain 
outcomes?  
 
The theoretical and empirical review of the previous studies supported the 
first research question. The first research question of this research was 
raised because the current partnership studies and water schools were 
inconclusive on the formation of co-governance institutions despite 
increasing diversity in the forms and practices of water 
partnerships.Furthermore, a few studies that focused on the partnerships as 
individual organisation hardly address why and how various experiences 
of co-governance institutions occurred in specific contexts such as Korea.  
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From a theoretical perspective, Ostrom’s IAD framework was selected and 
modified to depict the emergence of water partnerships into the multi-
layered water governance system. The conventional framework before my 
modification contained the rather static elements of actors, resource 
conditions and features of related socio-political contexts often at a small 
scale. Being an advocate of self-governance, the literature about the IAD 
framework has mainly focused on reviving the virtues of traditional, pre-
existing community institutions at the community level. Investigating the 
introduction of a totally new institution in state-centred water governance, 
the focus of this study, required a modification to the framework.  
 
Where there has been abundant work done in the US and developing 
countries from an empirical perspective, co-governance institutions in the 
contexts of the NICs in East Asia remain unexplored. Regarding this first 
research question, it is argued in this thesis that multiple path dependent 
developments of new institutions at the national and local scale occurred 
before the creation of water partnerships. To disclose how a partnership 
was shaped and developed within a context has become a critical but less 
explored topic, in which this study was based. Thus, this study attempted 
to modify this framework by adding exogenous variables such as reform 
discourses, national policy and previous capacity building. These analytical 
elements were found to influence the emergence of the water partnerships 
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in a centralised society, Korea. 
 
The second research question was formulated to advance the 
understanding of partnership studies in two ways. First, the current studies 
on partnership outcomes limited their scope of research to the 
establishment based on organisations’ objectives. This relatively narrow 
scope of research needed to be expanded to a more general and 
comprehensive assessment criteria. In reality, partnerships comprising of a 
broad range of stakeholders are under the influence of complicated 
institutional settings. Particularly, a multi-layered structure of management 
institutions have become commonly found in the water management sector, 
given the growing concerns with Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM), expressed by academics and practitioners worldwide (Falkenmark, 
Gottschalk et al. 2004; Mizanur Rahaman, Varis et al. 2004; Conca 2006). 
Thus, the application of a useful tool such as an IAD framework was 
advocated in Chapter 3 in order to investigate not only organisational 
performances of water partnerships but also linkages of partnerships within 
water governance.  
 
A modified IAD framework, proposed in Chapter 3, attempted to enhance 
understanding on the development of water partnerships by connecting the 
outcomes with organisational development as well as multi-layered water 
governance. The outcomes of water partnerships explored by the 
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partnership studies literature focused on organisational performance. These 
studies have neglected in-depth institutional analysis. In contrast, an IAD 
framework provides a useful analytical tool to link the outcomes of 
partnerships with theirlocally embedded development.  
 
Second, there has been a lack of agreement concerning the relationships 
between co-governance institutions and substantive outcomes. The current 
understanding on partnership outcomes ranges from positive 
assessments(Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Sabatier, Focht et al. 2005; Head 
2007) to scepticism concerned with whether partnerships can produce 
positive substantive outcomes (Freeman 1997; Kenney 2000; Cooke and 
Kothari 2001; Rydin 2006). Because previous partnership studies have 
focused on organisational performance, they have hardly captured the 
dynamic consequences of co-governance institutions. There is a need, 
therefore, to advance methodology on the assessment of partnership 
outcomes and to conduct comparative case studies. This study employed a 
multi-criteria assessment to examine partnership outcomes, which included 
not only environmental gains but also process-related and socio-economic 
perspectives.  
 
In short, the two research questions proposed in Chapter 1 were justified 
both theoretically and empirically. They supported the use of a modified 
IAD framework and its application to six water partnerships in Korea.  
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8.2 Discussion of the Findings 
This section presents a review of the findings from Chapters 5 to 7 in 
accordance to the research questions on the development of the water 
partnerships and their outcomes in Korea.  
 
8.2.1 The emergence of water partnerships in Korea 
Empirical findings 
According to the comparative case study conducted in Chapter 6, the six 
water partnerships in Korea emerged through the combination of the local 
actors’ initiatives and the political support from national and local capacity 
building experiences. This result confirms Mahoney’s periodization analysis 
adopted and proposed as an additional element for the IAD framework  
Chapter 5. The uniqueness of Korean cases that this study found was that 
there was no direct intervention of outside organisations, stipulating the 
formation of partnerships in comparison with the cases found in 
developing countries and the EU, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. In terms of 
a legislative perspective, all six partnerships had been formed and 
formalisation procedures such as enacting bylaws, or codes of conduct were 
followed. These processes of partnership development again confirmed the 
organic creation of water partnerships in Korea. Furthermore, despite no 
application of a top-down plan, all six partnerships shared common 
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features in their structures and composition of members. 
 
The empirical findings on the emergence of water partnerships in Korea 
suggest that local actors with experience of collaborative governance could 
lead the design of co-governance institutions. The Korean cases proved the 
growing power of the nongovernmental groups and the contrasting roles of 
governments in the development of water partnerships. In the case of the 
regional partnerships, despite the influence of incremental development in 
national water governance, once created, partnerships tend to be embedded 
within local conditions during the operation of co-governance activities. 
 
This approach verified that national and local actors in Korea were 
influenced by global water reform discourses. The notion of co-governance 
that was salient in these discourses, was found to influence the 
development of water partnerships in Korea. This means that co-
governance ideas about information provision and participation were 
voluntarily adopted by Korean actors, in contrast to claims that such 
discourses are imposed on developing countries by the Global North (See 
Chapter 2).  
 
Across the case studies examined in this thesis, only one partnership 
internally developed a strong co-governance identity. In the Daecheong case, 
partnership members formed the unique norm, ‘the unity of the region to 
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protect the shared Daecheong Lake’. This example showed the possibility of 
‘scaling-up’ co-governance institutions when participants not only 
mobilised political and economic resources, but also re-interpreted co-
governance discourse reflected in their own contexts.  
 
Changes in the social basins after the emergence of water partnerships in 
Korea revealed that the management topics of water governance have been 
evolving to cover more complicated and holistic approaches. Having been 
created to facilitate the river rehabilitation projects in the three cities, rising 
concerns with the ecological conservation of the river environment were 
evident in the urban partnerships. In these cases, therefore, social basins 
expanded to include ecological conservation. In comparison, the regional 
partnerships managed water resources by addressing more conventional 
topicsof management. These topics were, namely, pollution control, water 
supply and sanitation. Hence, the expansion of the social basin, found in the 
case of urban water partnerships was not found in the regional water 
partnership. The difference of social basins between the subgroups of water 
partnerships was mainly due to the features of related water resources. 
Given that the national government manages shared water sources, the 
urban actors were left to control the local streams. The regional partnerships 
also attempted to address pollution and water shortages, but were 
unsuccessful because there was no linkage to the current water 
management system. Thus, the case study results confirm the locally 
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shaped choice of management topics among the range of conventional and 
newly developed policy tools.  
 
As a result, the formation of co-governance institutions, represented by 
these six water partnerships, added another layer of governance to the 
evolving, but stable, state-centred water governance in Korea. Chapter 6 
found that the emergence of water partnerships changed the social basins in 
Korea by covering the fields of water management that had been left 
unaddressed by governments. The analysis of the urban cases showed that 
the local actors were allowed and even partly supported by central 
government to manage a newly emerged focus on local rivers in terms of 
ecosystem conservation. As a result, the urban partnerships kept a 
relatively independent position from the existing water governance, apart 
from the flat-rate financial support from the national government. In 
contrast, the regional partnerships overlapped with current water 
management bodies, e.g. water pollution control and/or the supply of safe 
water to the regions. The regional partnerships developed various strategies, 
with difficulty, to differentiate themselves from national water policies. It 
was relatively easy for urban partnerships to set up their functions and 
identity owing to the new management topic of ecosystem conservation of 
urban streams, while it was more difficult for regional partnerships to find 
distinguishable functions in the overlapped social basins within current 
water management system. 
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Theoretical implications 
The preconditions of the IAD framework, featuring physical conditions, 
community attributes and the rules-in-use with norms, explained to some 
extent,how the local partnership actors managed to form the locally 
adjusted partnerships in Korea. On the one hand, the framework used in 
Chapter 5 described the locally embedded development of co-governance 
institutions. This finding was consistent with the criticism against top-down 
reform ideas by academics, as discussed in section 1.1.3. Despite the 
similarity found at the subgroups of urban and regional partnerships, the 
initial structure of partnerships and norms was locally re-interpreted. 
Hence, the IAD framework proved to be a usefulexplanatory tool to 
disclose the complicated development process of co-governance water 
institutions in Korea.  
 
However, as proposed in the earlier chapters, these water partnerships 
could not be fully understood only through the lenses of a conventional 
IAD framework. Among the three pre-conditions of ‘physical conditions’, 
‘attributes of communities’ and ‘rules-in-use’, the first one-water problems 
as physical conditions-was significant only in the creation of the two 
regional partnerships in Daecheong and Paldang. ‘Attributes of community’ 
were important in the establishment of water partnerships in Jeonju and 
Paldang, wherestakeholders came together to try to resolve the local water 
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conflicts. No other particular factors related to the preconditions were 
found in the remaining three partnerships in Busan, Incheon and 
Gyeongnam. The ‘rules-in-use’as a precondition could not explain any 
partnership emergence, despite the long-lasting history of the centralised 
national state and the proven weakness of local actors in Korea.  
 
Overall, Chapter 6 found that the conventional IAD framework explained 
partly why and how, these actors in all six cases were motivated to organise 
co-governance institutions. The theoretical presumption of the IAD 
framework, that rational self-interest is necessary for successful collective 
action, was not found in all six Korean cases. Indeed, there was no prior 
awareness of these actors about costs and benefits. Instead, local actors were 
found to have political inspiration from co-governance discourse, rather 
than direct economic interests in either urban rivers or protected water 
sources. Subsequently, rules-in-use embodying economic incentives and 
sanctions were not created in any partnership instead there were the 
cooperative norms of saving ‘our water resources’ and ‘keeping co-
governance institutions’. Thus, this study identified that the political 
motivation of members was critical to forming partnerships, whichare 
neglected in the conventional IAD framework. 
 
Furthermore, the application of the classical IAD framework to the six cases 
raised the question about the scale of management. Beyond the political 
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motivation of partnership emergence, the community-focused framework 
could not explain the emergence of partnerships at the larger scale of 
management. The metropolitan cases and regional partnerships 
contradicted the literature in relation to Olson’s work on collective action 
(Olson 1965)and the IAD framework. These findings support academic 
literature (Agrawal 2000; Poteete and Ostrom 2004) that claims that a larger 
scale of management,leads to a better organisation of collaborative water 
governance. Thus, these findings agree the discussion of the institutional 
and water partnership literature in Chapters 2 and 3, which, consequently, 
confirmed the need for development of a modified IAD framework.  
 
A comparative case study conducted in Chapter 6 found that a modified 
IAD framework with extra analytical elements, filled those gaps of the 
previous literature. The modification of the IAD framework that comprised 
three additional elements explained how local actors were able to adopt co-
governance discourse and create the water partnerships in a highly 
centralised society. As shown in the Mahoney’s periodization analysis, the 
national and local actors accepted and implemented the co-governance idea 
promoted by international organisations. Subsequently, the local actors, 
who previously took part in the participatory governance in relation to the 
local water resources, were active in the creation of urban partnerships. The 
legacy of recent participatory water reform was also apparent in the 
regional cases in comparison with the urban ones. Apart from the Paldang 
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partnership that was initiated by the Ministry of Environment, involving of 
the higher capacity of the local NGOs was found to be critical in the 
creation of the other five partnerships. 
 
Policy implications 
Given the nature of multi-layered water governance, the voluntary 
emergence of water partnerships paradoxicallyhighlights the roles of the 
existing governments to support local actors. This links to the findings of 
the comparative case studies on the regional water partnerships where the 
main concerns of co-governance institutions overlapped with national 
policy on pollution control and water supply.An integrated approach to 
orchestrate the coordination of co-governance institutions and 
governmental bodies is needed for effective governance.Co-governance 
institutions within a centralisedsociety like Korea need even more to 
formalise and professionalise their activities, e.g. introducing the support of 
permanent staff or establishing a bylaw.The ways in which national and 
regional governments can create the conditions to nurture and support 
water partnerships need to be investigated. 
 
Other policy implications for developing water partnerships are drawn 
from the case studies as follows: 
- To develop co-governance institutions without the negative impacts of 
top-down planning, outside organisations such as central government 
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and/or international organisations should start from the capacity building 
of local organisations.  
- even if there are some leading actors within partnerships with more 
resources available, the balance of power among participants is critical to 
prevent internal conflict, and consequently, to minimise transaction costs. 
The Korean cases suggest that the initial procedure for creating partnership 
needs to be carefully designed. For example, members within co-
governance institutions should agree rules or the codes of conduct that 
explain responsibilities and possible sanctions.  
 
8.2.2 The outcomes of water partnerships in Korea 
Empirical findings 
The results of the attitude survey show that the water partnerships in Korea 
produced varied outcomes even within a relatively short time of operation. 
Positive process-related and socio-economic outcomes were produced. The 
proceduraloutcomes of the regional water partnerships were found to be 
positive, while the results for the socio-economic and environmental 
outcomes were much more varied. Relatively lower perceived achievement 
in environmental outcomes was found through the attitude survey results. 
These results reflected both sides of the debate between the sceptics and 
advocates about whether and how collaborative governance produces 
positive environmental outcomes. By adopting the multi-criteria assessment 
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method, this study managed to capture the complicated nature of 
partnership outcomes. Thus, the outcomes confirmed the rationale for 
multi-criteria assessment, in place of more simplistic performance 
evaluation focus on organisational goals found in partnership literature (see 
the discussion in Chapter 2).  
 
The overall varied outcomes indicated that the outcomes of co-governance 
institutions tended to be contextual. First, the scale of water resources did 
not match with the partnership outcomes. The smallest in Jeonju and the 
largest one in Daecheong were perceived as the most successful ones. Given 
that the Jeonju partnership among the urban cases, and the Daecheong 
partnership among the regional cases achieved the highest overall 
outcomes, the scale of management and the key water issues hardly 
determined the outcomes. Second, the average achievement of two 
subgroups indicated that the urban water partnerships were assessed as 
being more effective, particularly in terms of process-oriented and socio-
economic perspectives. It can be concluded that partnerships of this type 
can be successful within clear but limited boundaries of activities, which 
avoid contentious issues.  
 
Theoretical implications 
In comparison with its explanatory power on the emergence of water 
partnerships in Korea, the analytical elements of the IAD framework 
306 
 
provided more understanding on partnership operations and their 
outcomes. In particular, the IAD framework provided an excellent tool to 
disclose internal politics of the partnerships and relate these to the 
outcomes of the partnerships.The examination of the seven analytical 
elements found that the six partnerships were locally embedded. As argued 
in the IAD framework literature, the composition of participants (the set 
and positions) and allowable actions were relevant factors to shape 
partnership outcomes. Again, the Jeonju case fits most with the claims of 
the IAD framework, that small and homogenous communities are better for 
collective action. 
 
However, the case study results supported the rationale for developing a 
modified IAD framework, because of the positive outcomes achieved by 
some of the cases at the larger scale and their relation with political 
motivation. This was confirmed in the case of the Daecheong partnership, 
and the two metropolitan partnerships in Busan and Incheon. In other 
words, the IAD framework,based on claims that transaction costs and the 
absence of sanctions preclude the successful development of large-scale 
collective action, was not confirmed by the positive assessment results of 
the metropolitan partnerships and a regional partnership in Daecheong. 
Furthermore, the case study conducted in Chapter 7 showed that the IAD 
framework does not coverwider water governance structures in relation to 
the assessed outcomes.  
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With the six water partnership cases, a modified IAD framework, 
developed for this study in Chapter 3, disclosed a complicated picture 
about the relationship among the newly emerged water partnerships with 
existing water governance and surrounding institutional arrangements at 
multiple scales of management. The application of the first additional 
theoretical element, discourse, improves the explanation of the Daecheong 
case. The co-governance discourse inspired by the spirit of regional unity 
based on administrative and cultural boundaries, adopted in this 
partnership, was key to the emergence of a regional partnership addressing 
water resource issues on a large scale. In contrast, when there was a lack of 
consensus building on the co-governance discourse, as in the Paldang and 
Gyeongnam cases, the partnerships did not develop beyond the initial stage 
of information sharing. 
 
The application of a modified IAD framework explained the gaps found in 
the explanation of the conventional IAD framework regarding 
partnershipoutcomes.A modified framework highlighted the issue of 
linkage between the new co-governance institutions and the existing water 
governance. Unlike the Jeonju case, the metropolitan partnerships and the 
Daecheong partnerships secured the link with the existing national water 
management system, investing extra effort in a broader array of 
participation programmes, and furthermore, creating a more formal 
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sustainable structure to fit the Korean context. Given the ongoing nature of 
their activities, this embedded development of co-governancewas more 
likely to produce positive collective action outcomes; they appear not to be 
trapped by large group size but can utilise and benefit from the broader 
representation of members. The relatively positive remarks on the outcomes 
of the metropolitan and Paldang partnerships verify the potential strategy 
of larger co-governance institutions by taking advantage of economies of 
scalein partnership operations (Poteete and Ostrom 2004).  
 
Furthermore, a notion of social basins reconfirmed the findings through the 
modified IAD framework. What the changes of social basins captured was 
the marriage of a conventional water management topic – pollution control 
– and a new institution – partnership –whichhas been locally confined. It 
was apparent that the social basins of the two subgroups evolved 
differently. First, the urban partnerships added a new field of water 
governance, river ecosystem conservation, to the existing water 
governance.As a result, the environmental outcomes were found to be 
poorer than other categories, which were directly linked to the existing 
water governance. The case study found the worrying sign of cost-cautious 
tactics that the urban partnershipspreferred less expensive informal 
relationships with the current water management systems. Yet, the 
ecologically expanded social basins in the three cities were only partly 
connected to one another and may result in the problem of segmented 
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management. In the future, this wouldcall for further efforts atintegrated 
water resource management. Second, the social basins of the regional water 
partnerships under the strong influence of national water governance 
remained largely unchanged after the emergence of the partnerships. Their 
key activities and major agenda of the regional partnerships confirmed the 
incremental development of co-governance institutions following the state-
led reforms.  
 
Policy implications 
The empirical and theoretical findings of this research suggest a list of 
recommendations to achieve better outcomes inwater partnerships.  
- Given the difficulty of achieving improved environmental outcomes 
during the shortterm, partnerships need to plan their goals and 
programmes and have in mind,the lagged long-term effects of physical 
environmental change.   
- To manage the potential conflicts and disagreements within a partnership, 
one needs to set up sanctions as well as codes of conduct.  
- Given that the linkage between partnerships and the existing water 
governance was not automatically established in the Korean cases, extra 
efforts are neededto integrate this new type of institution with formal water 
organisations. 
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8.2.3 Reflections on using the modified IAD framework 
In retrospect, there were gaps between the expected functions and actual 
achievements of the modified IAD framework on which this study 
depended. Three additional elements were added in order to complement 
the conventional IAD framework: international water reform discourses, 
local institutional development prior to the partnership emergence and 
changes of social basins. To assist future studies, a few points about what 
worked and did not work in my case studies are listed here.  
-First, the two elements on water discourses and historical institutional 
development at national and local levels (by using Mahoney’s 
periodization)explained how stakeholders at the multi-layered water 
governance structure interacted through ideas, incremental changes, and 
stable institutions in more detail. Those two elements added value to the 
descriptive concept of ‘nested social enterprises’ proposed in the 
conventional IAD framework.  
-Second, however, it was hard to achieve the original analytical objective of 
using the notion of a social basin. This concept was adopted in this thesis 
because there was no dimension of ‘space’ or ‘scope of water governance’ in 
the IAD framework. Incipiently, ‘social basins’ were expected to capture the 
changed structure of multi-layered governance of water resources after the 
emergence of water partnerships. The social basins used in the case 
studiesshowed how different water agencies clashed and/or shared the 
scope of responsibilities (e.g. councils, city/town, regional governments). 
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The analysis of the Jeonju case was interesting as there were clashes among 
the geographic boundaries of water management by the partnership and 
other institutions. However, this notion was still too imprecise to pick up 
how water partnerships at a larger scale interacted with the existing water 
governance, as shown in the analysis of the remaining cases.  
-Third, to cover the emergence of water institutions and their outcomes in 
single study  was ambitious. Chapters 6 and 7 provided analyses about the 
formation of water partnerships and their outcomes. On the one hand, this 
attempt to cover the development processes of water partnerships provided 
a rich understanding of newly formed water partnerships in Korea. In-
depth findings on the lives of the six water partnerships were one of the 
achievements this thesis brought to the literature. However, on the other 
hand, as shown in the separate analyses in two chapters, it was difficult to 
link partnership emergence and outcome acrossthe six cases.  
-Fourth, as discussed in Chapter 2, the conventional IAD framework has 
rarely been used to examine new institutions. Despite this omission, the 
IAD framework was selected for this study on the grounds that the 
complicated processes of water partnership development in Korea could 
usefully be examined by this framework. However, covering the whole 
processes of partnership development is methodologically challenging. For 
future studies in this area,  it may be more feasible to conduct in-depth case 
analysis focusing on either the formation of an institution or itsthe 
operation and outcomes.  
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8.3 Research contributions 
This study was the first to investigate and yield supportive evidence for the 
development of co-governance institutions in Korea with a modified IAD 
framework. The emergence of water partnerships into centralised society 
such as Korea, served as a useful case study for the examination of co-
governance institutions in NIC contexts. Of course, there are differences 
between NICs’ political systems, but they all tend to have hierarchical 
structures of governance.  
 
The voluntary emergence of water partnerships in a centralised society 
required new perspective on water partnership studies.This research has 
produced a rich and complex account of current dynamics in water co-
governance through the water partnerships in Korea. Unlike the 
partnership literature, the case studies confirmed that co-governance 
institutions could be voluntarily organised by local actors without top-
down planning and even become effective within a system of highly 
centralised water governance. The important role of local capacity as a 
condition for co-governance building was noted at various stages.The 
comparative case demonstrated that the development of water partnerships 
was more likely possible when exogenous factors allowed space for the 
involvement of local actors. Applying a multi-criteria assessment, this study 
unveiled a mixture of outcomes as the results of the various water 
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partnerships. This study partly confirms the proposed hypothesis, ‘co-
governance institutions were more likely to be created and operated by not 
only the collective efforts of local actors,but alsowith the combined effects of 
the exogenous factorson a national and global scale’.  
 
In addition to the empirical findings, this thesis has also expanded the scope 
of research in partnership and water governance literature. This research 
has widened the focus found in previous studies on partnership 
performance to the relationships with institutional surroundings in the 
development of water partnerships. Current partnership studies mainly 
remain focused on single organisations. In contrast, this research, through 
using a modified IAD framework, paid attention to multilevel water 
governance from global to national and local scales. Encompassing this 
multi-layered water governance in the case studies, this study critically 
examined what the co-governance institutions achieved and explained the 
roles of national and regional governments in designing and fostering co-
governance institutions.  
 
8.4 Thesis limitations and further works 
Despite its theoretical and empirical contributions, this thesis has 
limitations. One limitation of this thesis is the scope of research. Because 
there had been few studies on Korean water partnerships, the scope of this 
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research was restricted to official partnership organisations58 for a limited 
period of operation by 2006. The research was done, less than ten years after 
the water partnerships had been created, which prevents an analysis of the 
long-term consequences of partnership development. Also, large N-case 
studies are necessary to capture the more dynamic and diverse nature of 
partnerships. In particular, the assessment of partnership outcomes would 
have been more representative with large N cases. Therefore, a statistical 
analysis of more comprehensive data covering both permanent and ad-hoc 
features of co-governance institutions would extend the results of this 
research.  
 
There is much room for development in the applied methodology for this 
study. Thequalitative comparative case study adopted for this research 
provided the big picture of partnership development but had limitations in 
measuring partnership outcomes. Partnership outcomes were measured 
through the indirect method of a simplified attitude survey. In the future, a 
study utilising a quantitative methodology will be necessary to advance the 
literature on the outcomes of co-governance. In particular, - large-N study 
will be desirable to draw conclusions that are more general on partnership 
outcomes.  
 
                                               
58However, there have been various informal forms of co-governance institutions such as regular 
roundtable meetings among local governments and NGOs (see River Network 2004). 
315 
 
The collection of data had some limitations. First, because of internal 
conflicts in some partnerships, the access to partnership members was 
limited in the data collection procedure. With limited time and resources, 
this study used alternative waysof collecting data through emails and 
telephone conversations instead. Second, given the diverse memberships 
and activities often found in water partnerships, a more extended period of 
data collection would be appropriate in the future. Further studies may 
include repetitive observations of partnership meetings and multiple 
interviews with the same interviewee over a longer period. To maintain the 
quality of comparative case studies, future research should plan enough 
time and resources by including possible conflicts and other obstacles for 
data collection. 
 
Despite what is often claimed about the design of co-governance for water 
resource management in theoretical and policy discussion, voluntarily 
formed water partnerships in practice have brought some solutions and 
costs to Korean water governance at the same time. A modified IAD 
framework explained these complicated achievements of water 
partnerships following their unique development. The case study found 
this new form of water institutions was created and maintained by 
stakeholders, who were mostly inspired by co-governance discourses to try 
to reform the current water governance. To the questions of whether and 
how these partnerships work for better water governance in Korea, the 
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outcomes of six water partnerships are hardly comprehensive at national 
level, but still provide important findings on co-governance 
institutiBibliography 
 
(1992). The Dublin statement and report on the conference. International 
Conference on Water and Environment, Dublin, Ireland. 
Ackerman, J. (2004). "Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond "Exit" and 
"Voice"." World Development 32(3): 447-463. 
Adeel, Z. and N. Nakamoto (2003). The future of environmental governance 
in East Asia. East Asian experience in environmental governance : 
response in a rapidly changing region. Z. Adeel. Tokyo, United 
Nations University Press: 217-232. 
Agranoff, R. and M. McGuire (2003). Collaborative public management: 
new strategies for local governments. Washington, D.C., 
Georgetown University Press. 
Agrawal, A. (2000). Small Is Beautiful, but Is Larger Better? Forest-
Management Institutions in the Kumaon Himalaya, India People 
and forests : communities, institutions, and governance. C. C. Gibson, 
M. A. McKean and E. Ostrom. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press: 57-86. 
Agrawal, A. (2001). "The Regulatory Community: Decentralization and the 
Environment in the Van Panchayats (Forest Councils) of Kumaon, 
India." Mountain Research and Development 21(3): 208–211. 
Agrawal, A. and C. Gibson, C,  (1999). "Enchantment and Disenchantment: 
The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation." World 
Development 27(4): 629-649. 
Amy, D. J. (1987). The politics of environmental mediation. New York, 
Columbia University Press. 
Armstrong, C. K. (2002). Introduction: civil society in contemporary Korea. 
Korean society : civil society, democracy, and the state. C. K. 
Armstrong. London ; New York, Routledge: 1-10. 
Armstrong, C. K. (2002). Korean society : civil society, democracy, and the 
state. London ; New York, Routledge. 
Armstrong, C. K. (2007). Korean society : civil society, democracy and the 
state. London ; New York, Routledge. 
Arnstein, S. R. (1969). "A Ladder Of Citizen Participation." Journal of the 
American Institute of Planners 35(4): 216 - 224. 
Ashman, D. (2001). "Strengthening North-South Partnerships for 
Sustainable Development." Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 30(1): 74-98. 
Associate Press in Daegu (1994). Call for civilian monitoring system: Special 
report on the pollution in the Nakdong River. The Hankyoreh. Seoul, 
January 13, 1994. 
Asthana, S., S. Richardson, et al. (2002). "Partnership Working in Public 
317 
 
Policy Provision: A Framework for Evaluation." Social Policy & 
Admin 36(7): 780-795. 
Baldwin, A. D., J. De Luce, et al. (1994). Beyond preservation : restoring and 
inventing landscapes. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
Baruch, Y. and N. Ramalho (2006). "Communalities and Distinctions in the 
Measurement of Organizational Performance and Effectiveness 
Across For-Profit and Nonprofit Sectors." Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly 35(1): 39-65. 
Beierle, T. C. (2002). "The Quality of Stakeholder-Based Decisions." Risk 
Analysis 22(4): 739-749. 
Béné, C. and A. E. Neiland (2006). From Participation to Governance:A 
critical review of the concepts of governance, co-management and 
participation, and their implementation in small-scale inland 
fisheries in developing countries. A review prepared for The 
Challenge Program on Water and Food. Penang, Malaysia, 
WorldFish Center and CGIAR. 
Berman, S. (1998). "Path Dependency and Political Action: Reexamining 
Responses to the Depression." Comparative Politics 30(4): 379-400. 
Bernard, H. R. (2006). Research methods in anthropology qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Lanham, MD, AltaMira Press. 
Berry, K. A. and E. Mollard, Eds. (2010). Social participation in water 
governance and management : critical and global perspectives. 
London, Earthscan. 
Bickerstaff, K. and G. Walker (2005). "Shared visions, unholy alliances: 
Power, governance and deliberative processes in local transport 
planning." Urban Studies 42(12): 2123 - 2144. 
Blomquist, W., T. Heikkila, et al. (2004). "Building the Agenda for 
Institutional Research in Water Resource Management." Journal of 
the American Water Resources Association 40(4): 925-936. 
Blomquist, W. and E. Schlager (2005). "Political Pitfalls of Integrated 
Watershed Management." Society & Natural Resources 18(2): 101 - 
117. 
Blomquist, W. A., A. Dinar, et al. (2005). Comparison of institutional 
arrangements for river basin management in eight basins. 
Washington, D.C., World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development 
Dept. 
Blyth, M. (2002). Institutions and ideas. Theory and methods in political 
science. D. Marsh and G. Stoker. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 
2002: xv, 368. 
Bogdanor, V. and British Academy., Eds. (2005). Joined-up government. 
British Academy occasional paper. Oxford, Oxford University Press 
for the British Academy. 
Bonn Freshwater Conference. (2001). "Bonn Freshwater Conference."   
Retrieved January 23, 2006, from http://www.water-2001.de/. 
Brandes, U., P. Kenis, et al. (1999). "Explorations Into the Visualization of 
Policy Networks." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11, no. 1: 75-106 (132 
318 
 
pages) Additional Info Sage Publications; 19990101. 
Brannen, J. (2005). MIXED METHODS RESEARCH: A discussion paper. 
NCRM Methods Review Papers, ESRC National Centre for Research 
Methods. 
Bressers, H. and S. Kuks (2004). Integrated governance and water basin 
management : conditions for regime change and sustainability. 
Dordrecht ; London, Kluwer Academic. 
Bressers, H. and W. A. Rosenbaum (2003). Achieving sustainable 
development : the challenge of governance across social scales. 
Westport, Conn., Praeger. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (1999). "Exploring State--Civil Society Collaboration: 
Policy Partnerships in Developing Countries." Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28(suppl_1): 59-86. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and J. Brinkerhoff (2002). "Governance reforms and 
failed states: challenges and implications." International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 68(4): 511-531. 
Brinkerhoff, J. (2002a). "Assessing and improving partnership relationships 
and outcomes: A proposed framework." Evaluation and Program 
Planning. 25: 215-231. 
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002b). "Government-nonprofit partnership: a defining 
framework." Public Administration and Development 22(1): 19 - 30. 
Brown, K., S. Gyde, et al. (2003). "Government-Community Partnerships: 
Rhetoric or Reality?" The Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business 
and Government 9(2): 51-62. 
Bryman, A. (2004). Social research methods. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Budds, J. and G. McGranahan (2003). "Are the debates on water 
privatization missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and 
Latin America." Environment and Urbanization 15(2): 87-114. 
Busan Development Institute (2006). Current conditions of urban streams 
and future management policy in Busan (in Korean). Busan, Busan 
metropolitan city, Busan Development Institute. 
Busan Metropolitan City (2005). Busan Administration White Paper. 
Busan office for LA21 and Gwangju office for LA21 (2003). Workshop 
report. Co-workshop of LA21 by Busan and Gwangju, Busan. 
Busan water partnership (2006). Current conditions of Rivers and 
rehabilitation cases in Busan (in Korean). Busan, Busan Hacheon 
Saligi Undong Bonbu. 
Busan Water Partnership (Busan Hacheon Sal-li-gi Simin Undong Bonbu). 
"Busan water partnership's homepage."   Retrieved Dec 12, 2006, 
from http://www.busanriver.or.kr/. 
Business-Academic partnership at Seongshin Women's University. (2006). 
"The OECD membership of Korea and Globalisation policy 
(Seghewha)."   Retrieved December 12 2007, from National Archives 
and Records Services of Korea, 
http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.
319 
 
do?id=002924. 
Caplan, K. and D. Jones (2002). "Measuring the effectiveness of multi-sector 
approaches to service provision." Water Science And Technology -
Water Supply- 2(4): 189-196   
Caponera, D. A. (1992). Principles of water law and administration : 
national and international. 
Carney, D. and J. Farrington (1998). Natural resource management and 
institutional change. New York, Routledge. 
Carter, J. and J. Howe (2006). "Stakeholder participation and the water 
framework directive: The case of the Ribble Pilot." Local 
Environment 11: 217-231. 
Castells, M. (2000). End of millennium. Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishers. 
Castro, J. E. (2007). "Water governance in the twentieth-first century." 
Ambiente & sociedade 10: 97-118. 
Center for the Economy and the Environment. (2000). "Governance in 
Watersheds." Learning from Innovations In Environmental  
Protection: Commissioned Research Papers, from 
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/learning_te
xts.html. 
Cha, S.-C. (2006). "Challenges to Civil Society Movement and the Strategy 
for Member-oriented Activities." Civil Society Organizations 
Network in Korea, Retrieved July 12, 2008, from 
http://www.civilnet.net/30390  
Chang, H.-J. (1993). "The political economy of industrial policy in Korea." 
Camb. J. Econ. 17(2): 131-157. 
Chang, H.-J. (2007). Institutional change and economic development. New 
York, NY ; London, United Nations University Press. 
Chang, H.-J. and P. Evans (2005). The Role of Institutions in Economic 
Change. Reimagining growth : towards a renewal of development 
theory. S. d. Paula and G. Dymski. London, Zed: 99-140. 
Cho, H.-Y. (2000). "Democratic Transition and Changes in Korean NGOs." 
Korea Journal 40(3): 275~304. 
Cho, M.-R. (2003). "Contending the Renaturalization of Cheonggyecheon in 
Seoul (in Korean)." ECO by The Korean Association for 
Environmental Sociology 4: 130 ~ 165  
Cho, M.-R. (2004). "Emergence and Evolution of Environmental Discourses 
in South Korea." Korea Journal 44(3): 138~164. 
Cho, S.-J. (1999). Jeonju city: to co-manage large projects with the 
cooperation between the city and nongovernmental sector. Seoul 
Sinmun. Seoul, Seoul Sinmun. 
Choi, D.-J. and H. Park (2001). "Analysis of water privatization scenarios in 
Korea with multi-criteria decision-making techniques." Journal of 
Water Supply Research and Technology AQUA. 50(6): 335-352. 
Choi, S.-H. (2005). River revived: Jeonju River in Jeonju (Hacheon 
Doesalanada: Jeonju Jeonjucheon). Jugan Hankook (Korean Weekly). 
Seoul, Hankook Ilbo. 2079: 28. 
320 
 
Choi, S.-H. (2007). Conflict over the development of the Nakdong River 
Basin. Naeil Sinmun. Seoul, Naeil Sinmun. 
Chung, D. (2004). Comparison of Watershed management of South Korea 
and U.S.A.: the Paldang Reservoir and the New York City 
Watershed. Syracuse, State University of New York, College of 
Environmental Science and Forestry. PhD. 
Chung, J.-Y. and R. J. R. Kirkby (2001). The political economy of 
development and environment in Korea. London, New York, 
Routledge. 
Clarke, R. (2003). "Water crisis?" OECD Observer(236): 8-10. 
Clarke, S. J., L. Bruce-Burgess, et al. (2003). "Linking form and function: 
towards an eco-hydromorphic approach to sustainable river 
restoration." Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater 
Ecosystems 13(5): 439-450. 
Cleaver, F. and T. Franks (2005). How institutions elude design: river basin 
management and sustainable livelihoods. BCID Research Paper 
No.12. Bradford, the Bradford Centre for International Development. 
Committee on Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems: Science, T. a. P. P. and C. 
National Research (1992). Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems:Science, 
Technology, and Public Policy, The National Academies Press. 
Conca, K. (2006). Governing water : contentious transnational politics and 
global institution building. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
Conley, A. and M. A. Moote (2003). "Evaluating Collaborative Natural 
ResourceManagement." Society and Natural Resources 16(5): 371 - 
386. 
Connick, S. and J. E. Innes (2003). "Outcomes of Collaborative Water Policy 
Making: Applying Complexity Thinking to Evaluation." Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 46(2): 177-197(121). 
Cooke, B. and U. Kothari (2001). Participation, the new tyranny? London, 
Zed. 
Cummins, R. A. and E. Gullone (2000). Why we should not use 5-point 
Likert scales: The case for subjective quality of life measurement. . 
Second International Conference on Quality of Life in Cities 
Singapore, National University of Singapore. 
Daecheong Water Partnership (2004). The Reports of the 2nd Annual 
General Assembly. The Annual General Assembly of Daecheong 
Water Partnership. D. W. Partnership. Yuseong, Korea, Daecheong 
Water Partnership. 
Daecheong Water Partnership (2005). The Reports of the 3rd Annual 
General Assembly. The Annual General Assembly of Daecheong 
Water Partnership. D. W. Partnership. Yuseong, Korea, Daecheong 
Water Partnership. 
Daecheong Water Partnership (Daecheong-ho Bojeon Undong Bonbu). 
"Daecheong water partnership's homepage."   Retrieved Dec 12, 2006, 
from http://www.daecheong.or.kr/. 
Davies, A. (2002). "Power, politics and networks: shaping partnerships for 
321 
 
sustainable communities." Area 34(2): 190-203. 
Davis, J. (2004). "Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from 
South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector." World Development 32(1): 
53-71. 
de Waal, L. C., A. R. G. Large, et al., Eds. (1998). Rehabilitation of rivers:  
Principles and Implementation. Landscape Ecology series. Chicester, 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Diamond, L. J. and T.-c. o. Sin (2000). Institutional reform and democratic 
consolidation in Korea. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 
Stanford University. 
Dinar, A. (2000). The political economy of water pricing reforms. 
Washington, D.C., published for the World Bank [by] Oxford 
University Press. 
Dinar, A. and World Bank. (2005). Decentralization of river basin 
management : a global analysis. Washington, D.C., World Bank. 
Ebenhöh, E. (2007). Designing agent based models of water management 
regimes using the IAD framework. The Challenge of Self-
Governance in Complex, Globalizing Economies. E. Ostrom and A. 
Schlüter. Freiburg, Institute of Forestry Economics: 81–98. 
Eden, S. and S. Tunstall (2006). "Ecological versus social restoration? How 
urban river restoration challenges but also fails to challenge the 
science – policy nexus in the United Kingdom." Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy 24(5): 661 – 680. 
Editor's comment (1994). This is not only for Nakdong. Sekey Ilbo. Seoul, 
Jan 15, 1994. 
Evans, P. (1996a). "Introduction: Development strategies across the public-
private divide." World Development 24(6): IN1. 
Evans, P. (1996b). "Government action, social capital and development: 
Reviewing the evidence on synergy." World Development 24(6): 
1119-1132. 
Evans, P. (2004). "Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of 
Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation." Studies in 
Comparative International Development 38(4): 30-52. 
Eversole, R. and J. Martin (2005). Participation and governance in regional 
development : global trends in an Australian context. Aldershot ; 
Burlington, VT, Ashgate. 
Falkenmark, M., L. Gottschalk, et al. (2004). Towards integrated catchment 
management: increasing the dialogue between scientists, policy-
makers and stakeholders. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, Carfax Publishing Company. 20: 297-309. 
Faulkner, H., A. Green, et al. (2001). "Residents' perceptions of water quality 
improvements following remediation work in the Pymme's Brook 
catchment, north London, UK." Journal of Environmental 
Management 62(3): 239-254. 
Feindt, P. H. and A. Oels (2005). "Does discourse matter? Discourse analysis 
in environmental policy making." Journal of Environmental Policy & 
322 
 
Planning 7(3): 161-173. 
Flinders, M. (2005). "The Politics of Public-Private Partnerships." Br J Politics 
& Int Relations 7(2): 215-239. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research." 
Qualitative Inquiry 12(2): 219-245. 
Folke, C., S. R. Carpenter, et al. (2010). "Resilience thinking: integrating 
resilience, adaptability and transformability." Ecology and Society 
15(4). 
Forsyth, T. (2005). "Building deliberative public-private partnerships for 
waste management in Asia." Geoforum 36(4): 429-439. 
Fox, J. (1996). "How does civil society thicken? the political construction of 
social capital in rural Mexico." World Development 24(6): 1089-1103. 
Frances, C. (1999). "Paradoxes of participation: questioning participatory 
approaches to development." Journal of International Development 
11(4): 597-612. 
Franks, T. and F. Cleaver (2007). "Water governance and poverty." Progress 
in Development Studies 7(4): 291-306. 
Freeman, J. (1997). "Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State." 
UCLA Law Review 45: 1-98. 
Galaz, V. (2005). Power in the Commons: The Politics of Water 
Management Instiutions in Chile and Sweden. Department of 
Political Science. Göteborg, Göteborgs universitet: Statsvetenskapliga 
institutionen. 
George, A. L. and A. Bennett (2005). Case studies and theory development 
in the social sciences. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
Gerlak, A. K. and T. Heikkila (2007). "Collaboration and Institutional 
Endurance in U.S. Water Policy." PS:Political Science and Politics 
January: 55-60. 
Gibson, C. C., M. A. McKean, et al. (2000). People and forests : communities, 
institutions, and governance. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
Global Water Partnership. (2001). "The Global Water Partnership ToolBox 
for Integrated Water Resourc Management." 
Global Water Partnership (2003). Effective Water Governance - Learning 
from the Dialogues. Stockholm, Sweden. 
Goodin, R. E. and H. D. Klingemann (1996). A new handbook of political 
science. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Griffin, C. B. (1999). "Watershed councils: an emerging form of public 
participation in natural resource management." Journal of the 
American Water Resources Association 35(3): 505-518. 
Gu, J.-I. (1996). "Local Agenda 21 and Habitat II (in Korean) " City and 
Poverty (Dosi-wa Bingon) 22: 55-77. 
Gyeongnam Water Expo and Forum organisation committee. "Gyeongnam 
Water Expo and Forum "   Retrieved April 1, 2009, from 
http://weexpo.org/. 
Hajer, M. and W. Versteeg (2005). "A decade of discourse analysis of 
environmental politics: Achievements, challenges, perspectives." 
323 
 
Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 7(3): 175-184. 
Hajer, M. A. (1995). The politics of environmental discourse : ecological 
modernization and the policy process. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Hammersley, M. (1996). The relationship between qualitative and 
quantitative research: paradigm loyalty versus methodological 
eclecticism. . Handbook of qualitative research methods for 
psychology and the social sciences. J. T. E. Richardson and British 
Psychological Society. Leicester, BPS Books: 159 – 174. 
Han, M. (2000). "Rain Harvest Measures as an Alternative source for water 
supply (in Korean)." Journal of Water and Wastewater 14(3): 207-210. 
Han, S.-J. (1998). "The Korean Path to Modernization and Risk Society." 
Korea Journal 38(1): 5~27. 
Harper, D., C. Smith, et al. (1995). The ecological basis for the management 
of the natural river environment. The Ecological Basis for River 
Management. D. Harper and A. Ferguson. Chichester, John Wiley: 
219-238. 
Hartley, J. (2004). Case study research. Essential Guide to Qualitative 
Methods in Organizational Research. C. Casell and G. Symon. 
London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Sage Publications: 323-333. 
Havard College Library. (2010). "Romanisation, Digital Resources for 
Korean Studies."  October 21, 2010. Retrieved October 26, 2010, from 
http://hcl.harvard.edu/research/guides/korean/#romanization. 
Head, B. and N. Ryan (2004). Can Co-governance Work? Regional Natural 
Resource Management in Queensland, Australia. The Eighth 
International Research Symposium on Public Management (IRSPM 
VIII), Budapest. 
Head, B. W. (2007). "Community Engagement: Participation on Whose 
Terms?" Australian Journal of Political Science 42(3): 441 - 454. 
Heikkila, T. and A. K. Gerlak (2005). "The Formation of Large-scale 
Collaborative Resource Management Institutions: Clarifying the 
Roles of Stakeholders, Science, and Institutions." Policy Studies 
Journal 33(4): 583-612. 
Hilden, M. (2000). "The Role of Integrating Concepts in Watershed 
Rehabilitation." Ecosyst Health 6(1): 39-50. 
Himmelman, A. T. (1994). Communities Working Collaboratively For a 
Change. . Resolving conflict: Strategies for local government M. 
Herrman. Washington, DC, International City/County Management 
Association.: 27-47. 
Hodgson, G. (1998). "The approach of institutional economics." Journal of 
economic literature 36(1): 166-192. 
Hofwegen, P. J. M. v. and F. G. W. Jaspers (1999). Analytical Framework for 
Integrated Water Resources Management – Guidelines for 
Assessment of Institutional Frameworks. Rotterdam, Brookfield., 
Balkema Publishers. 
Hooper, B. P. (2005). Integrated river basin governance : learning from 
international experience. Carbondale, Ill., IWA Publishing. 
324 
 
Huitema, D. and S. Meijerink (2009). Transitions in water management: 
positioning this book. Water Policy Entrepreneurs. D. Huitema and S. 
Meijerink. Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar: 
IWA Publishing: 3-22. 
Hwang, H.-G. (2004). Interview: Chairperson of Busan Hacheon Saligi 
Undong Bonbu, Professor Seung-hwan Lee Kookje News. Busan, 
Kookje Sinmum  
Im, H. (1994). Makeshift way to recover the Nakdong Pollution. Kukmin 
Ilbo. Seoul, Jan 20, 1994. 
Imperial, M., T., (1999). "Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based 
Management: The Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework." Environmental Management 24(4): 449-465. 
Imperial, M. T. and T. Koontz (2007). Evolution of Collaborative 
Organizations for Watershed Governance: Structural Properties, 
Life-Cycles, and Factors Contributing to the Longevity of Watershed 
Partnerships. the 29th Annual Association for Public Policy Analysis 
and Management (APPAM) Research Conference. , Washington, DC, 
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM). 
Incheon water partnership and Incheon Metropolitan City (2005). 
Performance Report. Incheon, Incheon Hacheon Saligi Chujindan  
Incheon water partnership and Incheon Regional Environmental 
Technology Development Centre (2004). Assessment of Saving River 
Campaigns in Incheon from Oct 1997 to May 2004, Incheon Hacheon 
Saligi Chujindan (the Incheon Save the Rivers Promotion 
Committee). 
Incheon Water Partnership (Incheon Hacheon Sal-li-gi Chujindan). "Incheon 
water partnership's homepage."   Retrieved Dec 12, 2006, from 
http://www.icriver.or.kr/. 
Innes, J. E. and D. E. Booher (1999). "Consensus Building and Complex 
Adaptive Systems: A Framework for Evaluating Collaborative 
Planning." Journal of the American Planning Association 65(4): 412. 
Inoguchi, T. (2002). Broadening the Basis of Social Capital in Japan. 
Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in 
Contemporary Society. R. Putnam. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
359-392. 
International Monetary Fund (2012). Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, 
period average), International Financial Statistics. 1997-2001., The 
World Bank Group. 
Jacob, T. (2001). "Path-Dependent Danish Welfare Reforms: The 
Contribution of the New Institutionalisms to Understanding 
Evolutionary Change." Scandinavian Political Studies 24(4): 277-309. 
Jaspers, F. G. W. (2003). "Institutional arrangements for integrated river 
basinmanagement." Water Policy 5: 77-90. 
Jeollabuk-do government (Jeollabuk-do cheong). "Jeollabuk-do 
government's homepage."   Retrieved April 1, 2008, from 
http://www.provin.jeonbuk.kr/. 
325 
 
Jeonbuk KFEM (Korean Federation of Environmental Movement) (1999). 
Drawbacks of River Pak Plan and appeal for improvement. Jeonju. 
Jeonju city government (Jeonju-si cheong). "Jeonju city government's 
homepage."   Retrieved April 1, 2008, from 
http://www.jeonju.go.kr/. 
Jeonju office for LA21 (2000). Launch of Jeonju office for LA21. Pureun 
Ongoeul. Jeonju, Jeonju office for LA21,. 1. 
Jeonju partnership (2000). The creation of the Jeonju partnership. internal 
document collected in 2005. Jeonju. 
Johnson, C. A. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford University 
Press. 
Jönsson, B. L. (2004). Stakeholder participation as a tool for sustainable 
development in the Em River Basin. International Journal of Water 
Resources Development, Carfax Publishing Company. 20: 345-352. 
Kang, B.-K. and Ministry of Environment (2007). Presentation on Plan for 
Ecological Rivers in 10 years (2006-2015). E. conservation. Kwacheon, 
Ministry of Environment. 
Kang, H.-k. (2007). Urban Waterway Project Behind Lee’s Victory. The 
Korea Times. Seoul. 
Kemper, K. E., A. Dinar, et al., Eds. (2005). Institutional and policy analysis 
on river basin management decentralization - the principles of 
managing water resources at the lowest appropriate level-when and 
why does it (not) work in practice? Washington, D.C., The World 
Bank. 
Kenney, D. S. (2000). Arguing About Consensus: Examining the Case 
Against Western Watershed Initiatives and Other Collaborative 
Groups Active in Natural Resources Management. Boulder, CO, 
Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of 
Law. 
Kenney, D. S. and W. B. Lord (1999). Analysis of Institutional Innovation in 
the Natural Resources and Environmental Realm: The Emergence of 
Alternative Problem-Solving Strategies in the American West. . 
Boulder, CO, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado 
School of Law. 
Kenney, D. S., S. T. McAllister, et al. (2000). The new watershed source book: 
A directory and review of watershed initiatives in the western 
United States, Natural Resources Law Centre, University of 
Colorado School of Law, Boulder. 
Kim, B.-J. (2007). Country paper: Republic of Korea,. Local Government in 
Asia and the Pacific: A Comparative Study. UNESCAP. Electronic 
book, UNESCAP,. 
Kim, C.-S. (2000). A study on the factors influencing environmental policy 
implementation - focusing on the water quality improvement 
policies of the Han River and the Naktong River Basins -. 
Department of Public Administration. Seoul, Seoul National 
University. 
326 
 
Kim, C.-S. (2005). Conditions for cooperation of bureaucracy and civil 
society in the local autonomy era - focusing on river restoration of 
Oncheoncheon in Busan metropolitan city -. 2005 Spring conference 
of KAPA, Busan, KAPA. 
Kim, D.-C. and K.-H. Han (1994). Polluted Nakdong River, National Politics 
Under Pressure DongAh Ilbo. Seoul, January 14, 1994. 
Kim, G.-G. (2005). "Questioning 10-year-Local Agenda 21 movement (in 
Korean) " City and Poverty (Dosi-wa Bingon) 75: 17-31. 
Kim, I.-S. (2002). "Devolution of Central Government’s Functions to Sub-
National Units in South Korea: Progresses and Prospects." The Korea 
Local Administration Review (Hankook Jibang Haengjeong Yeongu) 
16(2): 83-102. 
Kim, J.-K. (2002). Water pollution in the Nakdong River and the Issues of 
the Spectial Acts for Water Management. Busan Development Forum. 
Busan, Busan Development Institute. 
Kim, J. (2008). The key issues in the Bill of Water Act. Water Journal. 
Kim, K.-d. (2008). Social Change in Korea: A bird's-eye view. Social Change 
in Korea. K.-d. Kim and The Korean Herald. Seoul, Jimoondang: 26-
33. 
Kim, K. U., J. K. Koh, et al. (2007). The dynamics of water quality policy 
change in South Korea. CAIWA 2007, International Conference on 
Adaptive & Integrated Water Management, Basel, Switzerland, 
NeWater, Institute of Environmental Systems Research, University of 
Osnabrueck. 
Kim, M.-S. (2003). Water for Life: Saving Water Movements in Korea, Eco 
Justice. 
Kim, W. B., W.-s. Choi, et al. (2001). "[Debate] Discussion: Asian Values." 
Korea Journal 41(2): 282~291. 
Kim, Y.-K. (2007). Cheonggyecheon project: Mere token for presidency 
election? The Ohmynews. Seoul, from 
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN
_CD=A0000428069. 
Knight, J. and I. Sened (1995). Explaining social institutions. Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press. 
Koehler, B. and T. Koontz (2008). "Citizen Participation in Collaborative 
Watershed Partnerships." Environmental Management 41(2): 143-154. 
Koh, J.-K. (1995). A study on environmental policy making process in Korea: 
focusing on tap-water contamination episodes and policy change(in 
Korean). Environmental Planning, Graduate School of 
Environmental Studies. Seoul, Seoul National University. 
Koh, J. K., K. Kim, et al. (2005). The gap between theory and practice of 
consensus building in South Korea: the case of the Hantan river dam 
World Water Week 2005, the 15th Stockholm Water Symposium, 
Stockholm, Sweden, Stockholm International Water Institute. 
Koo, H. (1993). Strong State and Contentious Society. State and society in 
contemporary Korea. H. Koo and J. C. o. K. Studies. Ithaca, Cornell 
327 
 
University Press: 231-249. 
Kooiman, J. (1993). Modern governance : new government-society 
interactions. London, Sage. 
Kooiman, J. (2000). Societal Governance. Debating governance: authority, 
steering, and democracy. J. Pierre. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
138-164. 
Kooiman, J. (2003). Governing as governance. London, SAGE. 
Koontz, T. M. (2005). "We Finished the Plan, So Now What? Impacts of 
Collaborative Stakeholder Participation on Land Use Policy." Policy 
Studies Journal 33(3): 459-481. 
Korea Statistical Information Office (2005). 2005 census. 
Korean Council for Local Agenda 21 (2005a). Sustainable Development and 
Local Agenda 21 (in Korean), KCLA21. 
Korean Council for Local Agenda 21 (2005b). Walk to Partnership: Local 
Agenda 21 Practices in Korea, KCLA21  
Ku, D.-W. (2004). "The Korean Environmental Movement: Green Politics 
through Social Movement." Korea Journal 44(3): 185~219. 
Kwon, T.-J. (2006). Han kuk eui Sae ki Ddu eo num gi(in Korean), Century-
skipping industrialisation and Democratisation of Korea. Seoul, 
Nanam Publishing Co. 
Laerhoven, H. v., H. J. v. d. Zaag-Loonen, et al. (2004). "A comparison of 
Likert scale and visual analogue scales as response options in 
children's questionnaires." Acta Paediatrica 93: 830-835. 
Lane, M. B. and G. McDonald (2005). "Community-based Environmental 
Planning: Operational Dilemmas, Planning Principles and Possible 
Remedies." Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 
48(5): 709 - 731. 
Lane, M. B., G. T. McDonald, et al. (2004). "Decentralisation and 
Environmental Management in Australia: a Comment on the 
Prescriptions of The Wentworth Group." Australian Geographical 
Studies 42(1): 103-115. 
Lanz, K. and S. Scheuer (2001). EEB Handbook on EU Water Policy under 
the Water Framework Directive. J. H. (EEB), European 
Environmental Bureau  
Lawrence, K. (2000). "Empowered or constrained? The policy process and 
environmental politics in the Blackdown Hills." European 
Environment 10(3): 140-151. 
Leach, W. D. (2002). "Surveying Diverse Stakeholder Groups." Society & 
Natural Resources 15(7): 641 - 649. 
Leach, W. D. and N. W. Pelkey (2001). " Making Watershed Partnerships 
Work: A Review of The Empirical Literature." Journal of Water 
Resources Planning and Management. November/December:: 378-
385. 
Leach, W. D., N. W. Pelkey, et al. (2002). "Stakeholder Partnerships as 
Collaborative Policymaking: Evaluation Criteria Applied to 
Watershed Management in California and Washington." Journal of 
328 
 
Policy Analysis and Management 21(4): 645-670. 
Lee, B.-K. (2006). Institutional measurement for restoration of water eco-
system. Seoul, Korea Environment Institute. 
Lee, D. H., C. W. Kim, et al. (2006). Introduction of planning of a large-scale, 
multi-functional river experiment station in Korea. the 4th Korea-
Japan Joint Seminar, Seoul, Korean Institute of Construction 
Technology. 
Lee, J.-K. (2003). Activities of networked campaigns for saving rivers in 
Busan. Co-workshop of LA21 by Busan and Gwangju, Busan. 
Lee, M.-H. (2003). Modernisation and Water management in South Korea 
(in Korean). Seminar series of Academy of Democratic Society and 
Policy, Seoul, MinSaYeon (Academy of Democratic Society and 
Policy), Sangji Univerversity. 
Lee, S.-H. (2003). Critiques over Korean modern system of water 
management (Hankookeui Keundaejeok Mulkwanri Chegye Bipan, 
in Korean). Seoul, MinSaYeon. 
Lemos, M. C. and A. Agrawal (2006). "Environmental Governance." Annual 
Review of Environment and Resources 31(1): 297-325. 
Liang, C. and C. Yue (2010). 8. Social Participation in the Irrigation Sector in 
Yunnan, China: Roles of the State, User Associations, and 
Communities. Social participation in water governance and 
management : critical and global perspectives. K. A. Berry and E. 
Mollard. London, Earthscan: 163-182. 
Lijphart, A. (1975). "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative 
Research." Comparative Political Studies 8(2): 158. 
Lim, P. W. (2001). The Evolution of Korea's Development Paradigm: Old 
Legacies and Emerging Trends in the Post-Crisis Era. Research Paper 
series no 21. A. D. Bank, Asian Development Bank: 42 pages  
Livingston, M. L. (2005). "Evaluating changes in water institutions: 
methodological issues at the micro and meso levels." Water Policy 
7(1): 21-34  
Llamas, M. R., L. Martínez-Cortina, et al. (2009). Water ethics. Boca Raton 
[Fla.] ; London, CRC Press: xxvi, 353 p. 
Local Autonomy Research Institute. (2005). "Interview Si-Yong, Choi, on 
Local Council for Sustainable Development in Jeonju city."   
Retrieved January 07, 2007 from http://grassroot.or.kr/. 
Lowndes, V. and C. Skelcher (1998). "The Dynamics of Multi-organizational 
Partnerships: an Analysis of Changing Modes of Governance." 
Public Administration 76(2): 313-333. 
Lubell, M. (2004a). "Collaborative Watershed Management: A View from 
the Grassroots." The Policy Studies Journal 32(3): 341-361. 
Lubell, M. (2004b). "Collaborative Environmental Institutions: All Talk and 
No Action?" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23(3): 549-
573. 
Lubell, M., P. Sabatier, et al. (2005). 9. Conclusions and Recommendations. 
Swimming upstream : collaborative approaches to watershed 
329 
 
management. P. Sabatier, W. Focht, M. Lubellet al. Cambridge, Mass., 
MIT Press: 261-295. 
Lubell, M., M. Schneider, et al. (2002). "Watershed Partnerships and the 
Emergence of Collective Action Institutions." American Journal of 
Political Science 46(1): 148-163. 
Lundqvist, L. (2004). "Integrating Swedish water resource management: a 
multi-level governance trilemma." Local Environment 9(5): 413-424. 
Mahoney, J. (2000). "Path dependence in historical sociology." Theory and 
Society 29(4): 507-548. 
Manor, J. (1998). Civil Society And Governance - A Concept Paper. U. o. S. 
Institute of Development Studies. 
May, T. (2001). Social research : issues, methods and process. Buckingham, 
Open University Press. 
McCay, B. J. (2002). Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts, 
Situations, and Events  The drama of the commons. E. Ostrom, 
Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change and et.al. 
Washington, DC, National Academy Press: 361-402. 
Meijerink, S. and D. Huitema (2009). Water transitions, policy entrepreneurs 
and change strategies: lessons learned. Water Policy Entrepreneurs. 
D. Huitema and S. Meijerink. Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA, 
USA, Edward Elgar: IWA Publishing: 371-391. 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2001). The Rivers in Korea 
(Hacheon Illam). 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation. (2005). "Fach Sheet on Water 
Usage." 2005, from http://www.moct.go.kr. 
Ministry of Environment. (2013). "Environmental GIS service "   Retrieved 
January 28, 2007, from http://egis.go.kr. 
Ministry of Environment. (1992). "the 4th Northeast Asian Conference on 
Environmental Cooperation "   Retrieved January 23, 2005. 
Ministry of Environment. (1997). "Guide for Creating Local Agenda 21." 
2006, from 
http://library.me.go.kr/DLiWeb25/comp/search/Detail.aspx?srv=
4&m_var=64&cid=4574. 
Ministry of Environment. (2002a). "Comprehensive Measures for Water 
Quality Improvement of Four Major Rivers." 2002, from 
http://www.me.go.kr/. 
Ministry of Environment (2002b). Environmental White Paper, Ministry of 
Environment,  Republic of Korea. 
Ministry of Environment (2003). Environmental White Paper, Ministry of 
Environment,  Republic of Korea. 
Ministry of Environment (2004a). Environmental White Paper, Ministry of 
Environment,  Republic of Korea. 
Ministry of Environment (2004b). Water Policies & Innovative Practices 
Republic of Korea (ROK). the 8th Special Session of the UNEP 
Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Jeju, 
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Environment. 
330 
 
Ministry of Environment (2006). Water Environment Strategic Management 
Plan, Ministry of Environment. 
Ministry of Environment. (2009). "History of the environmental laws." 
December 2009. , from 
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode
=law_law. 
Ministry of Environment and National Institute of Environmental Research. 
(2010). "Water Environment Information System."   Retrieved 
January 28, 2008, from http://water.nier.go.kr/weis/. 
Ministry of Land Transport and Maritime Affairs (2008). Water 
Management Information System (WAMIS). 
Mizanur Rahaman, M., O. Varis, et al. (2004). EU Water Framework 
Directive vs. Integrated Water Resources Management: The Seven 
Mismatches. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 
Carfax Publishing Company. 20: 565-575. 
Mody, J. and World Bank (2004). Achieving accountability through 
decentralization : lessons for integrated river basin management. 
Washington, D.C., World Bank. 
Möllenkamp, S., M. Lamers, et al. (2008). Institutional elements for adaptive 
water management regimes. Comparing two regional water 
management regimes in the Rhine basin. Adaptive and Integrated 
Water Management: 147-166. 
Mollinga, P. P. (2001). "Water and politics: levels, rational choice and South 
Indian canal irrigation." Futures 33(8-9): 733-752. 
Moon, T. H. (2004). "Environmental Policy and Green Government in 
Korea." Korea Journal 44(3): 220~251. 
Moore, S. A. and S. F. Rockloff (2006). "Organizing Regionally for Natural 
Resource Management in Australia: Reflections on Agency and 
Government." Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 8(3): 259–
277. 
Morse, S. and N. McNamara (2006). "Analysing institutional partnerships in 
development: a contract between  equals or a loaded process?" 
Progress in Development Studies 6(4): 321-336. 
Moseley, C. (1999). New ideas, old institutions: Environment, community, 
and state in the Pacific Northwest. . Department of Political Science. 
New haven, Connecticut, Yale University, . PhD. 
Mosse, D. and M. Sivan (2003). The rule of water : statecraft, ecology and 
collective action in South India. New Delhi Oxford ; New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Mullen, M. W. and B. E. Allison (1999). "Stakeholder involvement and social 
capital: Keys to watershed management success in Alabama." 
Journal of the American Water Resources Association 35(3): 655-662. 
Murray, V. (2000). Evaluating the impact of public-private partnerships. 
Public private partnerships : theory and practice in international 
perspective. S. P. Osborne. London ; New York, Routledge: 277-292. 
National Archives of Korea. (2006). "the Comprehensive Measure for Clean 
331 
 
Water Provision (CMCWP)." January 2008, from 
http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.
do?id=003912. 
National Archives of Korea. (2007). "Conservation and management of 
water environment." January 2008, from 
http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.
do?id=007325. 
Newman, C. L. (2000). "Comparative  Study of NGO/Government 
Partnerships." The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 2(3): 
24. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic 
performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. C. (1995). Five propositions about institutional change. Explaining 
social institutions. J. Knight and I. Sened. Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
O'Neill, K. M. (2005). "Can Watershed Management Unite Town and 
Country?" Society & Natural Resources 18(3): 241 - 253. 
Oh, S.-K. (2003). Introduction of the River Network. LA21 Workshop: Water 
Management, Incheon, Korean Council for Local Agenda 21. 
Okun, D. A. (1991). "A Water and Sanitation Strategy for the Developing 
World " Environment ENVTAR 33(8): 16-20, 38-43. 
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action : public goods and the theory 
of groups, Harvard U.P.; Oxford U.P. 
Olsson, P., C. Folke, et al. (2004). "Adaptive Comanagement for Building 
Resilience in Social–Ecological Systems." Environmental 
Management 34(1): 75-90. 
Organisation Committee for Gyeongnam Water Forum (2004). The 
Proceedings of 2004 Gyeongnam Water Forum. 2004 Gyeongnam 
Water Forum. Bugok, Korea. 
Organisation Committee for Gyeongnam Water Forum (2005). The 
Proceedings of 2005 Gyeongnam Water Forum. 2005 Gyeongnam 
Water Forum. Changnyeong, Korea. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2006). OECD 
environmental performance reviews : Korea. Paris, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for 
collective action. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1998). "A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of 
collective action." Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 92: 1. 
Ostrom, E. (2005a). 30. Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than 
Markets and Hierarchies. Handbook of new institutional economics. 
C. Ménard, M. M. Shirley and MyiLibrary. Dordrecht ; [Great 
Britain], Springer: 819-848. 
Ostrom, E. (2005b). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2007). 2. Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the 
332 
 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. Theories of the 
policy process. P. A. Sabatier. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: 21-64. 
Ostrom, E., J. Burger, et al. (1999). "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, 
Global Challenges." Science 284(5412): 278-282. 
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, et al., Eds. (1994). Rules, Games, and Common-Pool 
Resources. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom, E. and V. Ostrom (2004). "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice." 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 63(1): 105-147. 
Paldang Water Partnership. (2008). "Paldang water partnership's 
homepage."   Retrieved Dec 12, 2006, from 
http://www.paldang.or.kr. 
Papadopoulos, Y. (2003). "Cooperative forms of governance: Problems of 
democratic accountability in complex environments." European 
Journal of Political Research 42(4): 473-501. 
Park, B.-J. (2004). A survey of visitors to Jeonju River. Maintenance of Jeonju 
River and Urban stream conservation for Ecocity Jeonju. J. o. f. L. 
Subcommittee of Ecological rehabilitation of city. Jeonju, Jeonju office 
for LA21. 
Park, D.-M. (2000). How to promote LA21. International Symposium Of 
Local Authorities, Busan, Korea (Republic of). 
Park, J.-H. (2005). Vision of the Daecheong Partnership: the NGOs Action 
Plan for improving the water quality of the Daecheong Lake Report 
of the Daecheong Local Agenda 21. T. D. w. partnership. 
Park, K.-N. (2004). Cheonggyecheon project: was it not restoration but 
developement? DongAh Ilbo. Seoul, from 
http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?f=ccs&n=200403050238&mai
n=1. 
Park, S.-H. (1999). Interview of the mayoral candidates of the Honam region 
Kyunghyang News. Seoul. 
Peters, B. G., J. Pierre, et al. (2005). "The Politics of Path Dependency: 
Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism." The Journal of 
Politics 67(4): 1275–1300. 
Pierce, J. C. and H. R. Doerksen (1976). Water politics and public 
involvement. Ann Arbor,. 
Pierre, J. (2000). Debating governance: authority, steering, and democracy. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Pierson, P. (2000). "Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in 
Political Processes." Studies in American Political Development 
14(01): 72-92. 
Plummer, J. and T. Slaymaker (2007). Rethinking governance in water 
services. Overseas Development Institute. London, Overseas 
Development Institute,. 
Plummer, R. and D. Armitage (2007). "A resilience-based framework for 
evaluating adaptive co-management: Linking ecology, economics 
and society in a complex world." Ecological Economics 61(1): 62-74. 
Postel, S. L. and B. Richter (2003). Rivers for Life - managing water for 
333 
 
people and nature -. Washington, Covelo, London, Island Press. 
Poteete, A. R., M. Janssen, et al. (2010). Working together : collective action, 
the commons, and multiple methods in practice. Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press. 
Poteete, A. R. and E. Ostrom (2004). "Heterogeneity, Group Size and 
Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management." 
Development and Change 35(3): 435-461. 
Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization 
(2004). Special Report on the Reform of Public Service Delivery. 
Seoul. 
Pretty, J. (2003). "Social Capital and the Collective Management of 
Resources." Science 302(5652): 1912-1914. 
Pretty, J. and H. Ward (2001). "Social Capital and the Environment." World 
Development 29(2): 209-227. 
Prime Minister's Office (PMO) (2000). Task group for Water quality 
improvement, 2000. Water Management White Paper (MulKwanRi 
BaekSeo). Kwacheon, PMO. 
Prime Minister's Office (PMO) (2002). Water Management White Paper 
(MulKwanRi BaekSeo). Kwacheon, OPM. 
Provan, K. G. and H. B. Milward (1995). "A Preliminary Theory of 
Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of 
Four Community Mental Health Systems." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 40(1): 1-33. 
Prud'homme, R. (1995). "The Dangers Of Decentralization." World Bank Res 
Obs 10(2): 201-220. 
Reed, M. G. (1995). "Cooperative Management of Environmental Resources 
- a Case-Study from Northern Ontario, Canada." Economic 
Geography 71(2): 132-149. 
Rees, J. (1992). "Markets--the panacea for environmental regulation?" 
Geoforum 23(3): 383-394. 
Rees, J. A. (1998). Regulation and Private Participation in the Water and 
Sanitation Sector. Stockholm, Global Water Partnership/Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency. 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding governance : policy networks, 
governance, reflexivity and accountability. Buckingham, Open 
University Press. 
River Information Centre and Ministry of Land.Transport and Maritime 
Affairs. (2010). "River Management GIS (RIMGIS)."   Retrieved 
January 28, 2008, from http://www.river.go.kr  
River Network (2004). The 3rd River Day report. B. H. S. p. River Network 
preparation committee, Eco-justice,. Busan. 
River Researches Group. "Eco Friendly River Guide." 2007, from 
http://www.river.re.kr. 
Rogers, P. and A. W. Hall (2003). Effective Water Governance. Stockholm, 
Sweden, Global Water Partnership/Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency. 
334 
 
Ryan, R. L. (1998). "Local perceptions and values for a midwestern river 
corridor." Landscape and Urban Planning 42(2-4): 225-237. 
Rydin, Y. (2003). Conflict, consensus, and rationality in environmental 
planning : an institutional discourse approach. Oxford ; New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Rydin, Y. (2006). 12. Conclusion. Networks and institutions in natural 
resource management. Y. Rydin and E. Falleth. Cheltenham, UK ; 
Northampton, MA, USA, E. Elgar Pub.: 201-216. 
Rydin, Y. and E. Falleth (2006). Networks and institutions in natural 
resource management. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA, E. 
Elgar Pub. 
Ryu, J.-H. (2004). "Naturalizing Landscapes and the Politics of Hybridity: 
Gwanghwamun to Cheonggyecheon " Korea Jounal 44(3): 8-34. 
Sabatier, P., W. Focht, et al. (2005). 1. Collaborative Approaches to 
Watershed Management. Swimming upstream : collaborative 
approaches to watershed management. P. Sabatier, W. Focht, M. 
Lubellet al. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press: 3-21. 
Sabatier, P., W. Focht, et al., Eds. (2005). Swimming upstream : collaborative 
approaches to watershed management. American and comparative 
environmental policy. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
Saleth, R. M. and A. Dinar (1999). Evaluating water institutions and water 
sector performance. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
Saleth, R. M., A. Dinar, et al. (2004). The institutional economics of water : a 
cross-country analysis of institutions and performance. Cheltenham ; 
Northhampton, MA, Edward Elgar. 
Sarker, A. and T. Itoh (2001). "Design principles in long-enduring 
institutions of Japanese irrigation common-pool resources." 
Agricultural Water Management 48(2): 89-102. 
Schneider, M., J. Scholz, et al. (2003). "Building Consensual Institutions: 
Networks and the National Estuary Program." Am J Political Science 
47(1): 143-158. 
Scholz, J. T. and B. Stiftel, Eds. (2005). Adaptive governance and water 
conflict : new institutions for collaborative planning. Washington, 
D.C., Resources for the Future. 
Seo, J.-G. (1996). "Habitat II and the roles of NGOs (in Korean) " City and 
Poverty (Dosi-wa Bingon) 23: 99-107. 
Seong, K.-R. (2000). Chapter 5 Delayed decentralisation and incomplete 
democratic consolidation. Institutional reform and democratic 
consolidation in Korea. L. J. Diamond and T.-c. o. Sin. Stanford, Calif., 
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University: 127-148. 
Seppala, O. T., J. J. Hukka, et al. (2001). "Public-Private Partnerships in 
Water and Sewerage Services: Privatization for Profit or 
Improvement of Service and Performance?" Public Works 
Management Policy 6(1): 42-58. 
Sheridan, B. and G. Wehrfritz (2008). The New Green Leaders. Newsweek. 
Shim, S.-B. and H.-S. Lee (1996). Korean experience and challenges in water 
335 
 
resource planning and management. Towards effective water policy 
in the Asian and Pacific region, Vol.2, Country papers. W. L. Arriëns 
and A. D. Bank. [Manila], Asian Development Bank: 237-249. 
Sklarew, D. M. (2005). Promoting public participation in international 
waters management: An agenda for peer-to-peer learning. 
Enhancing participation and governance in water resources 
management : conventional approaches and information technology. 
L. Jansky and J. I. Uitto. New York, United Nations University Press: 
98-119. 
Society team (2008). Cover story: Nationwide copycats of Cheonggye-cheon. 
Newsmaker (Weekly Kyunghyang). 759. 
Special team (1991). Fight for safe water in the Youngnam region (Busan, 
Gyeongnam, Daegu and Gyeongbuk). DongAh Ilbo. Seoul. 
Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications. 
The 6th World Water Forum. (2012). "List of Champion Cities: Istanbul 
Water Concensus 2009."   Retrieved April 30, 2012, from 
http://www.worldwaterforum6.org/en/commissions/political/loc
al-and-regional-authorities-political-process/list-of-champion-
cities/?id=222. 
The National Institute of the Korean Language. (2000, October 2010). 
"Romanization of Korean." 2010, from 
http://www.korean.go.kr/eng/roman/roman.jsp. 
Tikhonov, V. (2007). Militarism and anti-militarism in contemporary South 
Korea, SOAS Korea Studies Seminar  
Torgler, B. and M. A. Garcia-Valiñas (2006). Participation In Environmental 
Organisations: Political Interest and State Capacity, The Centre for 
Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), 
University of East Anglia. 
Tortajada, C. (2001). Institutions for Integrated River Basin Management in 
Latin America. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, Carfax Publishing Company. 17: 289-301. 
Trachtenberg, Z. and W. Focht (2005). 3. Legitimacy and Watershed 
Collaborations: The Role of Public Participation. Swimming 
upstream : collaborative approaches to watershed management. P. 
Sabatier, W. Focht, M. Lubellet al. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press: 53-
82. 
True, J. L., B. D. Jones, et al. (2007). 6. Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: 
Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking. Theories of 
the policy process. P. A. Sabatier. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: 
155-187. 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development. (2011, 2009). "Partnerships 
for Sustainable Development - CSD Partnerships Database."   
Retrieved Mar 1, 2011, from 
http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/statisticsResult
s.do. 
336 
 
UN/DESA. (2002, September 2002). "Key Outcomes of the Summit, World 
Summit on Sustainable Development."   Retrieved Jan 15, 2006, from 
http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/documents/summit_docs.html. 
UN/DSD. (1993). "Agenda 21."   Retrieved January, 2009, from 
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_00.shtml. 
UN/DSD (2003). CSD-11 Decision on Partnerships. UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs – Division for Sustainable Development. 
UNDP (2006) "Water: a crisis of governance." 
UNEP International Environmental Technology Centre. (2002). Proceedings 
of the International Symposium on Building Partnerships between 
Citizens and Local Governments for Sustainable Lake Management : 
8-9 November 2001, Kusatsu City, Shiga Prefecture, Japan. 
Osaka/Shiga, Japan, UNEP International Environmental Technology 
Centre. 
UNESCO and the UN World Water Assessment Programme (2006). The 
2nd World Water Development Report: Water, a shared 
responsibility. the forth World Water Forum in Mexico City, Mexico, 
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); 
Berghahn Books. 
Uphoff, N. (1993). "Grassroots organizations and NGOs in rural 
development: Opportunities with diminishing states and expanding 
markets." World Development 21(4): 607-622. 
Vidal, J. (2006). Heart and soul of the city. The Guardian, from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/nov/01/society.tr
avelsenvironmentalimpact. 
Volker, L. d. (2004). "Towards sustainable water resources management: A 
case study from Saxony-Anhalt, Germany." Management of 
Environmental Quality: An International Journal 15(1): 17-24. 
Waley, P. (2005). "Ruining and Restoring Rivers: The State and Civil Society 
in Japan." Pacific Affairs 78(2): 195-215. 
Walker, B. H., L. H. Gunderson, et al. (2006) " A handful of heuristics and 
some propositions for understanding resilience in social-ecological 
systems." Ecology and Society 11, [online]. 
Weizsäcker, E. U. v., O. R. Young, et al. (2005). Limits to privatization : how 
to avoid too much of a good thing : a report to the Club of Rome. 
London ; Sterling, VA, Earthscan. 
Wengraf, T. (2001). Qualitative research interviewing : semi-structured, 
biographical and narrative methods. Thousand Oaks, Calif., London, 
SAGE. 
Williamson, O. E. (1994). The Institutions and Governance of Economic 
Development and Reform. the Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, Washington, D.C., World Bank. 
Winpenny, J. T. (1994). Managing water as an economic resource. London ; 
New York, Routledge. 
Wondolleck, J. M. and S. L. Yaffee (2000). Making collaboration work : 
lessons from innovation in natural resource management. 
337 
 
Washington, D.C., Island Press. 
Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). The developmental state. Ithaca, N.Y. ; London, 
Cornell University Press. 
Woo, H. and S. Kim (2000). "Review of foreign river restoration guidelines 
and prospect of South Korean applications." Korean Society of Civil 
Engineers Journal 20(7): 563-566  
Wood, L. A. and R. O. Kroger (2000). Doing discourse analysis : methods for 
studying action in talk and text. Thousand Oaks, Calif., London, 
Sage. 
Woolley, J. T. and M. V. McGinnis (1999). "The Politics of Watershed 
Policymaking." Policy Studies Journal 27(3): 578-594. 
World Water Assessment Programme (2009). The United Nations World 
Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World. Paris, 
London, UNESCO Publishing, Earthscan, . 
World Water Council (2006). Session FT 1.15 Is water alive ? Indigeneous 
understandings of water The 4th World Water Forum, Mexico City, 
Mexico. 
World Water Forum (1997). Marrakesh Declaration. The first World Water 
Forum, Marrakesh, Morocco. 
WWF (2001). Elements of Good Practice in Integrated River Basin 
Management - A Practical Resource for implementing the EU Water 
Framework Directive -. Practical Resource, Key issues, lessons 
learned and ‘good practice’ examples from the WWF/EC ‘Water 
Seminar Series’ 2000/2001. WWF. Brussels, Belgium, World Wide 
Fund For Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund). 
Yang, U.-J. (2004). To save the Nakdong River and Water Resource of 
Gyeongnam. 2004 Gyeongnam Water Forum, Bugok, Korea. 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research : design and methods. London, Sage 
Publications. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research : design and methods. Thousand Oaks, 
California, Sage Publications. 
Yoon, B.-S. L. (2001). Democratization and Gender politics in South Korea. 
Gender, globalization, and democratization. R. M. Kelly, Jane H. 
Bayes, Mary E. Hawkesworth and Brigitte Young. Lanham, MD, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 171-194. 
Young, O. R., L. A. King, et al., Eds. (2008). Institutions and environmental 
change : principal findings, applications, and research frontiers. 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Yu, M.-J. (2005). "The achievement and problems of 10 years of Local 
Agenda 21 movement (in Korean) " City and Poverty (Dosi-wa 
Bingon) 75: 1-16. 
 
 
338 
 
Appendix I: The design and the results of the attitude survey on the 
urban water partnerships’ outcomes 
 
Table A1-1 Attitude questionnaire form 
Questions 1 2 3 4 5 
Q: To what extent are you satisfied with the 
partnership outcomes?  
     
Q: To what degree, would you agree with the 
achievement on the each element of your 
partnership outcomes shown below? 
     
 Improved ecological conditions 
Improved water quantity 
Improved water quality 
Mutual understandings 
Learning and change beyond the original group:  
- Expansion of the partnership 
- More application in other fields 
Changes in attitudes, behaviours, institutions & 
practices: Citizen awareness 
Cultural and professional gaps among members 
High transactional costs  
Trust building 
(capacity for) conflict management 
     
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
Table A1-2 Respondents with affiliated member information in urban partnerships 
Background of members 
Jeonju Busan Incheon 
Committee Survey Committee Survey Committee Survey 
Central government       
River basin authority       
Local government 6 5 3 1 2 6 
Local councillors 2 - 3 -   
Public research and education   2 2   
Public Owned Corporation -  -    
City-based NGOs 6 1 5 3 2 1 
Residential group -  8 5 1 2 
Private research and 
education 
- 1 8 2 4  
Private organisation   1    
PCLA21 - 1 1 1  1 
Water partnership *2  *2  1 1 
Sub-total 
(Response rate, %) 
14 
8 
(57%) 
31 
14 
(45%) 
16 
11 
(69%) 
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Table A1-3 Scoring on Satisfaction with each partnership in the Likert scale: urban water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 0 1 5 2 
(percentage)  - .0% 12.5% 62.5% 25.0% 
Busan  - 2 7 3 2 
(percentage)  - 14.3% 50.0% 21.4% 14.3% 
Incheon  - 1 3 6 1 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 27.3% 54.5% 9.1% 
Sub total  - 3 11 14 5 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 33.3% 42.4% 15.2% 
 
Table A1-4 Scoring on Mutual understanding in the Likert scale: urban water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 0 1 6 1 
(percentage)  - .0% 12.5% 75.0% 12.5% 
Busan  - 2 3 8 1 
(percentage)  - 14.3% 21.4% 57.1% 7.1% 
Incheon  - 1 3 7 0 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 27.3% 63.6% .0% 
Sub total  - 3 7 21 2 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 21.2% 63.6% 6.1% 
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Table A1-5 Scoring on Expansion of the partnership in the Likert scale: urban water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  -  - 0 3 5 
(percentage)  -  - .0% 37.5% 62.5% 
Busan  -  - 0 3 11 
(percentage)  -  - .0% 21.4% 78.6% 
Incheon  -  - 3 2 6 
(percentage)  -  - 27.3% 18.2% 54.5% 
Sub total  -  - 3 8 22 
(percentage)  -  - 9.1% 24.2% 66.7% 
 
Table A1-6 Scoring on More application of partnership in other fields in the Likert scale: 
urban water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 0 0 4 4 
(percentage)  - .0% .0% 50.0% 50.0% 
Busan  - 0 1 6 7 
(percentage)  - .0% 7.1% 42.9% 50.0% 
Incheon  - 1 1 3 6 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 9.1% 27.3% 54.5% 
Sub total  - 1 2 13 17 
(percentage)  - 3.0% 6.1% 39.4% 51.5% 
 
Table A1-7 Scoring on Citizen Awareness in the Likert scale: urban water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 0 0 7 1 
(percentage)  - .0% .0% 87.5% 12.5% 
Busan  - 1 2 9 2 
(percentage)  - 7.1% 14.3% 64.3% 14.3% 
Incheon  - 0 4 5 2 
(percentage)  - .0% 36.4% 45.5% 18.2% 
Sub total  - 1 6 21 5 
(percentage)  - 3.0% 18.2% 63.6% 15.2% 
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Table A1-8 Scoring on Cultural & professional gaps among members in the Likert scale: 
urban water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju 0 2 2 2 2 
(percentage) .0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
Busan 2 6 3 3 0 
(percentage) 14.3% 42.9% 21.4% 21.4% .0% 
Incheon 0 5 4 2 0 
(percentage) .0% 45.5% 36.4% 18.2% .0% 
Sub total 2 13 9 7 2 
(percentage) 6.1% 39.4% 27.3% 21.2% 6.1% 
 
Table A1-9 Scoring on Transactional costs in the Likert scale: urban water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju 1 3 0 2 2 
(percentage) 12.5% 37.5% .0% 25.0% 25.0% 
Busan 0 6 3 3 1 
(percentage) .0% 46.2% 23.1% 23.1% 7.7% 
Incheon 0 2 2 5 2 
(percentage) .0% 18.2% 18.2% 45.5% 18.2% 
Sub total 1 11 5 10 5 
(percentage) 3.1% 34.4% 15.6% 31.3% 15.6% 
 
Table A1-10 Scoring on Ecosystem improvement in the Likert scale: urban water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 0 0 6 2 
(percentage)  - .0% .0% 75.0% 25.0% 
Busan  - 3 8 2 1 
(percentage)  - 21.4% 57.1% 14.3% 7.1% 
Incheon  - 2 2 1 0 
(percentage)  - 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% .0% 
Sub total  - 5 10 9 3 
(percentage)  - 18.5% 37.0% 33.3% 11.1% 
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Table A1-11 Scoring on Water quantity improvement in the Likert scale: urban water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 2 4 2 0 
(percentage)  - 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% .0% 
Busan  - 4 6 3 1 
(percentage)  - 28.6% 42.9% 21.4% 7.1% 
Incheon  - 2 1 2 0 
(percentage)  - 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% .0% 
Sub total  - 8 11 7 1 
(percentage)  - 29.6% 40.7% 25.9% 3.7% 
 
Table A1-12 Scoring on Water quality improvement in the Likert scale: urban water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 0 0 5 3 
(percentage)  - .0% .0% 62.5% 37.5% 
Busan  - 3 6 4 1 
(percentage)  - 21.4% 42.9% 28.6% 7.1% 
Incheon  - 2 2 1 0 
(percentage)  - 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% .0% 
Sub total  - 5 8 10 4 
(percentage)  - 18.5% 29.6% 37.0% 14.8% 
 
Table A1-13 Scoring on Trust building in the Likert scale: urban water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  -  - 0 4 4 
(percentage)  -  - .0% 50.0% 50.0% 
Busan  -  - 4 8 2 
(percentage)  -  - 28.6% 57.1% 14.3% 
Incheon  -  - 2 9 0 
(percentage)  -  - 18.2% 81.8% .0% 
Sub total  -  - 6 21 6 
(percentage)  -  - 18.2% 63.6% 18.2% 
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Table A1-14 Scoring on Conflict management in the Likert scale: urban water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jeonju  - 0 1 6 1 
(percentage)  - .0% 12.5% 75.0% 12.5% 
Busan  - 2 7 4 1 
(percentage)  - 14.3% 50.0% 28.6% 7.1% 
Incheon  - 1 3 6 1 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 27.3% 54.5% 9.1% 
Sub total  - 3 11 16 3 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 33.3% 48.5% 9.1% 
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Appendix II: The activities of the urban partnerships 
Table A2-1 the Maintenance agenda after the completion of restoration project 
○ To boost up citizen movement on river rehabilitation: Organising Love Jeonju 
River Group and web pages operation, Encourage participation of NGOs to river maintenance and NGOs' operation of River ecology school 
○ Regular monitoring on water quality and ecosystem in the Rivers 
○ Marketing the character of natural monument fish, Shiri, found in the River 
○ Creating nature learning facilities 
○ Promotion to accommodate Annual River Day event and other academic 
conferences  
○ Building Task Force Team to lead more integrated Jeonju River management 
plan 
Source: Interview #J2, 2005 
 
Table A2-2 Partnership activities on education and monitoring in Jeonju  
○ Publication of the partnership’s achievement organisationally and personally by 
several members 
○ web page running and regular monitoring the River conducted by the CA21 
(NGO) and the Regional Research Centre at the Jeonbuk Nat’l Univ.;  
○ Regular monitoring and education programme led by the Jeonju PCLA21 and 
Water watch movement made of selected 10 NGOs supported by the city 
government, utilising the 5 million KRW per year from the Geum River basin fund 
since 2004  
○ Information exchange with other RBOs at the nationwide River Day host in 
2006. 
Source: Interviews with partnership members (Interview #J1 and J2); the minutes and 
documents, 2005 
 
Table A2-3 Details of negotiation results in the Jeonju River Restoration project 
 Existed plan Agreed plan 
Title  Jeonju River Park Plan Jeonju River Restoration 
Project 
How to secure the 
instream flow 
Supply by pumping the 
downstream water with the 
upstream water 
Supply by the upstream 
water 
How to treat the 
branch, Guwha-cheon 
Reverse contact 
oxidisation treatment  
Separated rainfall and 
sewage collection system 
Land use in the 
waterfront 
Waterfront leisure park and 
piers 
To minimise land use in 
the waterfront and more 
focused on ecosystem 
rehabilitation  
How to build the 
rubber beam in the 
Hanbeok  
Additional rubber 
beam(1.5m) to the existing 
one(1.5m) 
Additional rubber 
beam(0.8m) to the existing 
one(1.5m) 
Source: Jeonju PCLA21 (2000), ‘the main achievement of Jeonju PCLA21’, Pureun 
Ongoeul 21, Vol. 1, Sept. 2000, p.8. 
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Table A2-4 Financial support of local authorities for metropolitan partnerships 
Source: Environmental Policy Division, Busan, 2003; the general assembly report, Busan 
water partnership 2005; the Gulpocheon Network web pages, http://gulpo.net/ and; 
Performance Report of the Incheon water partnership, 2005.  
 
- Busan Met City provided 30 million KRW  to fund the partnership for 
saving river campaigns, and assisting the maintenance and administration 
of the partnership itself in the first year, 2003. The budget has increased 
to more than two times up to 80 million in 2004 partly because the 
partnership hosted the nationwide conference about river saving research 
and campaigns, the River Forum.  
- In the case of Incheon, as a bylaw-supported organisation, the 
partnership’s activities are fully funded by city government. The bylaw 
stipulates the city government’s support for partnership expense should 
be eligible as city government’s grant provision standards (The 2nd 
paragraph of the Clause 18). In 2005, the annual budget reached 90 
million KRW, which was divided by administrative costs of 60 million and 
programme costs of 30 million KRW.  
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Table A2-5 Chronology of Jeonju River partnership 
Time Events 
Jul. ‘98 
 
Dec. ’98 ~ Oct. 
‘99  
Apr. ‘00 
 
May ~ Aug. ‘00 
 
 
Aug. ‘00 
 
‘00~’01 
Jan. ‘03 
Apr. ‘04 
 
City hall announced the draft of ‘Jeonju River Park 
Plan’ 
Public consultation: two Audits & a citizen survey 
conducted 
Construction began  
Debates between Mayor and NGOs with local 
academics led to a stop in the construction 
GO-NGO cooperative commission (Jeonju River 
partnership) organised : six civilian, two city council 
MPs59, six public officers  
Partnership hosted 50 meetings with citizens  
Restoration project completed 
City hall, with 5 million KRW granted by Geum River 
Basin Fund & Environmental Conservation Fund, 
started ‘Water Watch’ programme with 10 local NGOs  
 
 
                                               
59 The governments in Korea are formed under presidential system The local councils in Korea are 
independent from the local governments because the central and local governments in Korea are 
formed as in contrast to the parliamentary system in the U.K.  
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Table A2-6 Chronology of Busan and Incheon water partnerships 
Busan Time Incheon 
- Feb.  The Alliance of Local 
NGOs for rehabilitating 
Rivers (Busan River Alliance, 
BRA) established 
- Sept/Dec. Co-Workshops 
between BRA & City officials 
produced 10 agreements on 
the city Rivers 
2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Jan, BRA, published a 
participatory research project 
(2002), ‘Status of Busan 
Rivers’, funded by LA21 
- Mar, Pre-committee to 
create the partnership 
- May, the partnership 
created  
2003 - Mar, Mayor ordered plan 
on how to improve Incheon 
Rivers after joining the 
event at the Seung-ggi 
River“ 
- Apr, a city council MP 
proposed organising a 
taskforce team about the 
Seung-ggi River 
- May, Mayor announced 
the master plan for Incheon 
Rivers 
- Jul, Pre-committee formed 
to create the partnership 
- Sept, partnership created 
Rehabilitation projects 
underway  
2006 
present 
Rehabilitation projects 
underway 
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Appendix III: The results of the attitude survey on the regional water 
partnerships’ outcomes 
 
Table A3-1 Respondents with affiliated member information in regional water 
partnerships 
Background of members 
Daecheong Paldang Gyeongnam 
Committee Survey Committee Survey Committee Survey 
Central government - - 1 4 -  
River basin authority 1 - 2 1 1 1 
Local government 13 4 8 8 1 1 
Local councillors - - -  1 - 
Public research and 
education 
- - -  1 1 
Public Owned Corporation 3 2 -  1 1 
City-based NGOs 7 6 -  3 2 
Residential group - - 8 2   
Private research and 
education 
3 2 -  6 3 
Private organisation - - -    
PCLA21 - - -  1  
Partnership staffs 5 3 2 1 *1 1 
Sub-total 
(Response rate, %) 
32 
17 
(53%) 
21 
16 
(76%) 
15 
11 
(63%) 
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Table A3-2 Scoring on Satisfaction with each partnership in the Likert scale: regional 
water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong 2 1 5 6 3 
(percentage) 11.8% 5.9% 29.4% 35.3% 17.6% 
Paldang 0 4 7 5 0 
(percentage) .0% 25.0% 43.8% 31.3% .0% 
Gyeongnam 0 1 1 9 0 
(percentage) .0% 9.1% 9.1% 81.8% .0% 
Sub total 2 6 13 20 3 
(percentage) 4.5% 13.6% 29.5% 45.5% 6.8% 
 
Table A3-3 Scoring on Mutual understanding in the Likert scale: regional water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong  - 1 5 11 0 
(percentage)  - 5.9% 29.4% 64.7% .0% 
Paldang  - 1 3 10 2 
(percentage)  - 6.3% 18.8% 62.5% 12.5% 
Gyeongnam  - 1 5 4 1 
(percentage)  - 9.1% 45.5% 36.4% 9.1% 
Sub total  - 3 13 25 3 
(percentage)  - 6.8% 29.5% 56.8% 6.8% 
 
Table A3-4 Scoring on Expansion of the partnership in the Likert scale: regional water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong  - 0 0 10 7 
(percentage)  - .0% .0% 58.8% 41.2% 
Paldang  - 1 0 4 11 
(percentage)  - 6.3% .0% 25.0% 68.8% 
Gyeongnam  - 0 1 2 8 
(percentage)  - .0% 9.1% 18.2% 72.7% 
Sub total  - 1 1 16 26 
(percentage)  - 2.3% 2.3% 36.4% 59.1% 
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Table A3-5 Scoring on More application of partnership in other fields in the Likert scale: 
regional water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong  - 0 2 8 7 
(percentage)  - .0% 11.8% 47.1% 41.2% 
Paldang  - 2 3 7 4 
(percentage)  - 12.5% 18.8% 43.8% 25.0% 
Gyeongnam  - 0 0 4 7 
(percentage)  - .0% .0% 36.4% 63.6% 
Sub total  - 2 5 19 18 
(percentage)  - 4.5% 11.4% 43.2% 40.9% 
 
Table A3-6 Scoring on Citizen Awareness in the Likert scale: regional water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong  - 0 5 10 2 
(percentage)  - .0% 29.4% 58.8% 11.8% 
Paldang  - 2 3 10 1 
(percentage)  - 12.5% 18.8% 62.5% 6.3% 
Gyeongnam  - 0 2 7 2 
(percentage)  - .0% 18.2% 63.6% 18.2% 
Sub total  - 2 10 27 5 
(percentage)  - 4.5% 22.7% 61.4% 11.4% 
 
 
Table A3-7 Scoring on Cultural & professional gaps among members in the Likert scale: 
regional water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong 3 9 4 1  - 
(percentage) 17.6% 52.9% 23.5% 5.9%  - 
Paldang 4 9 2 1  - 
(percentage) 25.0% 56.3% 12.5% 6.3%  - 
Gyeongnam 2 5 3 1  - 
(percentage) 18.2% 45.5% 27.3% 9.1%  - 
Sub total 9 23 9 3  - 
(percentage) 20.5% 52.3% 20.5% 6.8%  - 
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Table A3-8 Scoring on Transactional costs in the Likert scale: regional water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong 1 11 3 1 1 
(percentage) 5.9% 64.7% 17.6% 5.9% 5.9% 
Paldang 0 2 3 10 1 
(percentage) .0% 12.5% 18.8% 62.5% 6.3% 
Gyeongnam 2 4 3 2 0 
(percentage) 18.2% 36.4% 27.3% 18.2% .0% 
Sub total 3 17 9 13 2 
(percentage) 6.8% 38.6% 20.5% 29.5% 4.5% 
 
Table A3-9 Scoring on Ecosystem improvement in the Likert scale: regional water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong  - 2 6 8 1 
(percentage)  - 11.8% 35.3% 47.1% 5.9% 
Paldang  - 2 9 5 0 
(percentage)  - 12.5% 56.3% 31.3% .0% 
Gyeongnam  - 3 5 3 0 
(percentage)  - 27.3% 45.5% 27.3% .0% 
Sub total  - 7 20 16 1 
(percentage)  - 15.9% 45.5% 36.4% 2.3% 
 
Table A3-10 Scoring on Water quantity improvement in the Likert scale: regional water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong 2 3 6 4 2 
(percentage) 11.8% 17.6% 35.3% 23.5% 11.8% 
Paldang 1 5 7 3 0 
(percentage) 6.3% 31.3% 43.8% 18.8% .0% 
Gyeongnam 0 4 7 0 0 
(percentage) .0% 36.4% 63.6% .0% .0% 
Sub total 3 12 20 7 2 
(percentage) 6.8% 27.3% 45.5% 15.9% 4.5% 
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Table A3-11 Scoring on Water quality improvement in the Likert scale: regional water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong  - 2 6 7 2 
(percentage)  - 11.8% 35.3% 41.2% 11.8% 
Paldang  - 2 8 6 0 
(percentage)  - 12.5% 50.0% 37.5% .0% 
Gyeongnam  - 3 4 4 0 
(percentage)  - 27.3% 36.4% 36.4% .0% 
Sub total  - 7 18 17 2 
(percentage)  - 15.9% 40.9% 38.6% 4.5% 
 
Table A3-12 Scoring on Trust building in the Likert scale: regional water partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong  - 0 3 9 5 
(percentage)  - .0% 17.6% 52.9% 29.4% 
Paldang  - 3 5 8 0 
(percentage)  - 18.8% 31.3% 50.0% .0% 
Gyeongnam  - 0 2 8 1 
(percentage)  - .0% 18.2% 72.7% 9.1% 
Sub total  - 3 10 25 6 
(percentage)  - 6.8% 22.7% 56.8% 13.6% 
 
Table A3-13 Scoring on Conflict management in the Likert scale: regional water 
partnerships 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Daecheong 1 4 4 8 0 
(percentage) 5.9% 23.5% 23.5% 47.1% .0% 
Paldang 1 5 6 3 1 
(percentage) 6.3% 31.3% 37.5% 18.8% 6.3% 
Gyeongnam 0 2 6 3 0 
(percentage) .0% 18.2% 54.5% 27.3% .0% 
Sub total 2 11 16 14 1 
(percentage) 4.5% 25.0% 36.4% 31.8% 2.3% 
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Table A3-14 Process-related outcomes in the Likert scale (median) 
 
Mutual 
understanding 
Expansi
on 
More 
application 
Citizen 
awarenes
s 
Gap
s 
Cos
t 
Jeonju 4.00 5.00 4.50 4.00 3.50 3.00 
Busan 4.00 5.00 4.50 4.00 2.00 3.00 
Incheon 4.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 
Urban  4.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 
Daecheon
g 
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 
Paldang 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 
Gyeongna
m 
3.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 
Regional  4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 
 
 
Table A3-15 Environmental outcomes in the Likert scale (median) 
Assessment Criteria  Ecology  Water quantity Water quality 
Jeonju 4.00 4.00 3.00 
Busan 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Incheon 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Urban 3.00 4.00 3.00 
Daecheong 4.00 3.00 4.00 
Paldang 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Gyeongnam 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Regional 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 
Table A3-16 Socio-economic outcomes in the Likert scale (median) 
Assessment Criteria  Trust building  Conflict resolution 
Jeonju 4.50 4.00 
Busan 4.00 3.00 
Incheon 4.00 4.00 
Urban 4.00 4.00 
Daecheong 4.00 3.00 
Paldang 3.50 3.00 
Gyeongnam 4.00 3.00 
Regional 4.00 3.00 
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Appendix IV: The activities of the regional partnerships 
Table A4-1 The composition of the Paldang partnership 
- The first layer with representative function comprises 6 co-heads: Vice minister 
of the Environment, Vice governor of Gyeonggi Province, 1 representative of 
county mayors, 1 representative of local council chairpersons, 2 representative 
of local residents, which meets once or twice a year (Interview #P3).  
- The second layer is the Working group that actually operates the partnership. It 
is composed of 20 members: the MoE manager of water policy section, the 
manager of watershed planning section & the manager of local co-operation 
section at the Han River Basin Environmental Office, water supply and sanitation 
section manager at the Gyeonggi Province, managers at 7 counties, chief 
executive officer & policy supervisor at the Council and 7 resident 
representatives. Along with the working group, permanent office hires four full 
time staff: chief executive officer & policy supervisor, two research fellows and 
one administrative assistant (council service worker). In addition, an, ad-hoc 
taskforce team is organisable if appropriate.  
 
Table A4-2 Annual Key Programmes endorsed through the General Assembly 
 Year  Programmes 
2002 
Branches' activities stressing on Save Water campaigns & participatory 
water quality monitoring programmes 
Grant allocation to member organisations through application procedure. 
2003 
Branches’ activities stressing the Interchange programme & Save Water 
campaign 
Policy subcommittee: monitoring and solution for water quality 
improvement, writing Local Agenda 21 for Daecheong Lake  
Research & Investigation subcommittee: water quality research, 
ecosystem education programme 
2004 
Pilot projects of river restoration  
Local Agenda 21 for Daecheong Lake  
Interchange between Cities and Villages in the Lake Basin (led by 
Daejeon-Chungnam Green Korea) 
2005* 
Capacity building and enhancing amenity of communities in the 
upstream villages 
Monitoring water quality improvement in the Lake 
Interchange between Cities and Villages in the Lake Basin 
*: Programmes were just planned then at the time of data collection in 2005.  
Source: Reports for Annual General Assembly in 2003, 2004, 2005, respectively.  
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Table A4-3 Selected key programmes and themes in the 1st and 2nd GWFs 
Events Key programmes 
The 1st 
GWF 
held in 
2004 
Keynote speech: Nakdong River and Water in Gyeongnam 
Theme1: Water demand & supply:  
- Foreign Cases in Demand Management 
- Long-term Water Demand in Nakdong Basin 
Theme 2: Wastewater and Sewage Treatment 
- Small-scaled sewage treatment in rural areas  
Theme 3: Drinking water provision 
- how to solve water loss  
Theme 4: Integrated Coastal Management and water quality 
conservation 
- Eutrophication of upper level in the sediment of South Sea  
The 
2nd 
GWF 
held in 
2005 
Keynote speech: Is Water enough in Gyeongnam?  
Theme1: Water policy 
- How to do IRBM? 
- The impacts of Air pollution drops to water quality 
Theme 2: How to build Eco Cities with sustainable Water Usage 
- Nonpoint source management in cities 
Theme 3 & 4: Water Service: tap water and sewage 
- Design and operation of purification facilities to meet treatment 
standard  
Theme 5: Coast  
Theme 6: Rivers 
- Nature-typed river clean-up projects in Gyeongnam  
Source: Organisation Committee for Gyeongnam Water Forum (2004; 2005) 
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Figure A4-1 The information warehouse web pages of the Daecheong partnership 
(captured in Dec. 2008) 
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Appendix V: Summary of the twelve valued-scaled questions in the 
survey of 77 water partnership members 
Water partnerships 
 outcomes 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sum 
 (M) 
Mean SD 
Improved 
ecological 
condition 
- 12 30 25 4 71 (6) 3.3 0.818 
Improved water 
quality 
- 12 26 27 6 71 (6) 3.38 0.868 
Improved water 
quantity 
3 20 31 14 3 71 (6) 2.92 0.906 
Mutual 
understanding 
- 6 20 46 5 77 3.65 0.721 
Expansion of 
partnership 
- 1 4 24 48 77 4.55 0.66 
More application of 
partnership in 
other fields 
- 3 7 32 35 77 4.29 0.792 
Changes in 
attitudes, 
behaviours, 
institutions & 
practices: Citizen 
awareness 
- 3 16 48 10 77 3.84 0.689 
Cultural/profession
al gap 
11 36 18 10 2 77 2.43 0.979 
High transactional 
cost 
4 28 14 23 7 76 (1) 3.01 1.125 
Trust building - 3 16 46 12 77 3.87 0.714 
Conflict 
management 
2 14 27 30 4 77 3.26 0.909 
Strongly disagree =1, Disagree =2, Neutral =3, Agree =4, Strongly Agree =5; M: 
Missing data and; SD: Standard Deviation 
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Appendix VI: the list of abbreviations used in the thesis 
 
KOWACO Korean Water Corporation, recently changed to K-Water in 2008 
MOE Ministry of Environment 
MOCT Ministry of Construction and Transportation, recently changed to 
Ministry of Land Transport and Maritime Affairs (MoLAMA) in 2009 
PMO Prime Minister’s Office 
PCSD Presidential Committee for Sustainable Development (~2008), 
replaced by Presidential Committee for Green Growth since 2009 
 
KFEM Korean federation of Environmental Movement 
CEEJ Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
GWF Gyeongnam Water Forum 
KNRW Korean Network for River and Watersheds 
 
SOE Socially owned enterprise 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
IAD framework Institutional analysis and development framework 
LA21 Local Agenda 21 
 
 
 
